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ABSTRACT
Moral theories on abortion are often regarded as mutually exclusive. On the one hand,
pro-life advocates maintain that abortion is always morally wrong, for life is sacred
from its very beginning. On the other hand, the extreme liberal view advocated by the
absolute pro-ehoieers claims that the unborn is not a person and has no moral
standing. On this view there is no conflict of rights; women have the right to dispose
of their body as they wish. Therefore, killing a non-person is always permissible. In
between the two extreme views, some moral philosophers argue that a 'pre-sentient'
embryo or fetus cannot be harmed because it lacks the ability to feel pain or pleasure,
for it is 'sentience' that endows a living entity (human and non-human) with moral
considerability. Therefore, abortion of a pre-sentient embryo or fetus is permissible.
Neurophilosophy rests a philosophical conclusion on neurological premises. In other
words, to be tenable sentientism - the claim that sentience endows an entity with
moral standing - needs robust neurobiological evidence. The question is, then: What is
the basic neuroanatomical and neurophysiological apparatus required to be sentient?
The answer to that question requires a fair understanding of the evolution, anatomy
and function of the brain. The exploration thereof shows quite convincingly that the
advocates of sentientism do not provide convincing arguments to root their theory in
neurobiological facts. Their claims rest rather on emotions and on behaviours that
look like a reaction to pain. The other shortcoming of sentientism is that it fails to
distinguish pain from suffering, and that as a utilitarian moral theory it considers only
the alleged pain of the aborted sentient fetus and disregards the pregnant woman's
pain and suffering. And, finally, sentientism leaves out of our moral consideration
living and non-living entities that deserve moral respect.
The main thrust of the dissertation is that the argument of sentience as its advocates
present it has no neurophilosophical grounds. Therefore, the argument from sentience
is not a convincing argument in favour or against abortion.
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OPSOMMING
Morele teorieë wat handeloor aborsie word dikwels as wedersyds uitsluitend
beskou. "Pro-life" kampvegters hou oor die algemeen vol dat aborsie onder alle
omstandighede moreel veroordeelbaar is, omdat die lewe van meet af heilig is.
Daarteenoor hou die ekstreem-liberale oogpunt, wat deur "Pro-choice" voorstaanders
ingeneem word, vol dat die ongeborene nie 'n persson is nie, en as sulks geen morele
status het nie. Volgens hierdie standpunt is daar geen konflik van regte hier ter sprake
nie; vroue het uitsluitelike beskikkingsreg oor hulle eie liggame. Dus is dit toelaatbaar
om onder hierdie omstandighede 'n "nie-persoon" om die lewe te bring. Tussen
hierdie twee ekstreme standpunte argumenteer party morele filosowe dat die voor-
bewuste embrio of fetus nie skade berokken kan word nie, omdat dit nie oor die
vermoë beskik om pyn of plesier te voel nie. Dit is juis bewussyn en die vermoë om
waar te neem wat morele status aan 'n entiteit (hetsy menslik of nie-menslik) verleen.
Dus is dit toelaatbaar om 'n voorbewustw embrio of fetus te aborteer.
Neurofilosofie basseer filosofiese gevolgtrekkinge op neurolgiese beginsels. Met
andere woorde, so 'n standpunt sal eis dat 'n argument oor bewustheid op betroubare
neurologiese feite gebasseer word, om sodoende met sekerheid morele status, al dan
nie, aan de fetus of embrio toe te ken. Die vraag is dan: Wat is die basiese neuro-
anatomiese en neurofiologiese apparatuur waaroor 'n entiteit moet beskik om as
bewus beskou te word? Die antwoord op hierdie vraag vereis dan ook 'n redelik
grondige kennis van die evolusie, anatomie en funksie van die brein. Wanneer die
vraagstuk van naderby beskou word, word dit duidelik dat voorstaanders van die
bewustheids-argument oor die algemeen nie hulle standpunte op oortuigende,
neurologiese feite berus nie. Hulle beweringe rus dan eerder op emosie en op
waargenome optredes wat voorkom asof dit 'n reaksie op pyn is. Nog 'n tekortkoming
van die bewustheids-argument is dat dit nie 'n onderskeid tref tussen die konsep van
pyn en die van leiding nie, en dat dit as 'n utilitaristiese morele teorie slegs die
beweerde pyn van die ge-aborteerde fetus in ag neem en nie die leiding van die
swanger vrouw nie. Ten slotte neem die bewustheids-argument ook nie morele status
van lewende en nie-lewende entiete, wat geregtig is op morele respek, in ag nie.
Die hoof uitgangspunt van hierdie dissertasie is dan dat die bewustheids-argument,
soos wat dit tans deur voorstanders daarvan voorgehou word, nie neurofilosfies
begrond kan word nie. Dus is die argument vanuit 'n bewustheids-standpunt nie 'n
oortuigende argument hetsy vir of teen aborsie nie.
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Dedication
To Donna
All our sorrow is real, but the atoms of which we are made are
indifferent
George Santayana
The word 'pain' has its etymological home in 'poena' or 'punishment'
Elaine Scarry
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11 Introduction
Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part
through its unsharability, and it ensures its
unsharability through its resistance to
language ... The human attempt to reverse the de-
objectifying work of pain by forcing pain itself
into avenues of objectification is a project laden
with practical and ethical consequences.
Elaine Scarry (1985: 4, 6)
The ethical dilemma of abortion hinges on two main issues: the moral standing
of the unborn, and women's right to self-determination. Therefore, most moral
theories on abortion usually take a stance only on either of the two. Pro-life advocates
have a general tendency to dwell on the moral standing of the unborn. Said moral
standing is claimed to result from the possession of personhood (actual or potential),
or from the claim that a God-given soul inhabits the unborn from the time of
conception. In either case, this moral standing ascribes an inalienable right to life.
Pro-choice activists are more prone to insist on women's rights. The debate, then, is
more about conflicting rights, personal character, embodiment, and situatedness. On
these views, the moral standing of the unborn takes a backseat.
These are extreme positions on abortion. In reality, however, very few people
do actually go along with a die-hard, rigid, dogmatic pro-choice or pro-life stance.
The former would sound repulsive and at odds with common-sense morality, and the
latter would appear too intolerant (e.g., in the case of rape). The spectrum between the
two antipodean positions comprises a series of "softer" views that make allowance for
exceptions. One of these intermediate stances is the claim that sentience - the capacity
to feel pain and pleasure - is the criterion of moral standing. A sentient entity has
moral standing; a non-sentient or a pre-sentient (that has not yet acquired the capacity
to feel) being has no moral considerability. In the context of moral standing of a
sentient being, the main emphasis is placed on the sentient being's interest/right not to
be inflicted pain. Opinions diverge whether it stops there, or whether sentience also
ascribes a right to life.
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2The abortion issue is very sensitive and often extremely emotional. The
legalisation of abortion has, in many countries, been received with mixed feelings.
Matters of life and death capture the public's attention and stir up its emotions, often
in opposite directions. The current debates on physician-assisted suicide are another
testimony illustrating the potential conflict of opinions and emotions. We cannot
escape from having emotions, but this should not preclude a careful analysis of the
arguments pro or con an ethical dilemma. This is the scope of this essay. The thesis I
wish to defend is that the argument from sentience, as its advocates present it, is not a
convincing criterion for the ascription of moral standing. The arguments underpinning
my position are the following: 1) the concept of sentience used by utilitarians in the
sense of the ability to sense or to perceive a stimulus that produces pain or pleasure
does not do justice to the concept of the ability to suffer, which needs no physical
injury but the faculty of introspection, of self-consciousness; 2) mere sentience is
possible with a coarse neural equipment (e.g., nonhuman sentient animals, and
perhaps human embryos or early fetuses), whereas suffering requires a much more
elaborate nervous system (e.g. the paradigm person, and perhaps apes and cetaceans);
and 3) first and foremost, premises 1) and 2) must rest on neuroscientifically
convincing evidence. Neurophilosophy rests its philosophical case on substantiated
neuroscientific evidence, and not on emotions.
Chapter 2 presents the historical background in which the abortion issue has
evolved to what it is today. Most striking is the fact that a serious debate on abortion
did start only with the beginning of the nineteenth-century. From the times of West em
Antiquity until the eighteenth-century abortion was not seen as morally reprehensible
or legally indictable; it was a private matter. It seems that various circumstances and
events occurring during the nineteenth-century brought abortion to the attention of the
Law, the medical profession, and the Church. Abortion came under control of these
respective bodies, at the expense of women's former privacy and rights.
The Civil Rights movements in the United States and pro-choice feminism
were instrumental in changing attitudes towards abortion in the second half of the
twentieth-century. It was in that context that Judith Jarvis Thomson, Mary Anne
Warren, Baruch Brody, L. Wayne Sumner, Michael Tooley, and later, Bonnie
Steinbock - to mention only the most influential writers on abortion - wrote their
papers (which became classics in the field). At the same time, Aldo Leopold and Peter
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3Singer brought environmental issues and animal rights to the fore. A link arose
between animal rights and the argument from sentience against inflicting pain to
sentient entities. Post-threshold fetuses - that is, sentient fetuses - should not be
inflicted the pain that results from abortion. Conversely, it is claimed that pre-sentient
embryos/fetuses and insensate living entities do not possess moral standing; nothing
matters to them.
As could be expected, the revitalised awareness of matters of life and death, in
its broadest sense, triggered off a multitude of often diverging ethical theories. For
some nostalgic of the past, this appeared like a Tower of Babel of incomprehensible
moral languages underscored by a loss of moral fibre. For others, it was a re-
enchantment. The main point of this overview is to illustrate the complexity of ethics,
and more specifically of the abortion debate. It will, hopefully, show that there is
more to it than the feud between pro-lifers and pro-choicers.
Chapter 3 investigates the claims made by three moral philosophers (Brody,
Sumner, and Steinbock) that neuroscientific evidence indicates that the embryo/fetus
exhibits some brain function that endows it with moral standing and the right to life.
This is in contrast with Tooley's claim that the unborn (and even the infant) does not
possess any sufficient brain function that could ascribe a right to life; hence, even
infanticide is permissible.
Brody's thesis is that the embryo's brain functions since brain waves can be
recorded with an electroencephalograph (EEG). Since a functioning brain is what
makes a human being human (with an inalienable right to life), it follows that an
embryo with a functioning brain has a right to life. I will argue that the problem with
Brody's argument is that the claimed brain function is unsubstantiated.
Sumner's argument states that sentience is the criterion of moral standing. All
sentient beings (human and nonhuman) have a right to life. Pre-sentient beings - that
is, the embryo/fetus in the first half of pregnancy (it is unsure how far down the
animal kingdom sentience is possessed) - have no moral standing and no right to life.
How do we know whether an entity is sentient or pre-sentient? It depends, says
Sumner, on the structure of its brain. I will argue that, like with Brody's argument,
Sumner's neuroscientific argument is scientifically weak.
Tooley acknowledges that a sentient being, human or non-human, has a right
not to be inflicted pain. Sentience, however, does not, in his opinion, ascribe the right
to life. To possess the right to life, or any right for that matter, one must be able to
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4desire the content of that right. This requires the possession of a concept of time, past
and future - a concept of self as a continuing subject of experience. The unborn and
the infant, he argues, lack this concept. It follows that they have no right to life. How
do we know that unborn and infants lack this concept? Because neuroscientific data
indicate that their brain has not acquired the needed connections. Although Tooley's
neuroscientific argument, as it stands, is a bit thin, more recent neurobiological
evidence shows that there is something valid in Tooley's claim.
Steinbock borrows from Brody the argument from brain waves, and from
Sumner the argument from sentience. She tries to build an argument about what she
calls "brain birth". The birth of the brain is, in her opinion, something that can be
demonstrated scientifically (as opposed to sentience that is not a "marker event" since
there is in the middle of pregnancy a gray-area, a transition period from pre-sentience
to sentience). The fact is, however, that what we really do know so far about the
antenatal structure and function of the brain does not indicate that there would be any
marker event in the true sense - a sudden eruption of a fully structured and fully
functioning brain. Although Steinbock does not really acknowledge these facts, she
assumes that the brain is born when the fetus reaches the stage ofviabi1ity.
What is common to these four moral philosophers on abortion is their
ascription of moral standing to the possession of a neurobiological property:
sentience. To posses the ability to feel one needs a certain neural equipment that
perceives sensorily and triggers on a reaction. The onus is on them to prove their
neurophilosophical argument. Or, conversely, the onus is on me to show the
weaknesses of their arguments by showing that their alleged neuroscientific evidence
is neurobiologically ill-informed.
Since they refer to alleged brain waves detectable on the EEG, we have to gain
some insight and understanding of what brain imaging (that includes EEG) is about.
What we currently know about human fetal brain imaging is rather limited.
Concerning more specifically the fetal EEG, it is established that at thirty weeks non-
REM (rapid eye movement) sleep patterns can be recorded, and that at thirty-six
weeks a REM sleep pattern is present. This proves that the fetus has the ability to
sleep (!). However, it does not indicate that the fetal brain is just hibernating; evidence
suggests that fetal sleep does contribute to the preparation of the basic neural circuitry
of the brain. The connections within the circuitry will have to await birth to be
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5switched-on and to increase gradually. This is very different from Brody's claim about
brain waves.
Chapter 4 goes in more neurobiological details. First, some information is
given about the brain of lower and higher vertebrates. This is followed by a survey of
the main steps in the intrauterine development of the human brain. Then follows an
overview of the main role players, structural and functional, of the mature human
brain. Although this chapter is rather technical, it fits into the whole context of
showing the complexity of embryogenesis and of brain function (against the
background of an oversimplified concept of sentience).
Having made some preliminary inroads into the neurosciences to refute the
arguments presented by the moral philosophers, we need to become better acquainted
with brain structure and function, and how this has been shaped by evolution. This is
the topic of Chapter 5. The nineteenth-century witnessed the birth of theories of
evolution, of genetics and heredity, of clinical neurology and neuroanatomy. An
attempt to integrate all these important acquisitions gave rise to the neurosciences.
Chapter 5 takes us through the evolution of the brain, a short overview of the
two main theories of the mind (functionalism and connectionism), basic
neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, and the concept of brain maps. The aim of what
might appear too technical is to provide a glimpse on the complexity of the brain.
Neurophilosophy is about making a philosophical argument based on neuroscientific
premises. If the neuroscientific premises are shaky and unsubstantiated, the
philosophical conclusion does not follow. Chapter 3 has shown that no robust
evidence does substantiate the claimed moral considerability attributed to the presence
of an allegedly functioning brain. The argument from sentience suffers from the same
shortcomings.
Chapter 6 explores the moral philosophical argument from sentience. Sumner
sees sentience as a matter of degree: a primitive sentience and a developed sentience
(although he attributes the same moral considerability to both). The former would
seem to be equivalent to Edelman's concept of "primary consciousness" (or
awareness), and the latter equivalent to his concept of "higher-order consciousness"
(or self-awareness). The distinction between the two rests on neurobiological facts,
and the evidence presented by Sumner is unconvincing. The problem is that Sumner
seems to fail to see that primitive sentience (the mere ability to feel) is something very
different from developed sentience - that is, the ability of introspecting one's mental
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6states (to possess qualia). It might not really matter as a purely philosophical
argument to ascribe a right to life to all sentient beings; in practice, however, it leads
to the challenge of the commandment thou shalt not kill, ever. The best alternative, in
my view, to the untenable principle of sanctity of life seems to be the principle of
respect for life, as Albert Schweitzer proposed it. There are unavoidable and
inescapable limits to the principle of sanctity of life; it may happen that death will be
the best option.
Peter Singer's sentientism - the ascription of moral standing to sentience
unlike Sumner, does not link sentience and the right to life. It ascribes only the right
not to be inflicted pain. As a utilitarian, he claims that it is a sentient being's interest
to experience pleasure and to avoid pain. To be sentient, he claims, is roughly
equivalent to being "self-conscious". Now, one may argue (with Edelman) that
consciousness (primary consciousness) is not the same as self-consciousness or self-
awareness (higher-order consciousness, with a concept of time, past and present, the
ability to introspect, etc.), and that the structure and function of the brain that allows
the former does not allow the latter. Although Singer does not dwell on
neuroscientific facts, he does make questionable arguments from analogy between the
brains of birds, cetaceans, apes, and humans.
Steinbock claims that what matters to sentient beings is how you treat them.
She does acknowledge that the ability to feel pain is something different from highly
developed cognitive states (higher-order consciousness/self-awareness) such as
emotions. There is, however, an inconsistency in her thesis. Remember her view
about brain birth (not so different from sentience but happening a little later, roughly
when the fetus becomes viable, i.e. able to survive outside the uterus). Later on, she
states that late fetuses (i.e., having reached the stage of viability) are perhaps able to
have pleasurable sensory experiences. It makes one wonder what finally is
Steinbock's criterion of moral standing: sentience or brain birth? If it is sentience,
when is it acquired? Is it in the middle or at the end of intrauterine life (not to mention
the question of what is the meaning of perhaps)?
Chapter 7 looks at the roots of utilitarianism in order to understand the current
arguments on sentientism. The quest for pleasure and the avoidance of pain are two
inherent facets of life. The concepts of pain and pleasure have been interpreted in very
different ways by Epicureans, stoicists, classical and latter-day utilitarians. Two
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7aspects of utilitarianism are striking. First, it seems that, in order to refute the
objections to the theory, a large number of variations on the theme of
utility/happiness/good/pleasure is needed to keep the principle afloat - act, rule,
preference, restricted utilitarianism, and others. Second and more relevant to the topic
of this essay, one might argue that utilitarianism is short of a sliding-scale for
pain/suffering whereas it has one for pleasures (lower and higher).
The soft pro-choice moral theory on abortion states that the unborn moves
from a pre-threshold (that is, prior to the acquisition of sentience) state (roughly from
conception to around 18 weeks of gestational age), followed by a gray area of
incertitude about the presence of sentience, to a post-threshold phase (starting around
22 to 24 weeks, that is, the stage of viability) where sentience is said to be acquired.
On this view, it follows that abortion of the pre-threshold/insensate embryo/fetus is
morally neutral and permissible. It equally follows that "abortion" (a misnomer after
viability) of the post-threshold/sentient fetus is morally wrong. The theory qua theory
(not to mention the lack of scientific base) raises two objections. One question is,
How about the gray area? Another question is about the fact that a post-threshold
fetus is viable (at least in proper medical and technological circumstances); this is no
longer qualifiable as an abortion in the strict sense of the termination of pregnancy
before viability. Therefore, the argument from sentience does not apply to the post-
threshold fetus - this is no longer an abortion - but only to the pre-threshold or
insensate embryo/fetus that can be aborted since it is not sentient.
It can be argued that the so-called "Third Way" is only a variation of the
argument from potentiality advocated by some pro-lifers. One of the soft pro-life
moral theories claims that during the pre-embryonic stage there is no defined
individual because twinning is possible. If there is no individuality there is no
personhood and thus no moral standing. Therefore, the abortion of the pre-embryo is
morally neutral and permissible. From the embryonic stage on, there is an individual,
a person - real or potential - with the right to life. The argument I present is that the
two soft stances are not basically different. Both consider two stages of intrauterine
life: 1) pre-sentience or pre-individuality; and 2) post-sentience or
individuality/personhood. During phase 1 abortion is permissible, whereas during
phase 2, abortion is impermissible. During the gray area of dubious sentience the
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8unborn is potentially sentient; after the pre-embryonic stage, the embryo/fetus is a
potential person.
My central thesis is that the argument from sentience fails to be convincing,
not only for the above mentioned reasons, but also because, like most moral theories
on abortion, it leads to an either/or dead-end. Moreover, it excludes from our moral
consideration a vast world of living and non-living entities that deserve respect. Is the
final word really Jeremy Bentham's "What matters is not whether they can reason or
talk, but whether they can suffer"? Or, should it be: What matters is respect.
Chapter 8, Post-structural Neurophilosphy, places the concept of sentience in
the context of Complexity. The main argument is that sentientism is a functionalist
approach to sentience. In other words, sentience is reduced to an input/output type of
response. It (mis- )interprets a behavioural pattern as an indicator of an internal state or
emotion. And behavioural evidence is by its very nature ambiguous. Sentientism, in
other words, is rather "folk biology", to use Simon Baron-Cohen (1999: 22) words -
our everyday way of understanding a system in terms of its physical makeup. The
inroads made into the complexity of brain structure and function show that the ability
to feel and the ability to suffer require a complex neural network, and that therefore
the argument from sentience is biologically naïve.
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92 Approaching the complexity of the abortion debate
Wishful thinking, without admitting it,
overpowered knowledge.
Albert Schweitzer (1987: 274)
Introduction
It seems to be part of human nature to avoid complexity instinctively in order
to seek simplicity, and to give preference to wishful thinking that suits our intellectual
comfort rather than to hard evidence that may disturb our coziness. We feel more
comfortable with clear-cut positions and concepts than with less defined and fluctuant
ideas. This is what contrasts modem from postmodern thinking. Albert Einstein's
version of Ockham's Razor was:" Make things as simple as possible, but not simpler".
In other words, we cannot avoid complexity without loosing much of the substance of
our concepts, world-views, and moral theories (Bear & Cooper 1998: 132). It was one
of the main aims of the Enlightenment to look for final answers and to come up with
clear-cut moral imperatives that, hopefully, would solve ethical quandaries. It became
clear, however, that strict deontological morality could not solve a great deal of
genuine ethical conflicts. Consequential ism, on the other hand, proved to have to
grapple with other types of genuine moral problems without solving them by means,
for example, of the principle of the greatest utility for the greatest number. W. D.
Ross (1930) tried to solve the dilemma with the concept of prima facie obligations.
Principlism, as exemplified by Beauchamp and Childress' (1994) paradigm theory of
biomedical ethics, a blend of deontology and consequentialism also fails in many
respects. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984: 2) suggested a return to virtue ethics, claiming:
"We have - very largely, if not entirely -lost our comprehension, both theoretical and
practical, of morality". This sounds very similar to what Schweitzer wrote already in
1923:
Our age is striking out unmeaningly in every direction like a fallen horse
in the traces. It is trying with external measures and new organisation to
solve the difficult problems with which it has to deal, but all in vain.
The horse cannot get on its feet again till it is harnessed and allowed
to get its head up. Our world will not get upon its feet again till it lets the truth
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come home to it that salvation is not to be found in active measures
but in new ways of thinking (emphasis added) (1987: 271).
At vanance with MacIntyre's pessimism and invitation to return to the past,
Schweitzer seems to have believed in the future of morality provided new ways of
thinking would be explored. New ways of thinking, which Thomas Kuhn (1996) has
coined paradigm shifts, have proliferated over the last decades as much in the
sciences as in philosophy, and in the philosophy of sciences. Wherever they may lead
to - either ultimate pessimism and even nihilism, or naïve optimism or idealism -
what paradigm shifts, however, have in common is that they challenge our ways of
thinking. Socrates' dictum "the unexamined life is not worth living" remains a vital
necessity. Another positive aspect of new ways of thinking is the clear tendency we
are witnessing to build bridges between philosophy and the humanities. Philosophy is
no longer isolated, or, at least, should not. Philosophy, now, welcomes the
contributions of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and of the neurosciences, to
mention only a few, to the world of "love of wisdom". This is particularly true
concerning the topic of this essay.
Over the three last decades, the issue of abortion has attracted the interest of
moral philosophers of all lines of thinking; sociologists, anthropologists, biologists,
physicians, and political activists alike have challenged their mutual views. New
technological developments made in reproductive technology and in genetic
engineering have raised unprecedented moral problems related to issues such as
cloning, stem-cell research, surrogacy, supernumerary embryos, fetal selection and
fetal reduction, fetal tissue and organ transplants, etc. This is at the same time
overwhelming, exciting, and frightening: from time immemorial and for the
foreseeable future, Prometheus' and Frankenstein's specter has and will loom at the
horizon. Our world-views are challenged. Shall we ever find a balance between the
principle of the Sanctity of Life and the principle of Reverence jar Life?
More specifically, in the South African context (although this is neither unique
nor specific to South Africa), endeavours to implement and to be consequent with the
Bill of Rights have led to the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act No. 92 (1996).
In a multicultural society, this Act forces us to think things through. A simple-minded
attitude would be to take side with the extremists on either end of the spectrum:
absolute "pro-life" (viz., advocacy of the principle of the Sanctity of Life), or absolute
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"pro-choice". In such a perspective, the absolute pro-lifer would simply ignore
women's constitutional rights, and have no qualms with the death of about 600 women
per year as a result of illegal abortions. IOn the other hand, the Act imposes penalties
on whoever obstructs the law, putting in jeopardy the right to conscientious objection
and leading to conflicts of autonomy. Whose autonomy has precedence: the unborn,
the pregnant woman, the health care provider?
It may come as a surprise to many people not so familiar with the intricacies
and complexity of the abortion issue that roughly before the middle of the nineteenth
century it was rather a non-issue. To understand the paradigm shift it is paramount to
put the abortion debate in its historical context. Furthermore, the abortion debate
cannot or should not be seen just as the clash between pro-lifers and pro-choicers.
Therefore, I wish to outline briefly in the next section how from a common and
private matter abortion became a complex and public hotly debated topic. An
overview of the main ethical positions on abortion will follow.
Brief overview of abortion in Western history
A rarely quoted text in the Old Testament, namely Psalm 137, writes: "Happy
shall be who takes and dashes your little ones against the rock". From various sources,
it is well known that abortion and infanticide were practiced in the Ancient
Mediterranean World. For example, the Spartans would dip the newborns in the icy
waters of the Styx to test their strength, for only the strongest did stand a chance in
life. Plato, in the Republic (Book 5, 460), had no objections against the killing of not
only of handicapped newborns, but also of those who are the product of inferior
parents or of individuals past the ideal childbearing age (quoted in Jones et al. 1969:
21). In the Politics (Book 7, chapter 16), Aristotle holds that deformed infants should
not be allowed to live (quoted in Tooley 1983: 103). In Peri psuchês, later translated
in Latin under the title De anima, Aristotle's theory of the distinction between living
and non-living organisms was that the former did possess an animating principle -
something that gives the ability to move - which he called psuchê, a principle of life
(Laird 1970: 8). In the Theory of Human Generation and Reproduction. Aristotle
claimed that the male human fetus becomes animated (viz., starts moving) on day-40
after conception, and that it takes the female fetus 80 days to start moving (Ford 1991:
39). In line with this view, before the fetus starts moving, it is not alive; therefore,
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abortion before 40 or 80 days is permissible. In the Eudaimian Ethics (1216 a 6-8),
Aristotle wrote: "Just as we do not think: a fetus, who lives a purely vegetative
existence, without awareness, lives a full human life, so we are not going to be willing
to praise and congratulate the life of this hopeless inactive adult". Matters of life and
death at the two extremes of human life were already a matter of concern and debate;
vegetative life at the two extremes of life was not worth the same attention as the life
of adult rational persons.
The Stoics rejected Plato's theory of Forms. They had their own views on the
psuchê, also caUed pneuma, as the principle of specificaUy animal life that aUows
poioun, action. The stoic soul is a corporeal entity; it penetrates the physical body,
and leaves it after death (Long 1996: 233). Their concepts on human reproduction and
embryology were written down by Hierocles in Elementa ethica (circa 200 CE.), and
by the Greek physician, anatomist and philosopher Galen of Pergamon (129- circa
199 C.E.) in De foeto formatione. On their view, throughout most of gestation the
conceptus was just a growing thing, not reaUy different from a growing plant.
Progressively, the pure phusis (growth) becomes inhabited by the pneuma, the fiery
breath, the intelligent fire. On their view, it was only at the moment of birth that,
through an instantly hardening by contact with the cold air outside, the pneuma
became psuchê. The stoic psuchê was together the rational component necessary for
thought, language, and decision-making, as weU as the instrument for sensation and
movement. The psuchê was what aUows us to lead an inteUigent life within the
boundaries of the body (Long 1996: 226). Like Aristotle, the Stoics saw the fetus as
an almost purely vegetative entity.
It is quite clear that the concept of psuchê in the classical Hellenic world had
nothing in common with the later Christian concept of soul, which is the cornerstone
of the Roman Catholic pro-life position. The misinterpretation of the Greek concept
of psuchê is attributable to what is commonly called the problem of the tradutore
traditore (the so-caUed treason committed by translators): psuchê was translated
anima, and anima was (mis-) translated soul (Rothman 1997: 104)! The roots of this
interpretation are found in Augustine's adoption of Plotinus' theory of emanation that
said that the Creation issues from God's thought, something like a composite of
rationality and something celestial. On Plotinus' view, contrary to Plato's concept of
the body as the dungeon of the soul, body and soul were supposed to live in harmony
(Solomon & Higgins 1996: 12). For Augustine, God created the human soul in His
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image. Our soul shares with the divine mind; our body is only a repository for the soul
(123).
Aquinas shared Aristotle's view on the spark of life, the principle of motion
that makes a living being alive (Ford 1991: 39). A fetus starts moving 40 days after
conception - that is, when it starts to exhibit human features (Tivnan 1995: 34). This
became the official position of the Church at the Council of Vienna in 1312 (Rachels
1993: 59)~ it remained as such until 1869 when Pope Pius IX repealed it. Early
abortion was thus not morally forbidden until the second half of the nineteenth
century neither by the Church nor by the common law (Rachels 1989: 115).
The thirteenth century's debates opposed the Augustinian-cum-Neoplatonist
Franciscan friars to the Thomist-cum-Aristotelian Dominicans. Applied ethics was not
a major concern in their debates; abortion was definitely not a matter of enquiry. In
Medieval times, philosophy had not yet acquired its own status as a discipline
independent from theology, but neither did sciences (then called natural philosophy).
It was not until the Reformation initiated by Augustinian friar, Martin Luther (1483-
1546), that theology was set on a course independent from philosophy; the final
separation is attributed to René Descartes (1569-1650) (Jones et al 1969). With
Descartes, philosophy and sciences also became "unnaturally separated" (Jonas 1996:
59). William of Ockham's (c.1280-1349) writings are representative of a transition
from medieval thinking to a growing interest in Man (as essentially an individual) and
in nature that would reach its acme with the Renaissance. Natural philosophy had also
to be set on a course independent from theology. The Renaissance undertook this task.
Renaissance anatomist Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564) bravely debunked
Galen's medical teaching that had prevailed for as long as ten centuries discovering
that the sons of Adam have no missing rib (Gordon 1993: 9). This was evidence that
Eve must have come from elsewhere! Not only for this unholy finding but also for
having located the soul in the brain, Vesalius got under attack by the theologians of
the Catholic University of Louvain where he was teaching anatomy. Indeed, the hard
facts of early scientific discoveries and thinking were clearly not welcomed by the
ecclesiastic establishment of the time.
It was not until the first half of the seventeenth-century that Aristotle's theory,
formerly supported by Aquinas and confirmed by the Council of Vienna, became
discredited by Flemish physician Thomas Feyens, alias Fienus. As a professor on the
faculty of medicine at the Catholic University of Louvain, he published, in 1620, a
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treatise entitled De formatione foetus. in quo ostenditur animam rationalem infundi
tertia die. Fienus' thesis was that human semen needs only three days to "coagulate
the menstrual blood" so that it can receive a rational soul that will take care of the
further organisation of the embryo and fetus (Ford 1991: 47; Shannon & Wolter 1993:
41). The credit of the claim, made in Rome in 1621, that ensoulment does occur at the
time of conception is to be attributed to the Italian physician Paolo Zacchias. In 1644,
Pope Innocent X rewarded him for this brilliant achievement bestowing on him the
title of General Proto-Physician of the Whole Roman Ecclesiastic State (Ford 1991:
48). However, this did not affect the well-established and traditional view on abortion
before quickening. Abortion remained still rather a sin against marriage since,
following Augustine's teaching sexual intercourse was only permissible in married
couples and with the sole intention of procreating (Pence 1995: 147; Shannon &
Wolter 1993: 47-48). This remains the current official teaching of the Roman Catholic
Church.
During the seventeenth-century, European Common Law did not consider that
abortion was an indictable offence. It was only in 1803 that an English statute made
abortion of a quickened fetus a criminal offence. From the seventeenth through the
nineteenth centuries, American law followed the English Common Law (Pence 1995:
148). Neither the English nor the American Common Law, prior to the nineteenth
century, did recognise the existence of a fetus before quickening. And because
quickening was the criterion to determine the presence of a fetus, pregnancy was a
condition that only the pregnant woman could sense and make public, if so she
wished (Duden 1993: 82). In the early nineteenth century, in the United States,
abortion before quickening was legal and only a misdemeanor after quickening.
Abortifacients were freely advertised, privately procured, and self-administered
(Luker 1984). Eve's herbs such as pennyroyal and silphium have been known and
used from times immemorial as "emmenagogues" "to bring down the courses", to
free the "suppressed menses" (Bilger 1998: 38). In 1847, however, things started to
change with the creation of the American Medical Association (AMA).
The AMA is said to have been created to oppose the rising success of
homeopathy, and to retain the power, control, and authority of the traditional Western
medicine. This included control over abortion. There is some controversy surrounding
the real motivation of the antiabortion lobbying by the AMA that started in 1857. For
some, the intention was to protect women from health hazards by medicalising
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abortion. Rachels (1989: 115), however, is of the opinion that the real motives were
the prevailing Victorian mentality about illicit sex (that is, extramarital), and a feeling
among the medical profession that there was something morally wrong about killing
fetuses. On the other hand, Feinberg and Levenbook (1993: 195) attribute the AMA's
position to a desire to control and contain abortion practices. Duden (1993: 82) adopts
a similar view, namely that the medical profession wished to promote itself as the
experts in charge of the procedure and decision about abortion.
Whatever the deep motives inspiring the AMA, it is quite clear that the
medical profession initiated the opposition to abortion, and that the theologians only
followed suit (Tivnan 1995: 12). In 1869, Pope Pius IX declared the
excommunication for the sin of abortion, and, in 1870, at the First Vatican Council, he
declared the Sovereign Pontiffs ex cathedra pronouncements infallible. From 1895,
abortion became permissible only in the context of self-defence, as ruled by the
doctrine of double effect (Rachels 1989: 122) - that is, in case of ectopic pregnancy,
and of cancer ofthe uterine cervix in pregnancy.
It was not until 1967 that abortion became decriminalised in Britain (Oakley
1997: 364-396). In fact, it took Britain 29 years after the Bourne case to reach this
decision. On June 14th 1938, well-respected British gynaecologist Aleck William
Bourne (1886-1974) aborted a fourteen-year old girl at St Mary's Hospital in
Paddington. She was six-weeks pregnant after having been gang-raped. On July 18,
Bourne was indicted at the Old Bailey for "using an instrument to procure a
miscarriage", but was later acquitted by the jury (Gordon 1993: 151). The United
States followed the British move on abortion in 1973 with the famous or infamous
Roe v Wade.
At stake in the Roe v Wade 410US113 was a State of Texas statute making it a
crime to "procure an abortion" or even to attempt it, unless it was to save a pregnant
woman's life. Norma McCorvey, alias Jane Roe, was a single pregnant woman living
in Dallas. She wanted a safe and legal abortion to be performed by a physician. To
obtain it she challenged the constitutionality of the Texas law. Henry Wade was
Dallas County's district attorney. Justice Harry Blackmun and the US Supreme Court
ruled that the "right of privacy" was guaranteed by the 14th Amendment's concept of
personal liberty, and that the right of personal liberty and of privacy was "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"
(Annas 1988: 144). The decision held that laws prohibiting abortion violate women's
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constitutionally protected right to privacy. The Court also held the view that a fetus is
not a person in the legal sense, and so has no constitutionally protected right of its
own (Rachels 1989: 115). The Court, however, recognised that the State has a right to
limit abortion in the interest of either the woman's health or the fetus' life.
In 1973, an abortion procured after the first trimester was considered
medically dangerous for a woman's life.3 On the other hand, during that era, the
viability of the fetus was set at twenty-eight weeks, the onset of the third trimester of
pregnancy. Therefore, in line with the medical practice and technology of the time,
the Court decided that a first trimester abortion is a woman's decision and right; that a
second trimester abortion should be regulated by the Court; and that a third-trimester
termination of pregnancy would be permissible only if the woman's health or life is at
stake (Annas 1988: 145).
The salient points in the Roe v Wade Supreme Court decision were: (1) a first
trimester abortion is a woman's right; (2) the unborn has no constitutionally
recognised rights; and (3) the "viable" fetus has a "potential life" (potentiality being
here interpreted as the ability to survive outside of the uterus). These points are
important indicators of a paradigm shift. There is no mention of the intrinsic value of
the unborn in any moral sense. There is strong emphasis on women's rights with no
right of any sort attributed to the unborn (hence, no conflict between the woman and
the fetus). The State and the medical profession through the Court, however, retain the
right of decision-making after the first trimester. This has been seen "as much a
reaffirmation of the rights of physicians to practice as they see fit as it has been an
affirmation of women's right to control their reproduction" (Rothman 1997: 108).
Finally, the mention of "potential life" has given rise to the argument from potentiality
in moral philosophy on abortion, although the argument as it stands in bioethics has
little if anything in common with what it meant for the Court.
Still in the historical context of abortion, and with due respect for the
advocates of the argument from potentiality, one cannot but think that the argument is
inspired by Marcello Malpighi, a professor of anatomy at Bologna. In his treatise, De
formatione pulli in ova (1673), he published his theory of ontogenesis .ontogeny" or
preformationism- that is, that the whole future organism is already present in a
miniature state either in the egg (ovism), or in the sperm cell (spermism or
animalculism). Malpighi was not sure which of either was right: ovism or spermism.
It was only later that Dutchman Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), the
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designer of the first microscope, found the answer to Malpighi's query: under the
microscope he managed to see homunculi in human sperm cells (Ford 1991: 48)!
Ontogenesis, however, was proven wrong by embryologist Caspar Frederich Wolff
(1733-1794). Ontogenesis was replaced by the theory of epigenesis - that is, specific
events have to occur before the next can appear (a position still held in embryology as
will be shown). None the less, the spectrum of the homunculus is still roaming
(Rachels 1995: 70). Another, perhaps more respectable, view on the origin of the
argument from potentiality is suggested by Kristin Luker (I984: 11). She believes that
the argument can be found among the Pythagoreans for whom the embryo was the
equivalent of the child it will become.
Roe v Wade, however, was not the end of the story of the abortion debate in
the US. In 1989, Chief Justice William Rehnquist (the 'loser' in R v W) made a
significant retreat from the abortion rights that had followed from R v W In Webster v
Reproductive Health Services, he made it clear that the State has an interest in
protecting life, not just after viability, but throughout pregnancy because, he claimed,
life begins with conception (Tivnan 1995: 16). This fueled the debate about the
beginning of life and the sanctity of life even outside of the courts. In 1992, Planned
Parenthood v Casey reaffirmed the essential holding of R v W (Pence 1995: 172).
In 1987, RU-486 (mifepristone), an anti-progestagen prescribed for various
endocrinological conditions as well as for use as an early abortifaciant, was approved
in France (169). The American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did not approve
its circulation saying: ''It would decentralise the role of the medical profession in
abortion and remove them from public scrutiny" (Feinberg & Levenbook ]993: 196).
In other words, it would take us back to the era before 1857 when abortion was a
private matter practiced by women themselves; and that would be problematic
(mifepristone was finally approved by the FDA in the year 2000). It is not evident
from what follows, however, that the legalisation of abortifaciant drugs would really
remove abortion from public scrutiny.
A prostaglandin analog, misoprostol, was marketed in the eighties to treat
peptic ulcer. A number of pregnant women taking the drug for the prescribed
indication happened to abort. In the late eighties, misoprostol started to be used to
induce labour in case of intra-uterine fetal death. It is now widely used to induce
labour with a normal alive and term fetus, as well as to terminate a pregnancy at any
stage. It is a prescription drug, and, hence under medical control. In South Africa, the
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use of misoprostol for the purpose of termination of pregnancy (TOP) is restricted to
facilities designated, authorised, and registered for TOP by the National Department
of Health. Every effort seems to be made to keep abortion under public scrutiny and
under control of the health professionals and of the public authority.
The media have also been instrumental in this regard. As Rothman (1997:
111) put it, the fetus has become the subject of a "cultural creation" that fascinates the
general public. On her view, this started with The Silent Cry and with Miracle in the
Womb, picturing the "pain" endured by aborted fetuses. Rothman also claims that the
mediatisation of the fetus gave birth to the so-called "fetal medicine". 5 And this, says
Susan Sherwin (1999: 492, 496) has resulted in viewing pregnant women as "generic
female wombs, anti-mothers", and the fetus as a "third-party".
This overview shows that the history of abortion as a moral and a legal issue is
relatively recent. It also shows that the problematisation of abortion was initially a
matter of power; the Church authorities considered the moral aspect only eventually.
This is not to deny the moral dimensions of abortion. On the contrary, the debates, be
they legal, political, theological, or philosophical, have all shed a different and new
light on what was for centuries a non-issue. Abortion is undoubtedly a moral issue.
The ideal solution to the problem of abortion would be to create the necessary
conditions to avoid unwanted pregnancies. At first glance, this should be possible if
all sexually active people would use a safe contraceptive method when a pregnancy is
not desirable. However, this would not be enough. With the increasing incidence of
involuntary sterility, worldwide but much more in the developed world, recourse to
reproductive technologies is also on the increase." Unless technology comes up with
new methods, the problem of supernumerary embryos and of selective fetal reduction
will remain." In some developing countries, where culturally and traditionally male
offspring is mandatory or at least highly desirable and praised, the abortion of female
fetuses will remain widely practiced.
Unlike MacIntyre's pessimism, it seems that Schweitzer's view on new ways
of thinking has prevailed. The abortion issue forces us to think things through: the
beginning and the end of life, the value and meaning of life, personhood and lack
thereof, rights and their conflicts. Each of the facets of the problem has been the
subject matter of moral theories and speculation. This is not to say that a final answer
has been given. No final answer will ever solve ethical conflicts. What could be seen
as a tower of Babel of moral relativism should perhaps rather be seen in the
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perspective suggested by Iris Murdoch: What is important is to raise moral questions
because it creates moral awareness. Ethical consciousness and ethical practice are two
distinct things (Taylor 1995: 126). The answers to the moral dilemmas and conflicts
are many, as we shall see in the following section.
Prevailing moral theories on abortion
In broad and general terms, one could arguably subdivide the moral theories
on abortion according to the principle of right/wrong, permissible/impermissible, and
pro-life/pro-choice. Indeed, these strong views do exist and have their advocates. The
dogmatic and fundamental pro-life activists admit of no exception to the principle of
Sanctity of Life (PSL). On the other hand, the liberal pro-choice advocates claim that
not only abortion but also infanticide is permissible. Whereas it is practically
impossible to follow strictly the PSL, it is counterintuitive and repulsive to be an
absolute pro-choicer. Therefore, there must be room for softening at both ends of
these antipodean extreme positions: soft pro-life and soft pro-choice stances both
admit exceptions to their general principle. In what follows, I will present the basic
arguments of the hard and soft views at each end of the spectrum, as well as the views
of those who are discontent with the polar positions, hard or soft.
Strong pro-life morality
The PSL is at the heart of the conflict between staunch pro-lifers and liberal
pro-choicers. The reason of the conflict, says Ronald Dworkin (1997: 131), is that for
the pro-lifers abortion violates the PSL - this is what he calls the detached objection
to abortion. Life is sacrosanct. End of the discussion. There are two different
arguments supporting the PSL: the argument from association and the argument from
history. An example of the PSL by association would be that of the sacred cows in
India; they are valued because they are associated with certain divinities. The
argument from history would derive either from the Divine Command theory or from
the Natural Law theory.
The hard pro-life conservative position has its roots either in the Divine
Command theory or in the Natural Law theory. The basic claim of the Divine
Command theorists is that a soul is infused at the time of conception; therefore,
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human life is sacrosanct from the time of conception. No exception should ever be
tolerated. This is the expression of God's will. The position of the Natural Law
theorists is a secular variation on the PSL: Thou shalt not kill. What nature has
endowed with life is to be respected and allowed to follow its course. Natural Law
stands above and apart from the activities of human lawmakers; it constitutes an
objective set of principles that can be discovered by the use of reason (Blackburn
1996: 256).
One of the main difficulties with the Divine Command position is the fact that
a theological premise (the infusion of a soul) is supposed to lead to a general moral
conclusion (an ensouled entity is sacrosanct). The validity of an argument depends on
whether the premise(s) is/are true. Since, as Curzer (1999: 435) writes, "we have
nothing like a soul detector", without a leap of faith the premise cannot be
substantiated. Although there should be room, understanding, and tolerance for
theologically inspired worldviews, the Divine Command theory is convincing only for
those who believe in the existence of the God given soul. Nevertheless, even among
those who believe in the soul new perspectives are currently defended.
The current official position and teaching of the Roman Catholic Church still
sticks strictly to the Divine Command theory. Progressive theologians like Joseph
Donceel (1970), however, support the view of the so-called delayed animation (as
opposed to the doctrine of immediate animation). Donceel's argument rests on the
relatively new concept of the pre-embryo (or pro-embryo). 8 Advances in embryology
have shown that during the first fourteen days of development a pre-embryo can split
and produce identical twins; conversely (although very rarely) twin embryos can fuse
(producing a chimera). In other words, before day fourteen the identity or the
individuality of the pre-embryo is not definitely established; after the fourteenth day
there is an individual. Donceel's point is that a soul cannot be infused before the
individuality of the embryo is firmly established. In line with the embryological facts,
he concludes that early abortion - that is, of a pre-embryo - is not immoral. The spin-
offs of this view are that there should be nothing morally wrong with intra-uterine
contraceptive devices (IUD) or with the so-called "morning-after pill".9
Natural Law theorists are mainly concerned with the sanctity of human life.
Some of their arguments are, for instance, that a fertilised human egg is human
because it has a complete and specifically human genetic equipment, or that since the
time of conception the fertilised egg is alive (Noonan 1989). No one would really
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argue seriously against the claim that a human embryo (or zygote for that matter) is
both human and alive, and that it has a human genome. These are plain biological
facts. Conversely one could, however, argue (for argument sake) whether
chromosomal abnormalities (missing or additional chromosomes) deprives an entity
from humanity in the same way as we deny apes humanity (their genetic equipment is
extremely close to that of humans). 10 What really matters is, first, whether to be a
zygote/pre-embryo/embryo is enough to possess moral standing, and, second, whether
one should ascribe moral standing only to the species Homo sapiens. Animal rights
activists have a serious moral objection against speciesism. The moral considerability
of a zygote remains a matter of ongoing debate (van Niekerk & van Zyl 1996). The
last word has not yet been said in reproductive technology, and the related moral
issues surrounding it are cropping up every day. A clear example of the complexity of
the ethics of reproduction and of the ascription of a clear-cut moral weight to a pre-
embryo is that moral philosophers with a more or less strong pro-life inclination
choose the middle-of-the-road argument from potentiality to ascribe moral standing to
the "unborn". It is not in virtue of what the zygote/pre-embryo/embryo proper/fetus is
now (because at the early stages it is just a cell or a cluster of cells that, if
circumstances permit, will one day become a person) that it deserves moral
consideration, but rather in virtue of what it has the potential to become. For instance,
one could argue whether a frozen human embryo has a potential unless it is implanted
in a woman's uterus; if not implanted a frozen embryo will ultimately be discarded,
unless its stem cells are utilised (the only alternative potentiality).
The principle of Reverence for Life (PRL) has been mainly advocated by
Albert Schweitzer. He states the following:
However seriously man undertakes to abstain from killing and damaging,
he cannot entirely avoid it. He is under the law of necessity, which compels
him to kill and to damage both with and without his knowledge. In many
ways it may happen that by slavish adherence to the commandment not
to kill, compassion is less served than by breaking it. When the suffering
of a living creature cannot be alleviated, it is more ethical to end its life by
killing it mercifully than it is to stand aloof. .. The principle of not killing
and not-harming must not aim at being independent, but must be the servant of,
and subordinated itself to, compassion. It must therefore enter into practical
discussion with reality. True reverence for morality is shown by readiness
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to face the difficulties contained in it (quoted in Marshall 1966: 88).
Schweitzer's PRL, also called his "biotic egalitarianism" (Jonas 1996: 17) (as much as
his personal character) has been often misunderstood and misinterpreted. In the movie
Lambarene, he is shown putting a toad back into the shade and keeping some sugar on
his desk to feed the ants. On the other hand, Schweitzer was not a vegetarian. What he
advocated was respect for all kind of life, animal and vegetal. At variance with the
PSL, he acknowledged that death is part of nature and of life, and that we cannot do
away with it. This is not, as claimed by Bonnie Steinbock (1992: 12), that Schweitzer's
concept of RFL is no more than "a well-intentioned confusion of distinct moral
principles" and not different from the PSL. Mary Anne Warren (1991: 307) is of the
opinion (which I share) that it does not follow from Schweitzer's ethic of RFL that
abortion is morally wrong. Many abortions, she says, "may be defended as killing
'under the compulsion of necessity' If. Contrary to Steinbock's interpretation that "if
the ethics of RFL implies that it is seriously wrong to destroy any living thing, it is
implausible", the above quote clearly shows that the ethics of RFL is something very
different from the ethics of PSL. Although it is not clear whether Schweitzer would
have accepted the permissibility of mercy killing (e.g., physician-assisted suicide) of
human beings and of abortion, the logic of his argument would imply it. Schweitzer
died in 1965, before the emergence of postmodern ethics. The last sentence of the
quote - "True reverence for morality is shown by readiness to face the difficulties
contained in it" has a very postmodern flavour and reflects the position of many pro-
choicers. Il
Strong pro-choice morality
The strongest liberal pro-choice stance is undoubtedly epitomised by Michael
Tooley's (1972) extreme position. Briefly, it states that abortion and infanticide are
morally permissible. This position may sound prima facie repulsive to most of us but
would have met mainstream thinking and practice in the era before the middle of the
nineteenth-century. The main argument Tooley is making to underpin his thesis is the
lack of personhood not only of the unborn but also of the infant during the first
months after birth. If rationality is what characterises a person, he says, and if to be a
person is what ascribes moral standing and the right to life, then abortion and
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infanticide are morally permissible. What is morally impermissible, he claims, is to
inflict pain even to an animal (but this does not mean that an animal has a right to
life ).
Mary Anne Warren (1973) holds a similar view on the lack of personhood of
the unborn and the permissibility of abortion. Her emphasis, however, is on women's
right to decide on what is happening in and to their body. She does not see any
conflict between the unborn's right to life (since it does not possess a right to life) and
the decision to abort (a mere right to decide to remove something like a nuisance from
the body)." One should recall that the strong pro-choice and pro-life stances were
voiced in the early seventies, mainly in the United States and in the context of the Roe
v Wade controversy, that followed the Civil Rights crusade of the sixties. These were
the times when major emphasis was placed on rights (and rights rhetoric).
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971) is less adamant than Warren concerning an
unequivocal right to abort. Her famous Gedankenexperiment of the violinist who is
hooked to a woman's body during her sleep in order to survive is analogous, says
Thomson, to the situation of the unborn who needs a pregnant woman's body to
survive. The moral question is: Does a woman have the right to unhook the life-
support system, or, conversely what is her moral obligation to provide and maintain
life-support? The analogy with the violinist, however, would work only if the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest (a pregnancy forced upon a woman). In any
other case, she says that is, voluntary but unprotected sex - to maintain the life-
support is a charitable thing to do like "a minimally decent Good Samaritan" would.
To abort for reasons of personal convenience, says Thomson, would be callous. The
problem with Thomson's argument is that it is unconvincing. First, there is no much
more to her argument than to say that abortion is permissible in case of rape and
incest. Simple common sense morality (and even conservative pro-lifers) would have
no qualms with it. Second, it is not clear to me whether Thomson is arguing as a
virtue ethicist or in the context of conflicting rights. Callousness and Good
Samaritanism point at the morality of the agent rather than of the act. Keeping or
unhooking life-support points at a conflict of rights. To make things even more
confused, Thomson introduces in her argument the problem of the unborn as an
aggressor and the right to self-defence. It would be extremely difficult to argue
convincingly that the embryo/fetus could be an "innocent aggressor" (but an aggressor
none the less).
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Soft pro-life morality
Two mainstream doctrines are referred to in soft pro-life morality: the
Doctrine of Double Effect (DOE), and the Doctrine of Self-Defence (DSD). It is
mainly the Roman Catholic Church that holds the DOE. It states that when an
intended action has two foreseeable effects, a good one and a bad one, the action
should not be wrong in itself, the foreseeable wrong should not be intended, and the
good should not be itself the result of the bad consequence. Traditionally, there are
four situations related to pregnancy where a specific medical intervention on either
the pregnant woman or on the embryo/fetus will have a "good" and a "bad" effect: 1)
ectopic pregnancy; 2) cancer of the cervix in pregnancy; 3) a woman's medical
condition worsened by pregnancy that threatens her health or her life; and 4) an
obstetrical condition where a woman's life can be saved only by a fetal destructive
procedure.t'
According to the Roman Catholic interpretation of the DOE, only in
conditions 1) and 2) is a medical intervention that results in the end of pregnancy
morally permissible. In other words, the excision of a Fallopian tube containing a
pregnancy (viz., an ectopic pregnancy) and the excision of a pregnant uterus with a
cervical cancer is permissible. The threat to the health or even to the life of a pregnant
woman is no excuse for abortion. A lot could be said against the DDE as understood
in this way. First, it is based on simplistic, biologically ill-informed and erroneous
interpretation of medical conditions. Second, common sense morality in medical
practice is clearly offended by the ODE.
Very similar to the DOE, though not inspired by religious motives, is the DSD
and the morality of abortion. The basic tenet of the DSD is that one has the right to
kill an unjust aggressor. The difficulty with the doctrine, when used to justify abortion
as attempted by Thomson (with rape and incest), is the concept of the unjust
aggressor. Is the embryo/fetus not innocent by definition? If this is agreed upon, the
DSD collapses. Whatever the case may be (deliberate but unprotected sex, failure of a
contraceptive method), the pregnancy could or should have been prevented (unless it
resulted from rape). It would be hard to prove convincingly that any embryo/fetus
could ever be an aggressor in the usual sense of the word." In fact, what can be a
threat to a woman's health or life in the real sense is the pregnant condition. In the
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case of an ectopic pregnancy, it is the placenta that erodes the tube and causes the
internal bleeding (the embryo as such is no threat). With cervical cancer neither the
placenta nor the fetus are a threat. With obstructed labour, it is the fetus' inability to
make its way through the pelvis that threatens the woman's life (if the fetus was in a
different position or if it were lighter, there would be no problem). And, finally, when
a medical condition is worsened by pregnancy it is the whole of the pathophysiologic
changes accompanying pregnancy that affect the woman's health (again it is the
placenta and the placental hormones that cause the problem and not the fetus). This
takes us back to a similar sophistry as with the DDE. In medical practice, then, when
these situations do arise, neither the DDE nor the DSD are really of any use to handle
the conflict but rather the paradigm theory of medical ethics based on the principles of
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.
Soft pro-choice morality
The soft pro-choice morality states that there is room for abortion in certain
conditions. What soft pro-ehoieers basically claim is that early abortion is
permissible, but that it is morally wrong to terminate an advanced pregnancy. What is
the criterion of moral considerability that tips the balance? Two schools of thought are
representing the soft pro-choice position. One follows the recommendations of the
Warnock commission'< and the concept of the pre-embryo (or pro-embryo) alluded to
with Joseph Donceel's position on delayed animation. On this view, the abortion of a
pre-embryo is morally neutral. It follows from this argument that contraceptive'
methods such as the intra-uterine contraceptive device (IUD), the so-called morning
after pill, and mifepristone" are also morally neutral. The same argument would allow
the disposal of supernumerary embryos produced with in vitro fertilization (IVF), as
well as so-called embryo experimentation.l" But these are spin-offs that Donceel
might not have expected and might well disagree with. The other main soft pro-choice
position's thesis is that the acquisition of sentience is the criterion of moral
considerability. The main advocate of sentience as the criterion of moral standing is
L.Wayne Sumner, who claims that a pre-sentient embryo/fetus has no right to life and
can thus be aborted. The concept of sentience is also used by Peter Singer as a
criterion of moral standing of nonhuman animals. The validity of the argument of
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sentience is the topic of this essay and will be elaborated upon in the following
chapters. Let us now turn to other views on the morality of abortion.
Other views on the morality of abortion
The antipodean pro-life and pro-choice positions, be it in their hard or soft
versions, do not represent the whole spectrum of the current moral views on abortion.
This is mainly because they focus too specifically and too exclusively on autonomy
and rights. Furthermore, they are criticised for being gender-neutral and for
emphasising the presence or absence of a single criterion, actual or potential: 1) the
right to life deriving from either ensoulment, humanity (genetic), rationality
(personhood), sentience, viability (need for life-support or not), or potentiality (for
instance, Marquis' concept of "future-like-ours") (1997: 26); or, conversely, 2)
women's right to self-determination. In these perspectives of maternal-fetal conflict,
however, all other aspects of a pregnant woman's identity are erased (Roth 2000: 6).
Virtue ethics, ethics of care, feminist ethics, microethics, and postmodern
ethics have all added their voice to the philosophical conversation. What they have
mostly and mainly in common is that they set the problem of abortion in context
rather than to argue in favour of an overarching principle in favour or against
abortion. Pro-life and pro-choice are, in Roth's (16) words, "dead-end arguments", and
in Curzer's (1999: 435) vocabulary, "line-drawing or gender-neutral approaches".
Understandingly, women appear to be more "vocal" about contextualising abortion.
After all, women are the ones who have a live-experience of the burdens of pregnancy
as well as of most if not all the rewards of a planned and welcomed pregnancy.
Therefore, it is only fair to listen to what they have to say.
As stated by virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse (1997: 153): "current
philosophical literature [on abortion and moral theory] has got badly out of touch with
reality". What Hursthouse is saying is that it is one thing to argue about the ontology
of the unborn (e.g., personhood), which is a metaphysical debate, but that the life-
experience of a person with the right mind-set who ponders the decision to abort,
which is a personal ethical dilemma, is altogether another thing. Aretaic ethics focus
on the character of the agent rather than on the consequences of his or her acts. If a
woman decides, after thorough consideration of her act and with the right motives, to
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terminate a pregnancy, abortion should be morally permissible. This is not to say that
abortion is not a serious matter or that it is always callous.
Feminist ethics per se has no specific position on abortion. There is probably
as many pro-choice as there are pro-life feminists. However, it can be said safely that
many a pro-choice feminist is a women's right advocate and as such is likely to join
the camp of the pro-ehoieers and their emphasis on the right to decide about their
body. What is more specific to feminist ethicists is the attempt to articulate the
feminine voice in moral reasoning through insistence on interconnectedness. In this
perspective, abortion becomes more of a decision about severing or not a relationship
(Wolf-Devine 1997: 160). This is not to say that abortion is permissible. For Celia
Wolf-Devine (1999: 442), abortion is wrong because it severs a relationship
irremediably. Susan Sherwin's (1999: 442) position is less clear. On the one hand, she
claims that to have a right to life one must fit into a network of relationships. She
denies that the fetus does possess the "network criterion". On the other hand, she
contends that the effects of an unwanted pregnancy on the lives of women should be
seen individually and collectively (vzz., women do possess the network criterion). In
other words, what is important is that women fit into a network (but to which fetuses
do not participate). It would thus follow that there is no moral dilemma involved in
abortion. Surprisingly, however, Sherwin then writes: "the moral status of fetuses is
determined by the nature of their primary relationship and the value that is created
here" (497). Therefore, it should follow that the fetus does possess the network
criterion and that abortion is morally wrong because it severs the relationship.
The thesis of the ethics of care, promoted by Carol Gilligan (1982), holds that
people must balance conflicting responsibilities that arise from different relationships.
The care approach rests on five central values: moral attention, sympathetic
understanding, relationship awareness, accommodation, and response (Steinbock
1998: 142). Ethics of care accommodates abortion as a self-caring act, because care
for oneself is e prima facte duty (Curzer 1999: 442).
Catriona Mackenzie (1997: 175-186) gives a phenomenological account of
pregnant embodiment insisting on the fact that "in pregnancy, questions about the fate
of the fetus cannot be separated out from the issue of a woman's right to self-
determination". This is, she says, because of the psychic and somatic connectedness
that is so peculiar to pregnancy; conscious experience is structured by our bodily
situations. The problem of abortion is not, she claims, a question of women's rights
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overriding fetal rights. Like Steven Ross (1982), she opts in favour of the view that
abortion is rather "choosing that there be no being at all in relation to whom she is in a
situation of such responsibility". This is a decision-responsibility - the decision that
one is not prepared to bring such a child into existence. One may agree that the
physical and psychological experience of pregnancy is something singular that an
outsider can hardly understand (something similar to a quale). Nevertheless, to argue
that a quale justifies abortion is rather controversial. Where Mackenzie makes a point
is when she complains that men's responsibility is almost never touched upon (178).
Among feminists are also women like Sally Markowitz (1997: 198), who
justify abortion on demand "because the society is sexist". Allison Jaggar's feminism
aims at combating male biased normative dualism and its excessive focus on
rationality. According to her Personal Control Principle, women should control
abortion decisions (Wolf-Devine 1997: 160). This is no different from Mary Anne
Warren's position on the right to dispose of the body. Against the thesis held by a
number of advocates of women's right to bodily autonomy (and its conflicts with the
unborn's right to life), Christine Overall (1987) argues that abortion could, with the
advancing state of technology, become two separate events: 1) the evacuation of the
fetus (morally permissible); and 2) the destruction of the fetus (morally
impermissible). This is a way of reconstructing the conflict of rights into a situation
where rights are absent. The traditional view is that of a conflict between the pregnant
woman who has no right to kill, and the embryo/fetus that has no right to occupancy
of the uterus. Overall's solution is to extract the fetus alive and to place it in the uterus
of a surrogate, or, when technology will permit, in an incubator. This contentious
view makes morality contingent on technology (Mackenzie 1997: 190-191).
The rights rhetoric still heavily permeates the abortion debate. It seems
unlikely that a satisfactory solution will ever be reached by keeping the conflict of
rights going. It seems equally doubtful that one of the contemporary mainstream
bioethical theories, promoted inter alia by Beauchamp and Childress (1994), will be
in a better position in this regard." If respect for autonomy is a basic tenet or is the
basic tenet of principlism (and there is no reason to disagree with the importance of
autonomy), it does not solve anything in the abortion debate. If the embryo/fetus is
autonomous and has an inalienable right to life, the pregnant woman equally
possesses inalienable autonomy and the right to life. Since abortion has been
medicalised, it can also conflict with the health care provider's autonomy (viz.,
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conscientious objection). Since men are responsible for impregnating women, they
should be part of the decision-making process and share the responsibility. This adds
up to four autonomies to be reconciled, or, at least, to be taken into consideration.
This is a conundrum that principlism cannot solve (and is hardly addressed by
Beauchamp and Childress).
The paradigm theory of biomedical ethics, says Winkler (1993: 352-353),
conflicts with contextualism, for it has "oversimplified an inadequate conception of
moral reasoning as the application of principles to concrete issues of practice". In
addition and specifically concerning the abortion debate where the concept of moral
status is central, Winkler claims that the paradigm theory "is useless" for it "is silent
on the question of moral standing". Following the same line of thinking, Barry
Hoffmaster (1993: 372) lists four reasons why the paradigm theory cannot succeed on
its own terms (internal criticism), neither account for the phenomena of morality
(external criticism): 1) autonomy is a contested concept; 2) the paradigm theory
provides no weighting when principles conflict; 3) it does not consider the issue of
moral standing; and 4) it is blind to actual moral principles and new moral situations.
Because of the dissatisfaction and the frustrations resulting from principlism
microethics or contextualism is gaining momentum. The focus is on rootedness:
What, in the specific circumstances, should guide the ethical decision? Contextualism
possesses a "greater sensitivity and realism" about the general conception of the
process of moral reasoning, but without denying the normative force of moral
principles (Winkler 1993: 362). For Hoffmaster (1993: 376), "moral decision-making
is more a matter of coming up with creative, responsive solutions than it is trying to
apply a philosophical formula". Concerning abortion, he writes (373): "Even the
abortion controversy - perhaps the most intractable of moral disputes - can be
illuminated by locating it culturally and historically".
Concluding remarks
It has been the two main purposes of this approach to the complexity of the
abortion debate, first, to situate the topic in its historical context, and, second, to
illustrate the various perspectives in which the moral issue can be viewed. It is not
because abortion was not of any great moral concern until relatively recently that it
should not be seen as a serious moral problem. So did it happen with slavery, sexism,
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and racism. Even if racism, sexism, and (to a lesser extent) slavery still do prevail
widely what has changed is that from a non-issue they have become a matter of
serious moral enquiry and concern. What distinguishes the abortion issue from these
three morally reprehensible attitudes is that it is less certain that abortion is always
morally wrong. Furthermore, it is not because there are many views on the morality of
abortion that one should conclude with MacIntyre that we have lost our
comprehension of morality. It rather shows that the complexity of the ethical debate is
such that it needs, as suggested by Schweitzer (in a broader perspective), new ways of
thinking. And new ways of thinking there are. This is not moral impoverishment, but
rather heightened moral awareness.
Life and death, pleasure and pain, are issues that arouse our emotions. Gut
feelings can easily blur our rationality. Some feel that life is sacrosanct; to be strictly
and absolutely consistent with this principle, whether inspired by Divine or by Natural
law, is a challenge that can hardly be met in real life. Suffering and death are an
integral and inescapable component of life. The difficulty is to accept it, as J. Baird
Callicott writes:
Death and often pain are at the heart of nature's economy [even those who]
recognise this implication inconsistently tum aside from it Sudden, untimely
death and often pain are fundamental and intractable ecological facts (1993: 352,373).
Many pro-life anti-abortion activists have rallied, and still rally, behind the
question: When does life begin? Alternatively, abortion advocates with a moderate
pro-choice leaning rally behind the banner of sentience. The latter position on
abortion (as well as on animal rights) could be translated into the question: When does
pain begin? It is noteworthy that both positions base their respective argument on a
biological fact - that is, being alive or feeling pain. In other words, one could say that
both moral stances on abortion rest their case on the possession of a biological
feature: life (vegetative or mental), or a neurological property (the ability to perceive
noxious stimuli).
To the first question - When does life begin? - moral philosophers who
support the principle of the sanctity of life have an easy answer: From the time of
conception (viz., the so-called genetic view). Although it appears irrefutable that life
begins with conception, some argue that not only zygotes are alive, but also gametes
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(viz., the so-called metabolic view). On this view, life is a continuum with neither a
beginning nor an end. Others argue against the PSL asking whether it is life per se
that is sacrosanct, or rather the quality of life of a living entity. Furthermore, they
would argue that if it is life qua life (rather than its quality) that is sacrosanct, then
every single living being across the border merits to be preserved. The PSL, as it
stands for the die-hard contenders, is thus untenable. In reality, it has to be watered
down either to the principle of reverence for life (including all living entities), or to
the infamous speciesist position on the sanctity of human life.
To the second question - When does pain begin? there is no easy answer.
Pain is one of the so-called qualia, as well as the opposite of pleasure. Utilitarians see
pain as something negative, bad, wrong, to be avoided at all cost. Surely, the wanton
infliction of pain is morally wrong. However, it is simplistic to see pain as a purely
negative thing. From a biological point of view, pain is a warning, a defence
mechanism. According to neurophysiologist and Nobel prize laureate Lord
Sherrington's (1857-1952) "utility-of-pain" concept, the value of pain is to function as
an alarm signal; pain has the utility of a self-protection mechanism and of inducing
physical strengthening as a result of pain (Rey 1995: 284 ).If direct contact, say, with
fire were not painful we would not withdraw and we would be burned. What do we
really know about the ability of an embryo/fetus to feel pain (viz., its sentience)?
Paraphrasing Thomas Nagel's famous "What is it like to be a bat?" (viz., the difficulty
if not the impossibility to know and to understand what other people's qualia really
feel like), one may ask the question: "What is it like to be an embryo or a fetus?
"What is the evidence that a fetus (and a lower animal for that matter) is not a kind of
"someone floating in a tank as an indeterminate blob", to paraphrase Robert Nozick
(1994). Is the concept of sentience something more than folk psychology or folk
biology?
The morality of abortion based on sentience not only assumes that from a
certain stage, the fetus is sentient, but also that abortion inflicts pain to the fetus. This
might well be a mere assumption, in need of scientific backup. Who of us recalls how
painful it was to be squeezed through our mother's birth canal? If birth were so
painful for the fetus (we surely know that it is for women), and if infliction of pain is
always morally wrong, would there not be a moral obligation to deliver all fetuses by
Caesarean section? But that would sound not only impossible but also outrageous.
Similarly labour wards where pain relief is not administered systematically to all
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parturients would be staffed by immoral midwifes and obstetricians. For utilitarians,
pleasure has to be maximised and suffering has to be minimised; and, every one
counts for one and the same in the hedonic calculus. One might wonder why, in the
utilitarian morality of abortion, only the fetus' pain (whatever that could be) seems to
count in the hedonic calculus.
If sentience is to be the criterion of moral standing of the unborn, one has to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the ability to feel pain and pleasure is present at
some stage of intra-uterine life. This needs reliable neuroscientific evidence and not
mere assumptions. Sentience needs a certain neural equipment. As we will see later,
sentience requires more than a "primitive" brain. The nervous system relays messages
either chemically (by neurotransmitters) or electrically (by action potentials).
In the next chapter, I will examine what four moral philosophers have claimed
about a basic neurobiological feature, the so-called "firing" of neurons (i.e. the
presence of an action potential) in the brain of the embryo and of the fetus that, in
their view, endows the embryo/fetus with "humanity".
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3 Four moral philosophers on alleged brain function of the unborn
The core of myself is my functioning brain. J am
not just my brain. But the brain is the only part
of me whose destruction J could not possibly
survive. The brain, but not the rest of the animal,
is essential to the self
Thomas Nagel (1986: 40)
Introduction
Brain death, defined as the absence of detectable brain waves on the
electroencephalogram (EEG), is a clear marker of the cessation of function of both the
brain stem and the cerebral cortex (Boyd et al 1997: 27). Most, if not all, of us would
agree that brain death marks the end of a person's terrestrial life. Whereas we are quite
clear about brain death, matters are less clear about brain birth. Does the birth of the
brain coincide with the birth of the body, that is, on average 280 days after
conception? Alternatively, as some writers claim, one should ask the question: Does
the birth of the brain antedate the birth of the body?
The question is not trivial. If, as suggested in Nagel's quote, the core of my
self is my functioning brain, and if the brain birth happened to occur somewhere
during intra-uterine life, it is important to know if and when the alleged brain birth
might occur. If the functioning brain is the core of the self, of the person, and if the
brain of the fetus' is functional in the sense alluded to by Nagel, it follows that the
fetus is a person and that abortion is morally wrong. On the other hand, if the fetal
brain is only fully structured but not fully functional, the embryo/fetus' moral standing
deriving from brain function cannot be grounded.
The question then is to find out: What is meant by functioning brain, and what
brain structure is not only sufficient but also necessary in order to function? The
importance of answering these questions relates to the fact that some moral
philosophers claim that the unborn', at some (variable) stage, exhibits signs of brain
activity. On this view, the (often unspecified) nervous system activity is claimed to
endow the unborn entity with an inalienable right to life. Not so, others argue. It does
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not follow from the presence of an anatomically completely structured brain
(provided that this were the case) that it is well functional - that is, capable of
consciousness/awareness (even in the most basic sense).
At this preliminary stage, it is already clear that the neurological criterion of
personhood (that a person is a human being with detectable brain waves) (Pence
1995: 159) is used to tip the balance against or in favour of abortion. The argument in
favour of a neurological criterion of personhood possessed by the unborn runs as
follows (or vice versa) (161):
(1) An embryo/fetus has brain waves after n weeks of gestation.
(2) A conscious adult (the paradigm person) has brain waves.
(3) Therefore, killing an embryo/fetus after n weeks of gestation is as wrong as
killing a conscious adult.
In the following sections, I shall present the respective arguments put forward
by Brody, Sumner, Tooley, and Steinbock. The choice of these moral philosophers'
views on abortion relates to the fact that all of them refer to alleged neurobiological
data to underpin their argument. Brody founds his antiabortion position on brain
waves allegedly emitted by the embryo. Sumner bases his middle of the road pro-life
stance on the criterion of sentience, which needs some degree of development of the
brain. Tooley's extreme pro-abortion and pro-infanticide stance claims that the brain
structures of the fetus and of the infant are unable to sustain any type of rationality
and self-consciousness needed to possess moral standing. Finally, Steinbock argues in
favour of what she calls "the interest view" - that is, that the possession of interests is
both necessary and sufficient for the possession of a moral status (and nothing matters
to a pre-sentient fetus because it is non-conscious). Since a good deal of their
neurophilosophical argument (although none of them claims to practice
neurophilosophy) refers to neurobiology, mainly brain waves allegedly detectable on
the EEG, some neurophysiological evidence will be discussed to see whether the
arguments are sound or not.
Baruch Brody's argument
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In 1975, Brody wrote: "the fetus [sic] has a functioning brain about the end of
the sixth week of development". 3 The evidence that the brain is functioning, he says,
derives from the fact that brain waves are detectable with an EEG. Although no
reference was provided in support of this statement, he concluded that, from this stage
onwards, there is a human person with a right to life.
A note of caution is in order. First, one should be clear about the vocabulary and
terminology to avoid confusions. In medical terms, the various stages of intra-uterine
development are called respectively: pre-embryo 4, embryo proper, and fetus. The term
pre-embryo refers to a conceptus' of 1 to 14 days of age from the time of conception;
the term embryo proper refers to a conceptus aged 3 to 8 weeks after conception.
Between 9 and 40 weeks after conception, one speaks of a fetus. Hence, there is no
fetus yet in the true sense at the end of the sixth week of development, that is, six
weeks since conception. Second, the sonographic diagnosis of pregnancy is only
possible at 6 to 7 weeks of gestation with an abdominal probe, and about one week
earlier with a vaginal probe. At 6 weeks, the gestational sac" measures between 1.0
and 1.5 cm, and the embryo measures about 4.0 mm (it can hardly be seen!). At this
stage, the embryo's heartbeats are mostly not visible and body movements are seen
only very uncommonly (Jeanty & Romero 1986: 39). In view of these facts, it is
hardly conceivable that one could place a EEG electrode on the scalp of a4-mm
embryo since there is not even a scalp to speak of and that, as will be shown, the
"brain" at this stage is not yet formed. It consists of "brain vesicles" (hollow sacs lined
by undifferentiated nerve cells or neuroblasts ).
In spite of the very implausibility of such a technical prowess (i.e., to record the
EEG of a human embryo), a number of writers do refer to these unsubstantiated brain
waves allegedly detected at six (Feinberg & Levenbook 1993: 197), seven (Flower
1985: 237; Wennberg 1985: 27), eight (Olen & Barry 1996: 170), ten (Thomson
1971: 48), or thirteen weeks of gestation (Sumner 1997: 111). It is quite surprising
that none of these writers (with the exception of Thomson's reference to Daniel
Callahan, 1970) ever provides a reference to the medical or scientific literature to
substantiate their claim. In addition, contemporary scientific evidence from human
embryology shows that at six weeks the embryonic brain consists only of three
dilatations of the cephalic end of the neural tube called respectively forebrain, mid-
brain and hindbrain, or prosencephalon, mesencephalon, and rhombencephalon (from
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the Greek EVKElj>UAOV, literal1y, what is inside of the head). These structures are
vesicles with no brain matter as such, in the sense of grey and white matter (Sadler
2000: 426); these structures are not functioning, but only potentially functioning since
(i.e., at some stage, they will evolve into the different brain structures of an adult
paradigm person). But no argument from potentiality could even apply when the
argument is about (even if they are alleged) biological facts -that is, the presence of
brain waves detectable by EEG. It would be inconsequent to use the argument from
potentiality when the moral argument rests (or should rest) on biologicalfacts.
Brody's (1997: 95) argument runs as follows:
(1) A functioning brain (or at least, a brain that, if not functioning, is susceptible
of function) is a property that every human being must have because it is
essential for being human.
(2) By the time an entity acquires that property, it has all the other properties for
being human.
(3) Therefore, when the fetus acquires that property it becomes a human being.
Let us unravel Brody's argument. Premise (1) looks like an ignoratio elenchi, a
circular argument: it is essential to have a functioning brain to be a human being;
therefore, one cannot be a human being if one does not possess a functioning brain.
This is question begging. Moreover, the condition put between brackets introduces the
argument from potentiality, and jumps the fact-value gap (i.e. it commits the
naturalistic fallacy). Furthermore, it is not clearly defined what is meant by
"functioning brain". Does it refer to the neurovegetative functions located in the brain
stem (regulating the basic vital functions such as breathing and cardio-vascular
function), or does it refer to the higher cortical brain functions of higher-
consciousness? Actually, Brody does not explain what could possibly be the
significance of the alleged brain waves; he merely states that they are emitted. It can
be surmised that the brain function Brody refers to must be the "brain waves"
allegedly detected by EEG.
More details about the intra-uterine brain waves will follow. What can be said
at this stage is that the only electrical activity existing in a seven-week's embryo arises
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in the brain stem (Flower 1985). This means that the embryo is alive and that it
exhibits neurovegetative functions (a rudimentary cardio-vascular and gastro-
intestinal system is present and functional). But this has nothing to do with the
cortical brain waves detectable on EEG.
Premise (2) is also problematic for it is not clear what "property" it refers to. Is
it an established or a potential brain function? The way the premise is phrased
suggests that Brody refers to a potentially functioning brain, or, at least, wishes to
include it to make the argument work. Now, if the premises are not valid (they are
mere assumptions we have no reason to take for granted) the conclusion does not
follow. The conclusion does not follow in the sense Brody wishes - that is, as an
argument against abortion. That the zygote', the pre-embryo, the embryo proper, and
the fetus are human in the genetic sense of belonging to the species Homo sapiens is
beyond any doubt. That the same entities are beings, in the sense of living entities, is a
truism. It is altogether another thing to claim that they have a fully functional brain
and that they are rational beings like a paradigm adult person. Finally, if the presence
of brain waves (whatever this could mean) is the indicator of humanity, as Brody
claims, one could take his argument at face value and conclude that before 6 weeks
the embryo is not human since it does not yet emit "brain waves", and that, therefore,
early abortion is morally neutral. But that would be against Brody's antiabortion
position. Hence, Brody's argument is unsound.
L.Wayne Sumner's argument
What is central in the debate on abortion is the ascription of moral standing to the
unborn entity (Steinbock 1992: 4), be it personhood (actual or potential), ensoulment,
or sentience. Women's right to bodily integrity is a very different approach that does
not take into consideration the moral standing of the embryo/fetus. As we have seen
with Brody's argument the ascription of moral standing on the basis of an ill-defined
and unsubstantiated brain activity is problematic and unconvincing, to say the least.
Let us now investigate whether Sumner's argument from sentience fares better.
Sumner's (1997: 100) "Third Way" is a quest for a more satisfactory and plausible
criterion of moral standing that would ascribe the right to life to any entity possessing
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said moral standing." In order to be satisfactory, he says, that criterion must meet the
following conditions: (1) it must be general (not only applicable to human fetuses);
(2) it must root moral standing in empirical properties of the entities to which it
applies; and (3) it must be grounded in a moral theory to be morally relevant.
Sumner's position thus differs from Brody with respect to the first and third condition.
Brody's moral theory rests on the principle of sanctity of human life; Sumner rejects
speciesism' and advocates utilitarianism (all sentient beings have a moral standing).
In addition to the three above mentioned conditions, says Sumner, the
following is assumed: (1) to have a moral standing is to have some right to life (101);
(2) the paradigm bearer of moral standing is an adult human being with normal
capacities of intellect (viz., rationality), emotion, perception, sensation, and the like
(101); and (3) a criterion of moral standing must rest on something whose presence or
absence can be shown objectively (this condition is applicable to life, sentience, and
rationality)(l02). Like Brody, Sumner wants to found his moral theory on a
scientifically provable fact - that is, the presence of the ability to feel pain and
pleasure. The challenge, now, is to prove scientifically the possession of sentience.
In order to meet the first criterion of moral standing (vzz., to be general - that
is, to avoid the charge of speciesism), Sumner has to modify the second assumption
that includes rationality. This reduction is required, first, to avoid the exclusion of
non-rational beings that is, in his terms, "the mongoloids, the psychotics, the
autistic, the senile, and the profoundly retarded" (107). A second reason for the
reduction is that otherwise some non-human animal species (apes, cetaceans) as well
as fetuses and infants would not be included, for none of these beings possesses all of
the "higher-order cognitive processes typically owned as a bundle by rational
beings"(106). Finally, the third reason for the reduction relates to the necessity to
dissociate moral rights from moral duties, for one has to be rational to be a bearer of
rights and duties (sentience without rationality can only ascribe moral rights). For all
these reasons Sumner suggests: "something less demanding [than rationality] (such as
sentience) is better suited to the latter [viz., the possession of moral rights]". A
criterion of sentience (or consciousness), he argues, "is a promising middle path"
(108).
Concerning Sumner's second satisfaction criterion (viz., that moral standing
must have an empirically objectifiable evidence), it is simply assumed (see the third
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assumption) that sentience is a property that can be measured empirically with
scientific tools. In order to make his point in this regard, Sumner presents a
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological expose of what is roughly needed in terms of
brain development to possess sentience (l11-112) (the complex issue of sentience as
such will receive more attention later). The only mentioned "quantifiable data"
indicative of the presence of sentience presented by Sumner in a non-referenced
footnote are the presence of two neurotransmitters, dopamine and endorphin, qualified
by him as the "pleasure-inducing chemicals", that can be found in sentient beings.
(More will be said later about neurotransmitters.) Strange enough, however, he then
concludes: "The possession of particular neural structures cannot serve as a criterion
of moral standing, for we cannot rule out encounters with sentient beings whose
structures are quite different from ours" (a reference to possible extra-terrestrials).
This contradicts an earlier statement that "the capacity for sentience is present only
when the necessary physiological structures [SiClO]are present". Thus, on the one
hand, Sumner suggests that the capacity of sentience is a minimum but necessary
requirement to possess moral standing and the attached right to life, and that the
ability of sentience requires basic neurological equipment that might be species-
specific. On the other hand, he wants to avoid the charge of speciesism while making
the point that some sentient beings may have structures quite different from ours. One
should be clear about those anatomical structures and distinguish sentience from what
in non-human animals resembles the paradigm human reaction to pain. Furthermore,
similar structures may have different functions. As already mentioned, the similarity
in gene structure, embryology, and neuroanatomy between humans and chimpanzees
is such that they are almost indistinguishable (Miklos 1998: 203). Nonetheless, the
paradigm adult rational person seems to function differently from a chimpanzee
(Baron-Cohen 1999: 127; Mitchell 1997: 35).
Finally, with regards to Sumner's third satisfaction criterion - that is, that the
argument must be supported by a moral theory - it is quite clear that the use of
sentience (viz., the ability to feel pleasure and pain) as the criterion of moral standing
is rooted in classical Benthamite hedonistic utilitarianism: "the greatest happiness for
the greatest number", and what matters is can they feel. The problem is not whether
one adopts utilitarianism or not. The question is rather: Is the argument sound? In
other words, is sentience as defined by utilitarians - that is, the ability to suffer and to
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enjoy - a convincing moral argument against abortion? For it is not enough to state
that they do suffer and enjoy; the onus is on the utilitarians to prove beyond any
reasonable doubt that these living entities have the necessary neural equipment to
actually suffer and enjoy in a meaningful sense rather than behave as though they
were able to feel.
In summary, the only convmcmg point made by Sumner is the linkage
between sentience as a criterion of moral standing and utilitarian morality. As Eric
Katz (1993: 856) and Raanan Gillon (1996: 43) argue: moral standing derived from
sentience is a "highly counterintuitive" and "a pure outgrowth of classical Benthamite
utilitarianism". One could also argue about the meaning of feeling as it is used by
Sumner to define sentience. Is feeling merely the ability of sensory perception? Is
what is observed as a reaction to pain more than a behavioural response to a noxious
stimulus? As Konrad Lorenz (1979: 93,187) pointed out, "behaviour is determined by
the play of multiple interactions between the different automatic instincts (hunger,
fear, sex) ... every one of these behaviour patterns is the function of a corresponding
special physical organisation of the nervous system, sense organs, etc. ". How do we
really know whether, say, a lower non-human animal really feels pain? Or are we
talking about qualia? Sumner argues in favour of the extension of sentience to all
nonhuman animals, possibly including the so-called lower animals, on mere
assumptions; his alleged neuroscientific argument, however, is thin and unconvincing.
We would all agree that a sensible human being is (or should be) normally and
spontaneously prone to avoid pain as well as to refrain from inflicting pain. In that
respect, we may agree with Sumner's intuitions. It needs, however, more scientific
evidence, than the alleged "empirically provable basis" provided by Sumner, to
conclude that a fetus has the ability to experience pain rather than that it just exhibits
reflex arcs (automatisms).
Having analysed and refuted Brody's (a self-confessed moderate conservative
pro-life advocate)!' and Sumner's (a moderate utilitarian pro-choice advocate)
arguments, let us now tum to Tooley's (a radical pro-choice advocate) position.
Michael Tooley's argument
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According to Jonathan Glover (1990: 127), Tooley's discussion on abortion
seems to be "the most unconventional and at the same time the most convincingly
argued in the literature". Two things are unconventional in Tooley's book, Abortion
and Infanticide: (1) the mere logic of the argument leads to the inescapable (but
intuitively repulsive) conclusion that not only abortion (or the termination of
pregnancy at any stage) but also infanticide are permissible and morally neutral; and
(2) that it is morally wrong to torture a kitten whereas it is permissible to kill it.
Like Sumner and Singer, Tooley argues against the permissibility of inflicting
pain to sentient beings (the example of the kitten). Like Sumner, Tooley (1997: 57)
agrees that "a desire not to suffer pain can be ascribed to something without assuming
that it has any concept of a continuing self' (for instance the kitten). Contrary to
Sumner, however, Tooley (and Singer, as will be discussed) claims that it does not
follow from the right not to be tortured that one has a right to life. His main thesis is
that one needs a concept of "continuing self' to have a right to life (neither the kitten
nor the fetuslinfant do possess that concept). Glover, however, disagrees with Tooley
by arguing that it is inadequate to set sharp boundaries in order to try to answer the
question: "What sorts of killings are directly wrong?" This is, he says, "because there
is some arbitrariness in stipulating that 'person' is a purely moral term, roughly
equivalent to 'bearer of rights' ".
Tooley's argument is basically that to be a bearer of rights - in this case, the
bearer of right has the right to life - one must have at least the capacity to desire what
one has a right to. Moreover, to have this capacity, one must possess the idea of
oneself as a continuing subject of experience. Because an infant (and a fetus, for that
matter) does not possess an idea of self as a continuing subject of experience, it
cannot have a desire to life. Therefore, neither a fetus nor an infant has a right to life.
At a later stage, Tooley (1997: 40-58) modified his argument by changing the link
between rights and desires to a link between rights and interests. In other words, to
have a right to life one must have an interest in having one's life continued. That
interest, however, should not be something momentary. In addition, to have a "non-
momentary interest" one needs a concept of a "continuing mental substance".
Now, what are the conditions or what is necessary for having a non-
momentary interest? Tooley (1983: 303) says: "What makes an individual a
person ... is the property of being an enduring subject of non-momentary interests". He
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argues that at least three conditions must be met to qualify as an enduring subject of
non-momentary interests: (1) one must have the ability of having desires, i.e. states
that can be represented in consciousness (not merely behaviour); (2) one must possess
the ability of having thoughts about time other than the present; and (3) one must
possess and have exercised in relevant ways the concept of self as a continuing
subject of mental states. Neither kittens nor fetuses/infants meet these conditions.
Therefore, they have no right to life.
In the conclusion of the chapter entitled The Scientific Evidence: Human
Neuro-physiological Development (372-407), Tooley concludes that newborns (and a
fortiori fetuses) are no "human persons" because: (1) they show no evidence for a
capacity for thought, self-consciousness or rational deliberation; (2) the networks
located in the upper layers of the cerebral cortex, that are thought to underlie higher
mental functions are not present at birth; and (3) the bioelectrical changes [necessary
for (2)] take place after birth. The main neuroscientific arguments Tooley refers to in
order to substantiate claims (2) and (3) are two articles (quoted in Tooley 1983). One,
by Dreyfus-Brissac (1966), is about the fact that the electro-encephalic difference
between wakefulness and sleep appears only at 36-37 weeks of gestation. The other,
by Yakovlev and Lecours (1967), reports that at birth only 60 percent of "what is
characteristically human in the brain" shows myelination. The two issues (sleep and
wakefulness EEG, and myelination of the nervous system will be considered later).
It is quite clear to anyone that a newborn shows no evidence of rational
deliberation. No one would argue against this statement. The question, however, is
then that if one denies personhood to any being devoid of rational deliberation, one
may easily get rid of a sizable proportion of humankind (remember the examples
given by Sumner). As far as the neuroscientific arguments are concerned, it might be
unwise to reach dramatic conclusion based on a limited number of outdated data.
Daily experience with what is called "evidence-based medicine" amply shows that a
number of concepts and practices considered being self-evident and unshakable in the
past have no valid scientific or clinical grounds. The question of electrical brain
waves evidenced by EEG deserves further attention; and the question of myelinisation
refers to the insulation coating of some nerve fibers that affects the speed of action
potentials. The peripheral nervous system is composed of motor and sensory nerves.
The sensory peripheral system comprises two sorts of nerves: myelinated and
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unmyelinated. The unmyelinated or poorly myelinated sensory nerves convey
impulses concerned with pain and cold. The myelinated nerves are larger, conduct
their impulses faster (because myelin sheaths act as insulators). They originate in the
skin as well as in the muscles and tendon receptors. Myelinisation of nerve fibers in
the spinal cord begins in the fourth month of intrauterine life. Some of the motor
fibers descending from higher brain centres to the spinal cord do not become
myelinated until the first year of postnatal life. Tracts in the nervous system become
myelinated at about the time they start to function (Sadler 2000: 421). In the present
context, however, what is relevant is the fact that the unmyelinated or poorly
myelinated nerve fibers are those conducting pain and temperature stimuli. In other
words, there is no need for myelinisation in order to feel pain (Cole & Paillard 1998:
245; Lazorthes 1999: 298). Accordingly, the issue of myelinisation taken in isolation
would indicate that a fetus might possibly be able to feel pain, but it does not as such
prove or disprove this possibility. Concerning EEG sleep patterns, current evidence
indicates that the first REM sleep is detectable at 30 weeks of gestational age
(Lazorthes 1999: Ill). More details will be discussed on this issue later.
Finally, Tooley (163) states: "Once one introduces reference to specific [brain]
functions, one is confronted with the very difficult question of which functions are the
morally relevant ones". And: "Purely biological concepts cannot enter into right-
making or wrong-making characteristics" (313). Unless I did misread Tooley, it
appears that this is precisely what he has been arguing for: no (fully functional) brain,
no mind. No mind, no personhood. No personhood (i.e. no property of being an
enduring subject of non-momentary interest), no right to life.
What is common to Brody, Sumner, and Tooley is that they refer to brain
structure and brain functions either to support or to reject a moral standing of the
unborn (or even newborn). Brody is quite adamant that even at six weeks the embryo
has a fully functional brain (brain waves are emitted!). Sumner takes an intermediate
position: the fetal brain starts functioning (allowing for sentience) somewhere in the
middle of intra-uterine life (a mere assumption though). Tooley denies any brain
function to speak of until a couple of months after birth. Both Sumner and Tooley are,
however, ambiguous about the weight that can be assigned to neuroscientific data to
support an ethical argument. In other words, they appeal to neuroscientific data of the
time to ground their argument while they reject the idea that biological facts could
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support ethical and philosophical conclusions. This link was established by Patricia
Churchland in her book Neurophilosophy (1986).
Bonnie Steinbock's argument
From the outset, Steinbock (1992: 48) accepts the premise that "brain waves
are detectable at about 8 weeks". However, she rather advocates the argument from
"brain birth", and, therefore, she argues: "the emergence of brain waves is only a
necessary, not a sufficient, condition of conscious experience" (49), for
Pain perception requires more than brain waves. It involves the development
of neural pathways and particular cortical and subcortical centres, as well as
neurochemical systems associated with pain transmission (189).
Now this sounds reasonable and prudent enough, and, broadly speaking, in line with
the neurosciences. If brain death is manifested by the disappearance of brain waves
detectable on the EEG, it is also a fact that an irreversible comatose person's brain
does emit electrical waves (Carpenter 1996: 284). Hence, consciousness requires
more than the presence of electrical activity in the central nervous system, and the
presence of some electrical activity in the brain is no indicator of the ability to be
conscious. Where the argument becomes confused is when Steinbock makes either
bold or contradictory statements about the intra-uterine development and function of
the brain. She writes:
Painful sensations are transmitted on [sic] nerve fibers and interpreted
in the cerebral cortex. Development of the fetal neocortex begins at 8
weeks of gestation, and by twenty weeks each cortex has a normal
complement of 109 [sic] neurons (49).
Unless on should be seen as a typographic error, it makes no sense to claim that the
transmission of any neural in- or out-put occurs on a neuron. Furthermore, while it is
true that painful sensations are "interpreted" in the cerebral cortex, Steinbock seems to
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ignore that between the peripheral nerve that transmits the sensation and the cortex
(that interprets) there is a very complex thalamo-limbic system, which permits full
integration of the nervous system (Grobstein 1988: 48) and plays an essential role in
the projection of sensory stimuli to the prefrontal cortex (Changeux 1998: 159).
Quoting Grobstein (1988: 48), Steinbock states that the development of the thalamus
starts around the twentieth week. As it will be shown in Chapter 4, the primitive
thalamus is already recognisable in an 8-weeks embryo (i.e. the primitive embryonic
structure is present). What counts, however, is the establishment of the thalamo-
cortical connections. In addition, it should be said that the neocortex is the fully
developed mature part of the brain (the outer layer of gray matter) with its six layers
of neurons (Kahle et al. 1996: 226), that appears only late in the fetal development of
the brain (194). The cortex and the neocortex are not the same thing, neither are the
global cortex and the prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal cortex is not a general "central
executive" but a set of control systems, each with its separate targets (Kinsbourne
1998: 238). The prefrontal cortex, says Kinsbourne, "enables the individual to
overcome primitive preprogrammed responding when that would be maladaptative".
Furthermore, the left prefrontal cortex regulates planning and the right prefrontal
cortex the interpersonal relations (239). There is more to the cortex than just cortex.
Finally, the claim that not only a twenty-week fetus has a normal (i.e. full)
complement of neurons and that this consists of 109 neurons is appalling. In fact, the
neocortex contains 28 billion neurons and one to ten trillion synapses (Edelman 1998:
38; Mountcastle 1998: 5).
On the other hand, Steinbock writes (in contradiction with the above quote):
The neural pathways are not sufficiently developed to transmit pain messages
to the fetal cortex until 22 to 24 weeks of gestation (50) ... Before 8 weeks of
gestational age sentience is not possible; after 28 weeks, it is very likely ...
Brain birth is when neocortical brain activity begins. The neocortex first
begins producing EEG waves between the twenty-second and twenty-fourth weeks of
gestation (85).
If one would accept the unsubstantiated claim that by twenty weeks the brain has a
full complement of neurons, one might then wonder why it is still not fully
functioning (she claims that the first EEG waves are detected at 22 to 24 weeks, and
sentience only after 28 weeks). In addition, the statement is in contradiction with the
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earlier claim (48) that brain waves are detectable at about 8 weeks (which waves, and
how are they detected?). Finally, Steinbock claims that "sentience appears roughly to
coincide with brain birth" (87) - that is, a 4 to 6 weeks gap in between the two alleged
events (in obstetrics this represents a huge gap that makes the difference between
potential life and certain death, between possible viability and non-viability).
Her closing argument is the following:
The brain-birth standard has the advantage of being objective (unlike sentience)
and unaffected by developments in medical technology (unlike viability)(86) ...
It is sentience rather than brain birth that marks a qualitative difference in the life
of the unborn. However, sentience appears roughly to coincide with brain birth (87).
It is difficult to see what is "objective" in Steinbock's argument. In addition, it is not
clear whether she advocates "brain-birth" rather than "sentience" as the criterion of
moral standing. The claim that sentience and brain birth coincide roughly is highly
questionable since, as Steinbock states, there is a four-week gap in between.
Moreover, as already mentioned, four weeks more or less of intra-uterine life
constitutes a significant time span; it cannot be ignored or minimised.
The four authors refer to brain waves. Let us now find out what these brain
waves are in reality and if they can be used (as they are) in a moral argument about
abortion.
Electroencephalography and allied brain imaging procedures
In order to gain access to and insight into the structural and, much more
importantly, the functional properties of the brain we need in vivo imaging methods.
The oldest one is electroencephalography (EEG), and the latest one is functional
magnetic resonance imaging (tMRI). In between, we have a series of brain imaging
techniques such as event-related potentials (ERP), magnetoencephalography (MEG),
computerised tomography (CT), full-body scan or electron-beam computerised
tomography, low-dose CAT scan, positron emission tomography (PET), and single
photon emission computed tomography (SPECT). In Raichle's (1999: 109) words, as
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opposed to PET and MRI that allow to make a connection between what is seen and
what the brain does, EEG, ERP, and MEG are "venerable electrical tools".'!
Brain Imaging
Hans Berger pioneered EEG as early as 1924. This was followed about 50
years later, in the 70s, by the realisation of computerised tomography (CT) (or
computer assisted tomography, CAT scan) by Hounsfield and McCormack. The CT
scan is a method using X-radiation to generate separate images of consecutive slices
of the body (as opposed to a plain X-ray that shows the superposition of planes). The
same year, 1972, Lauterbur and Damadian realised magnetic resonance imaging
(MRl); the method has the dual advantage of providing better images than the CT
scan but without the use of ionising radiation. MRl discerns the behaviour of
molecules and atoms in high magnetic fields. CT-scans and MRl, however, give static
images of the brain that is, information on the brain structure and alterations
thereof. Neuroscientists are rather interested in brainfunction.
The newer techniques, positron emission tomography (PET) and.fMRT provide
information on the functional aspects of the brain. PET, a derivative of
autoradiography, uses the injection of radioactive water to identify changes in the
blood circulation. The concept of PET is based on the principle that the activity of
nerve cells is an energy-dependent process. The oxygen carried in the blood supplies
this energy to the brain by the blood flow. The detection of changes in blood flow and
oxygenation allow co-Iocalising any increase in neuronal activity as an index of local
firing cells. In this manner, PET provides an anatomical and functional map of the
brain. Data obtained with PET suggest that we possess an automatic and a non-
automatic brain system. The automatic system operates for familiar tasks and for
stressful situations, where we are acting in a reflexive way. The non-automatic
system, subserved largely by the frontal cortex, operates in the processing of novel
tasks. The latter area of the brain develops fully only some time after birth (Raichle
1999: 115). This is relevant to our topic since it indicates that even though there may
be some non-automatic brain activity before birth, the unborn's brain activity is
mainly automatic.
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The limitation of PET, however, is related to its power of resolution of a
sphere of 6 to 10 mm in diameter, whereas one needs a much higher resolution of a
sphere of one cubic mm to gain enough insight into the functional anatomy of the
cortex (Frackowiak 1998: 109). This is the advantage of BOLD:fMRI, a variant of
jMRI that is based on the detection of local brain oxygen levels; it provides a better
but not yet ideal resolution of 3 cubic mm. Event-related potential (ERP) mapping
integrates the information that is obtained from PET and MRI, thus providing more
detailed information than EEG. Another combination, called magneto-
encephalography (MEG), integrates the information from the EEG and ERP-mapping
(Raichle 1999: 115). At variance with conventional EEG that records largely the
cerebral voltages occurring in the surface gyri (the convolutions, bulges) of the
cerebral cortex, MEG goes down to the banks of the sulci (the fissures). It must,
however, be said that these techniques (with the exception ofa recent report onjMRI)
have not yet been used to investigate the functional anatomy of the human fetal brain.
The first report on JMRI in the human fetus was published in the year 2000 (Vadeyar
et al. 2000: 28). In this study, auditory stimuli applied to the abdominal wall of 16
pregnant women between 36 and 41 weeks of pregnancy elicited temporal lobe
activation in the fetal brain. This was interpreted as an indication that there is sensory
competence in mature fetuses, in other words, that the mature fetus has the ability to
hear sounds. Three-dimensional trans-abdominal ultrasound to study the possible
structural anomalies of the fetal brain is still in its infancy; at any rate, it helps in the
diagnosis of structural anomalies but says nothing about the function of the fetal brain
(Cohen et al. 2001: 145).
Electroencephalography
Hans Berger is credited for having described the u-waves of the resting brain,
as well as their block by the onset of alertness. The work of H. Blake and R.W.
Gerard, in 1937, and of E.D. Adrian, in 1944, provided more information about the
nature and disorders of sleep, as well as of epilepsy (Sournia 1992: 494). Although the
functional significance of the various EEG waves remains largely to be elucidated
(Lazorthes 1999: 81), there is general agreement that the EEG is basically a marker of
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sleep intensity.':' The two types of alternating waves, indicating respectively the so-
called REM (rapid eye movement) sleep and the non-REM sleep were described in
1953. The non-REM sleep, also called "orthodox", "quiet", or "deep" sleep is
characterised by slow waves: the SW-sleep. It constitutes 75 to 80 percent of the sleep
and reaches its maximum within the first hour after the onset of sleep. The highest
threshold to sensory stimuli is reached at the same time. The EEG slow waves
indicate decreases in metabolic activity (Kinsbourne 1998: 249). The non-REM sleep
is interrupted periodically (more or less every 2 hours) by periods of REM sleep. The
EEG waves of non-REM sleep have a high voltage and a low frequency. Thus,
paradoxically, the largest potentials are recorded when the brain is at rest. When brain
activity is "disturbed" as it is in schizophrenia, the dimension of the resting scalp EEG
is higher due to the less organised, less coherent and less stable dynamics (Globus
1995: 98). REM sleep, also called "active" or "paradoxical" sleep, characterises the
EEG of dreaming adults; it resembles closely what is recorded in the waking state.
REM sleep occupies proportionally much longer of babies and children's sleep. The
same has been observed in the fetus, which spends most of its time in states of active
sleep that resembles REM sleep (Carpenter 1996: 284; Borbély & Tononi 1998: 186).
Although most of what we know about the fetal EEG results from
observations made in fetal lambs (Nathanielsz 1992: 127), there is some indication
that in the human fetus the first non-REM waves of deep sleep are detectable around
the 30th week after conception, and that the first REM waves of active sleep are
detectable around the 36th week of intra-uterine life. In early extra-uterine life, REM
of active sleep is the predominant EEG pattern (Lazorthes 1999: 111). This does not
mean that the fetal brain is in a dormant state of hibernation. According to Borbély
and Tononi:
Activity-dependent processes are essential for axonal growth, synaptic
remodeling, and the refinement of connectivity. In the absence of extrinsic
stimulation, the intrinsically generated activity of sleep, which is often
oscillatory in nature, might promote the growth and maturation of neuronal
circuits (1998: 187).
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In other words, it is likely that fetal sleep is preparing the basic neural circuitry that
will be switched-on after birth when extrinsic stimulation will establish the needed
connections between the circuits.
It should also be noted that during the state of coma large amplitude EEG
waves are recordable and that they resemble the SW-sleep (Carpenter 1996: 284). A
technical point is equally in order at this stage. In adults, the recording of the EEG is
carried out with up to 120 scalp electrodes (the size of the head is the limiting factor
to the number of electrodes) in order to compensate as much as possible for the poor
localisation of the number and of the origin of signals (Mountcastle 1998: 20;
Frackowiak 1998: Ill). As already mentioned, it is hardly conceivable how one could
record the EEG of a 6-weeks human embryo (Brody's unsubstantiated claim) when
the length of the body is between 10 and 14 mm! Andy Clark (1998: 275) recently
reported on a kind of world premiere where some scanty neural recordings from a
locust in free flight have been obtained through tiny radiotransmitters. With progress
in technology, more neurobiological knowledge will undoubtedly be acquired.
Whether this technology will be applicable to and morally permissible in human
embryology and fetus research remains an open question.
The main problem related to techniques like EEG is that they are "secondary
signs of neural activity", but "say nothing about how neuronal activity generates the
secondary signs" (Mountcastle 1998: 24). To know how the secondary signs are
generated, one needs chronically implanted microelectrodes in relevant neurons
(ibid.). While this appears possible in locusts, it would be ethically questionable in
human embryos or fetuses.
Concluding remarks
It can be said with confidence that there is no scientific evidence supporting
Brody's and others' claim concerning brain waves emitted by the embryonic and early
fetal brain. When EEG waves start appearing (and this happens rather late during
intra-uterine life, the earliest around the thirtieth week) they merely indicate that the
fetus has the ability to sleep. Although fetal sleep might activate the brain and prepare
it to extra-uterine life, this is far from saying that its brain is fully structured and fully
functional. Hence, the ethical arguments based on the alleged presence of brain
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electrical activity, have no solid neuroscientific, hence no neurophilosophical
grounds.
Currently available scientific evidence on the intra-uterine development and
function of the embryonic and fetal nervous system are still very limited.
Embryologic data, information gathered from autopsies, ultra-sonographic imaging of
the fetus and clinical data from severely premature newborns give the information
listed in Table 1.14 It is important to note that fetal "behaviour" should be seen merely
as a "conservatory automatism" rather than an adaptation to variable conditions (we
know little about the fetus' perception of environmental changes except the faculty of
hearing sounds). Even the anencephalic newborn sleeps, yawns, cries, and sucks its
thumb (Lazorthes 1999: 30). Also of note is the presence of the Babinski sign (the
upgoing big toe when the foot sole is stimulated) in all newborns, indicating
dissociation between the brain and the spinal cord (as it can be observed with central
nervous system damage) (Carpenter 1996: 196).
The newborn has a full complement of neurons. However, "the fact that a
neural system is in place does not guarantee that it will participate in the control of
behaviour; it needs to be switched on, or activated" (Kinsbourne 1998: 252). During
intra-uterine life, says Edelman:
Cells divide, migrate, die, stick to each other, send out processes, and form
synapses. This dynamic series of events depends quite sensitively on place
(which other cells are around), time, and correlated activity (whether cells
fire together or change together chemically over a period oftime) (1992: 22).
These facts should be understood in the perspective of a brain that is ever changing,
against the simplistic and static view that the brain is born somewhere in early
embryonic life and just grows bigger with time. There is no homunculus in the brain.
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4 Approaching the complexity of the brain
What peculiar privilege has this little
agitation of the brain which we call
thought, that we must make it the model
of the whole universe?
DavidHume
Introduction
The aim of the present chapter is to introduce the reader to the complexity of
the brain - its evolution, basic embryogenesis, and function. The main thrust could be
said the refutation of the seventeenth-century theory of preformationism that is, that
all future generations were already present in Eve's ovaries like dolls within dolls -
which still remains in the back of some people's mind (Rachels 1995: 70). As
Edelman writes (1992), the spectrum of the homunculus is still with us. In other
words, those less (or not at all) familiar with the intricacies of phylogenesis and
organogenesis might, as in the past, have the idea that the human embryo has
miniature organs that just grow larger during intra-uterine development. If this can be
said to some extent for some of our body parts, it surely does not apply to the brain.
Moreover, although the human brain reaches a more or less complete structure by the
onset of the third trimester of gestation, there is sufficient evidence that indicates that
it is unable to function like the brain of a paradigm mature rational person. The other
vital organs (lungs, heart, intestines, kidneys, liver) are structurally and functionally
ready at birth. They will grow larger with the growth of the body. Not so for the brain.
There is also a misconception about the nervous system that needs to be
dispelled. Advocates of sentientism rest their case on the claim that non-human
animals possess a brain that is similar to the human brain. Humans have the ability to
feel pain and pleasure. Since animals (at least the higher animals) have the same brain
they feel the same. Therefore, they demand the same respect.
In order to refute these two misconceptions it is imperative to have a minimum
of insight into the evolution and the basic functioning and structure of the brain in
animals and in humans. In the present chapter, the anatomic aspects of the brain and
its evolution will be addressed. This is the task we are now turning to.
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The phylogenesis of the central nervous system: nonhuman animals
It would be far beyond the scope of this essay to survey in any depth the
anatomy and physiology of the nervous system of all animal species.' First, it would
not be relevant. Second, even the most radical sentientists have doubts about the
capacity of sentience of molluscs, arthropods, and microbes. Arguably, perhaps, they
limit sentience to the world of vertebrates, and even only the higher mammals - the
limitation of moral consideration to the so-called "mammalian ethics".
The animal kingdom can be subdivided into two major classes: those with no
brain so to speak (hyponeureans) and those with a brain (epineureans), as summarised
in the following table.
1. Hyponeureans: 1.1. worms
1.2. molluscs: 1.2.1. gastropods (e.g. snails)
1.2.2. bivalves (e.g. oysters)
1.2.3. cephalopods (e.g. octopus)
1.3. arthropods: 1.3.1. crustaceans (with neural ganglia above
and below the oesophagus)
1.3.2. insects (with a network of metameric
ganglia)
2. Epineureans: the phylum Chordata (vertebrates):
2.1. agnathes (primitive fish)
2.2. cartilaginous fish (e.g. sharks)
2.3. lower vertebrates: 2.3.1. osseous fish
2.3.2. amphibians
2.3.3. reptiles
2.4. birds
2.5. mammals: 2.5.1. lower (or primitive): - monotremes (egg-laying)
- marsupials (e.g. kangaroo)
- placentals: 18 orders ~
2.5.2.higher: - cetaceans (e.g. whales, dolphins)
-primates: lemurs, monkeys, apes, and humans
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
54
Lower vertebrates (fish, amphibians, reptiles) possess a rhombencephalon
(hindbrain), a midbrain (archencephalon or reptilian brain), and a forebrain consisting
mainly of a sizeable olfactory bulb (bulbus olfactoriusï. The telencephalon (the
cerebral hemispheres) is limited to a small appendage situated in front of the olfactory
bulb. Their archicortex is limited to the hippocampus (a component of the limbic
brain). This means that lower vertebrates possess the neural equipment needed for
automatisms and reflexes, a potent organ of smell, and an integration system.
Higher vertebrates comprise the class of mammals, lower and higher. The
lower (or primitive) mammals are characterised by a progressive increase in the
development of the forebrain, or telencephalisation. The increase in size of the
neoencephalon (forebrain) leads to the burrowing of the diencephalon and of the
midbrain (mesencephalon). The burrowed portions of the brain, called
centrencephalon, comprise the archencephalon or reptilian brain and the
paleoencephalon. The reptilian brain is constituted by the reticular formation, the
hypothalamus, and the archicortex. The reticular formation, situated in the truncus
cerebri (hindbrain), regulates the sleep/wake tonus. The hypothalamus regulates the
basic biological needs (hunger, thirst, reproduction), emotions (fight/flight), and the
internal milieu. The most ancient component of the cerebral hemispheres, the
paleopallium, situated at the lowest part of the brain, is predominantly composed of
the olfactory bulb and the rhinencephalon (the adjacent paleocortex). Because of the
importance of the organ of scent, Lorenz (1979: 27) says that animals "think through
their noses". The archicortex is composed mainly of the hippocampus, a portion of the
limbic brain. Lower mammals, then, possess the necessary brain equipment for basic
emotions (fight/flight) as well as for a rudimentary memory.
It can be said, as a rule, that during phylogenesis (the evolution of species) as
well as during embryogenesis (the coming into being of an individual member of a
species) what appears first is the centreneephalon and the paleocortex. The
centreneephalon has two components: 1) the paleoencephalon or limbic brain; and 2)
the archencephalon, the hindbrain or brain stem and the hypothalamus (a component
of the limbic brain). The only cortical structure at this stage is the paleocortex
(rhinencephalon), an outgrowth of the diencephalon: the olfactory system. The
neoencephalon or forebrain appears last both in phylogenesis and in embryogenesis. If
one considers the brain of a primitive rodent (e.g. the porcupine), of a primitive
primate (e.g. the tupaja), and of a primitive lemur (e.g. the maki) one can see the
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transition between a brain anatomy where the cerebellum is respectively free (not
burrowed underneath the forebrain), one-third, and half-covered by the expansion of
the neopallium (cerebral cortex). In these animals, the surface of the brain is smooth;
there are no sulci (small groves) or gyri (bulges).
In higher mammals, the telencephalon (brain hemispheres) reaches its highest
development. The neocortex (cerebral cortex), now called gyrencencephalon, exhibits
sulci and gyri. It is the organ of relationship with the outside world. The
centrencephalon, which is covered by the telencephalon, is in charge of the
maintenance of the internal milieu. According to the phylogenetic ancienty of the
species, the centreneephalon comprises: 1) the reptilian brain (the reticular formation,
the hypothalamus, and a portion of the fronto-temporal archicortex); and 2) the limbic
brain. According to Lazorthes (1999: 99), the importance in size of the frontal lobes
and their late appearance towards the end of intra-uterine life, argue in favour of the
idea that they are the sites of intelligence although they are not totally conditioning
the ability to think. The same is said from higher mammals, and more specifically the
apes:
Animals have clever brains, but blank minds. They receive sensory inputs
but their minds are not conscious of any accompanying sensation.
They go about their lives deeply ignorant of an inner explanation for their
own behaviour (Baron-Cohen 1999: 6).
These rudimentary data on the evolution of the brain are enough to show that
so-called primitive or lower animals (a "naïve value-judgement" says Lorenz), mainly
the primitive vertebrates (fish, reptiles, and amphibians), possess the basic neural
substrate to cope with biological life and reproduction. Their forebrain is mainly
structured at providing a potent ability to smell (to compensate for the limited potency
of the other sensory systems - vision and hearing). They have the ability to
experience emotions - that is, to react to visceral sensations required to survive. But
as Mayerfeld (1999: 59) writes: "To understand the feelings of animals attention must
be paid to the organisation of the nervous system". If this is true about non-human
animals, there can be no reason why it should not be true about human animals,
including the embryo and fetus. Let us now tum to the genesis of the human brain.
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The organogenesis of the nervous system: human animals
In this section, I will present some of the main steps in the organogenesis of
the human brain. I will try to illustrate them, although in a rudimentary manner, by a
series of pictorials.
The very first steps of development of the pre-embryo (day 1 to 14 after
fertilisation) and embryo proper (third through eighth week of intrauterine life) have
been described in Chapter 3. In the present section, I wish to focus again on the early
development of the central nervous system - that is, the brain and the medulla
spinalis.
The central nervous system arises from the neural groove of the embryonic
disc. By day-14, the neural tube is formed. Two weeks later, the cephalic or rostral
end of the tube starts dilating and flexing (Fig.1). 2 The wall of the "brain vesicles" is
lined by undifferentiated neural cells (neuroblasts). The process of dilatation and
flexion of the brain vesicles intensifies gradually. At day-32, the roof of the 4th
ventricle starts thickening (Fig.2).3 A sketchy diencephalon (the caudal part of the
forebrain) is recognisable by day-49~ it contains the rudimentary elements of the
thalamus and of the hypothalamus (Fig.3).4 During the last week of the embryo proper
stage the three components of the brain (forebrain, midbrain, and hindbrain) are well
individualised. The relative size of each is roughly similar (Fig. 4).5 At this stage of
embryogenesis, the hypophysis and the epiphysis (pineal gland) make their
appearance at the lower rostral and upper caudal end of the diencephalon respectively.
We now enter the fetal stage of development. During the tenth week, the
diencephalon undergoes major modifications. In addition to the thalamus and the
hypothalamus, two new structures make their appearance: the neostriatum (the
caudate nucleus, the lentiform nucleus, and the putamen) and the paleostriatum (the
globus pallidus). The pallium, the future cerebral cortex, is represented by three
structures: 1) the paleocortex at the lower part of the diencephalon (the future
olfactory lobes); 2) the archicortex at the inner aspect of the telencephalic vesicle (the
future hippocampus); and 3) the neocortex on top of the future cerebral hemispheres
(the future cerebral cortex)(Fig. 5).6 The corpus striatum connects the extrapyramidal
nervous motor system to the brain; but its precise function remains unknown. Its
experimental destruction does not produce motor dysfunction; its stimulation is
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followed by circular movements of the head (Kahle et al. 1996: 222). At this stage,
then, the central nervous system starts establishing its internal connections. The basic
elements from which the future brain components will arise are in place. By the third
month of fetal life, more rudimentary structures become visible (Fig.6).7
Eight weeks later, by the end of the fourth month of gestation, the cerebral
hemispheres have expanded considerably and the diencephalon has become partly
burrowed under the overlying telencephalon. The olfactory bulbs are well visible. The
hypophysis starts its expansion. The rostral part of the corpus callosum, a connection
between the two brain hemispheres, is present. The cerebellum, pons cerebelli, and
medulla oblongata are recognisable. The surface of the cerebral cortex is still flat (Fig.
7).8 The most advanced development is at the level of the midbrain (mesencephalon
and pedonculi cerebri) and hindbrain (pons and medulla oblongata), the parts involved
in the vegetative functions of the body. It has been suggested that by the twenty-
second week (end of the fourth month) of gestation the connections between the
thalamus and the cortex are in place (i.e. the cortico-thalamic connections) (Flower
]985). Based on this suggestion it has been inferred that from that stage on the fetus
has the ability to feel pain. It is true that the thalamus possesses sensory relay nuclei
that project to the sensory cortex of the brain, more specifically the sn area
(Carpenter 1996: 85). The cortical sensory areas receive projections from two
spinothalamic pathways: an anterior (more highly developed in higher animals) and a
lateral pathway. The anterior spinothalamic tract projects to regions that are not
wholly somatosensory; the lateral spinothalamic (older) is more concerned with pain
(77-78). It cannot be ruled out nor can it be proven that the fetus has the ability to feel
pain. Carpenter reminds us: "the central pathways for pain are in fact rather complex
and poorly understood, partly because the sensation of pain is itself very complex"
(85).
It is not before the seventh month of gestation that the various layers of
neurons in the brain cortex become clearly individualised. They reach their ultimate
outlook during the eighth month (Lazorthes 1999: 108). By the time of birth, the brain
is a bulk of neurons and of circuitry, says Lazorthes (109). It is by practice that triage
is achieved. The circuitry is put in place by establishing new connections as well as by
neuronal death resulting in disconnections. The initial phase of synaptogenesis is
genetically induced; fine-tuning results from the interaction with the environment
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(lIO). Therefore, the fact that the spinothalamic tract is in place does not prove that
the cortical structures are able to process the nociceptive input.
In order to make sense of the preceding, it seems that an outlook on the
structure and the function of the adult brain is in order. This is the topic of the next
section.
The major role players in the central nervous system
As we have seen earlier, the brain (encephalon, cerebrum) refers to the parts
derived from the forebrain - that is, the cerebral hemispheres (telencephalon, or
anterior portion of the prosencephalon) and the diencephalon (posterior part of the
prosencephalon). The brainstem refers to the unpaired parts derived from the midbrain
and the hindbrain - that is, the truncus cerebri, which comprises the mesencephalon
(with the pedunculi cerebri) and the pons (a midbrain derivative), and the medulla
oblongata (a hindbrain derivative). Let us now consider the components of the brain
that are viewed as the major role-players in the processes of thought, memory, and
sentience (in its broadest sense).
The frontal lobes
The brain hemispheres are subdivided into four lobes: frontal, parietal,
temporal, and occipital (Fig. 8).9 The frontal lobe extends from the frontal pole (viz.,
the most anterior part that corresponds to the forehead) to the sulcus eentralis of
Rolando (or central sulcus). The cortex of the anterior and lower part of the frontal
lobe is called the prefrontal cortex. It is noteworthy that only human animals do
possess a prefrontal cortex (Lazorthes 1999). It is composed of associative neurons -
that is, neurons that are neither motor nor sensory but that have the function of
establishing links between all the areas of the brain. It receives input from the
thalamus, and sends output back to the thalamus and to the limbic system (Lazorthes
1999: 102). Therefore, the prefrontal cortex is not a "general executive" (Kinsbourne
1998: 238), but rather what I would call a "public relations officer". The left
prefrontal cortex is involved in planning; the right prefrontal cortex is involved in
interpersonal relations. It enables the individual "to overcome primitive pre-
programmed responding when that would be maladaptative" (ibid.). Between the
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prefrontal cortex and the central sulcus, there is a premotor area and a somatomotor
area. The frontal lobe is undoubtedly a major role-player in the process of thinking.
One of the hypotheses suggesting how mental activity is brought about has been
suggested by Luria (1973 quoted in Lazorthes 1999: 101) (Fig. 9).10
A major part of our understanding of the function of the central nervous
system is the result of neurological diseases and accidents. With regard to the role of
the frontal lobe, the famous case of American mining engineer is worth recalling. J.M.
Harlow in the Bulletin of the Massachusetts Medical Society published it in 1868.
Working with dynamite sticks in a mine in 1848, Phineas Gage suffered from an
accidental perforation of the skull by a crowbar that destroyed his prefrontal cortex.
The most remarkable consequence of this accidental leucotomy (severance of the
white brain matter, also called lobotomy or section of the frontal lobe) was that Gage
became totally indifferent, mainly to pain. A similar case was that of Elliot V.R, who
underwent an excision of the ventromedial frontal lobes. This was followed by the
incapacity of long-term planning, a lack of sense of what is socially appropriate, and
an inability to defer instant gratification (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 196).
Gage's accident was at the origin of what became known as frontal lobotomy,
which was initially performed surgically, but eventually became possible through
pharmacological means. The procedure is used in patients suffering from intractable
pain. The interesting thing is that it does not result in the disappearance of pain. The
pain is there and the subject is aware of it. What disappears is the emotional quality of
pain. Cambridge University neurophysiologist RHS. Carpenter has suggested that an
explanation of this dissociation between the feeling of pain and the pain-affect might
be that "by stripping the pain of its meaning for the future, we also relieve its
emotional threat" (1996: 250). In experimental so-called "frontal" animals - that is,
having undergone a frontal lobotomy (they possess a frontal lobe but no prefrontal
cortex)- the ability to store a program of action for deferred use is lost (ibid.). This
suggests two things. One, that the frontal lobe (and more specifically the prefrontal
cortex) needs to be connected with the rest of the brain to be able to memorise and to
have a concept of time, present, past, and future. And two, that without a concept of
time pain looses its emotional overtone. If this hypothesis were valid, it would mean
that suffering requires a fully structured and fully functional brain. Therefore, the
unborn (and lower animals) may possibly feel pain but not suffer.
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Another part of the frontal lobe, the orbito-frontal cortex (locus of the
amygdala), plays an important role. It is connected to the superior temporal sulcus.
This orbito-frontal cortex/superior temporal sulcus has been studied by single photon
computed tomography. It suggests that it plays a major role in our mental states
(think, imagine, hope, fear, remember, plan)(Baron-Cohen 1999: 92). A damage to
the amygdala or a disconnection between the two areas results in abnormal social
perception, failure to attach emotional significance to stimuli, diminution of
aggression, and affiliative behaviour (95).
Since the topic of discussion is the neurophysiology of pain perception, the
other cerebral lobes will not be considered. Suffice to say that sensory inputs to the
brain are directed to the sensory cortex located in the temporal lobe behind the sulcus
eentralis (Fig. 8).9 It is worth noting that the electrical stimulation of the
somatosensory cortex in conscious human subjects rarely produces a pain sensation
(Carpenter 1996: 84). More relevant to the discussion are the functions of the
thalamus and hypothalamus.
The Thalamus
The thalamus (from the Greek thalamos, bedroom) is one of the four
components of the diencephalon. In other words, the diencephalon is composed of
four areas lying on top of each other: the epithalamus, the dorsal thalamus, the
subthalamus, and the hypothalamus. The hypothalamus will be considered in the next
section.
The epithalamus is a relay between the olfactory centre and the truncus
cerebri. It is also connected to the epiphysis (pineal gland). The dorsal thalamus
receives sensory inputs from the skin, the eyes, the ears, and the taste buds. It has two-
way connections with the cerebral cortex. The subthalamus is the motor-zone of the
diencephalon. As a whole, the thalamus is a relay for sensory and motor afferents to
the cortex. It also exhibits connections with the associative cortex and with the limbic
brain.
The thalamus is composed of a number of nuclei. The anterior and dorsolateral
nuclei connect with the limbic brain. The median nuclei connect with the frontal
cortex. The lateral nuclei connect with the parietal lobe. The ventral nuclei connect
either with the motor and the sensory cortex or with the visual and the auditory cortex.
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It is through the ventral thalamic fibres that somatic inputs are integrated and
transmitted to the frontal cortex. This is the pathway through which unconscious
stimuli originating from the visceral and somatic spheres of the body reach the frontal
cortex to affect our moods and to become conscious of our moods (Kahle et al. 1996:
170). Remember the corticothalamic and spinothalamic tracts referred to by Flower
(1985) in support of the possibility for the fetus to feel pain.
Once again, we have to refer to experimental data and other procedures that
may help the understanding of the role of this part of the brain. During some
neurosurgical procedures on the brain patients are kept awake and conscious. This has
the advantage that specific areas can be stimulated and that the patient can report what
he or she experiences. The electrical stimulation ofthe ventrobasal thalamus provokes
a pricking pain (also called first pain). The stimulation of the central thalamus is
followed by a sensation of intense unpleasantness (Carpenter 1996: 85).
Thalamotomy - the stereotaxic destruction of selected portions of the thalamus - is
practiced for the relief of pain, for the arrest of involuntary movements, and for the
treatment of emotional disturbances (Stedman 1997: 876). This is not to say that the
thalamus is the "pain centre" of the brain (as opposed to the alleged "pleasure centre"
located in the hypothalamus). It means that the thalamus participates in the chain of
events leading to the perception of pain. Once the communication between the
sensory input and the higher cortical areas has been severed, the processing procedure
is hampered.
The Hypothalamus
The hypothalamus is the fourth component of the diencephalon (Fig. 10). II It
IS In close relationship with the underlying hypophysis. Like the thalamus, the
hypothalamus is composed of nuclei: the nucleus supraopticus, the nucleus
paraventricularis, the tuber cinereum (itself composed of the nucleus ventromedialis,
dorsomedialis, and infundibularis), and the mamillary bodies. The hypothalamus has
two-way connections with the cerebellum, the thalamus, the limbic system, and the
hypophysis.
In Carpenter's words, "the hypothalamus determines all what we do"; it is a
"need detector and a response generator" (1996: 278). In Kahle et al. view, the
hypothalamic centres influence all the phenomena that playa role in the homeostasis
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of the internal milieu. They adapt the function of the organs to the needs of the body:
energy supply and consumption, water and minerals supply and consumption, cardio-
vascular and respiratory function, and circadian rhythm (biological clock). It
processes the instinctual body requirements perceived as hunger, thirst, sexual
pulsions, and all the conservatory mechanisms which most of the time have emotional
overtones such as refusal, pleasure, fear or anger (1996: 186).
In human pathology, according to the site of damage there will be either
gonadal atrophy or precocious puberty. Other sites of damage result in either cachexy
or obesity. In animals, experimental stimulation or destruction of hypothalamic nuclei
have similar results.
The Limbic system
In evolutionary terms, the limbic brain is the so-called paleoencephalon (the
ancient brain). Together with the archencephalon (the initial brain) - that is, the
hypothalamus and the hindbrain - the limbic brain belongs to the centreneephalon
(burrowed underneath the cerebral hemispheres, in the centre of the brain). Remember
the reptilian brain or midbrain common to the lower vertebrates (fish, amphibians,
reptiles), and the limbic brain (composed only of the hippocampus in lower
vertebrates). Likewise, recall the fact that lower mammals have a more complex
limbic brain, a less developed olfactory brain system, and a more developed
archicortex than the lower vertebrates (Lazorthes 1999: 65).
The limbic system (from the Latin limbus, edge) was identified as a specific
system only in 1953 (Rey 1995: 328). It has since received a number of nicknames
such as visceral brain, affective brain, and emotive brain. All names point to the view
that this part of the brain plays a special role in animal behaviour loaded with
emotional overtones. It is composed of a heterogeneous array of nuclei, fibre tracts,
and cortical areas at the edge of the medial wall of the cerebral hemispheres (Fig. 10
& 11).11-12 It has telencephalic (brain hemispheres) and diencephalic components.
The limbic nuclei comprise the amygdala (corpora amygdaloidea), the septal
nuclei (the so-called "pleasure centre"), the mamillary bodies, and the hypothalamus.
The limbic cortical areas are: the hippocampus (from the Greek hippocampus,
seahorse) (or hippocampal gyrus), the cingulum (from the Latin cingulum, girdle)
(cingulate gyrus, or limbic convolution), and some parts of the olfactory cortex. The
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limbic nuclei and the limbic cortical areas are connected by fibre tracts (Carpenter
1996: 258). The limbic convolution is composed of associative cortex that links up
different parts of the brain: the hypothalamus (the fornix to the preoptic area and tuber
cinereurn, the stria terminalis to the tuber cinereurn, and the ventral fibres to the
corpora amygdaloidea), the thalamus, the mamillary bodies, and the frontal cortex
(through the hippocampus) (Fig. 10).II
Because of its hypothalamic component, the limbic system is involved in all
the functions mentioned earlier about the hypothalamus. The limbic projections from
the amygdala and the information received by the hippocampus (an important
contributor to the faculty of memory) contribute to the limbic processing of emotional
reactions, motivation, and accompanying the vital processes involved in conservation
(survival) (Carpenter 1996: 259; Lazorthes 1999: 259).
In animals, the selective electrical stimulation of specific areas of the
hippocampus produces anger, hyperphagia, defecation, micturition, or retreat. In
humans, it produces relaxation. The selective stimulation of the septal nuclei (the so-
called pleasure centre) produces euphoria. The electrical stimulation of some areas of
the dorsomedial thalamus, of the hypothalamus, or of the amygdala produces
reactions of avoidance and of withdrawal. It is not clear whether the latter reaction
results from the production of pain (Carpenter 1996: 282). Cingulectomy (the removal
or destruction of the cingulum or hippocampus) significantly decreases aggressive
behaviour; like frontalleucotomy, it produces indifference to intractable pain (Kahle
et al. 1996: 306).
From the above data, we can build a kind of map of the various loci of the
central nervous system that are involved in the processing of pain and emotions.
Mapping the "pain centres"
It would be contrary to the connectionist view on brain function to retain the
idea of centre( s) since the processing of pain is not performed by any centre so to
speak but by the loops and feedbacks between a large number of loci scattered
through the entire central nervous system. Nonetheless, as it can be seen from animal
experiments as well as from stereotaxic electrical stimulation or destruction of
specific areas of the brain, the thalamus plays a central role in the process of pain
sensation.
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The thalamus is the only central nervous component whose electrical
stimulation provokes a feeling of pain. On the other hand, the perception of pain can
be altered by interventions at levels other than the thalamus.
Starting from the prefrontal cortex, we have seen that prefrontal lobotomy or
leucotomy in humans suffering from intractable pain results in indifference to pain.
Pain is still perceived but its "unpleasantness" (its emotional, psychological, temporal
overtones) so to say, disappears. The same result is obtained through cingulectomy
(the destruction of the limbic convolution) for intractable pain. A third locus in the
brain hemispheres (although they are a component of the limbic system that has also
components within the diencephalon), the corpora amydaloidea ofthe temporal lobes,
plays a less defined role; their stimulation results either in anxiety or relaxation,
depending on the mood of the subject at the time of the stimulation.
Moving down to the diencephalon - the limbic system, the thalamus, and the
hypothalamus - we find two major role players in the perception of pain and pleasure
(the hypothalamus does not seem to playa role in this regard). As we have mentioned,
stimulation of the ventral thalamus evokes "first pain" (pricking pain). Stimulation of
the central thalamus evokes a feeling of intense unpleasantness. Stimulation of the
dorsomedial thalamus evokes "second pain" (withdrawal). The section of the
spinothalamic tract (that is, in the medulla dorsalis), or mesencephalotomy, relieves
intractable pain. This is different from frontal lobotomy and from cingulectomy in the
sense that the section of the spinothalamic tract results in the disappearance of the
sensation of pain and not only of the emotional aspect of pain. In other words, the
pain-affect requires the connections between the thalamus, the limbic convolution
and/or the frontal cortex. Pain sensation requires the connections between the
peripheral pain receptors and the thalamus through the spinothalamic tracts (Fig.
l2).13
What about the pleasure centres? The main central nervous system loci of
pleasure are the septal nuclei and amygdala. These have been called pleasure centres
in the sense that if an electrode is implanted and connected up so that when an animal
presses a lever in its cage it receives a pulse of electrical stimulation. Then, as soon as
the animal discovers what the lever does, it will go on pressing it repeatedly, often in
preference to other pleasant stimuli such as food and sex. As Carpenter (1996: 282)
comments: "Of course, one cannot tell whether it isfeeling pleasure as a result; but it
is clear that the electrode must in a sense be by-passing the normal motivational
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mechanisms of the hypothalamus and in some way activating the tropistic input to the
motor system directly". In other words, we are interpreting a behaviour without
knowing exactly what the animal really feels.
Having gained some insight into the main sites involved in the transmission of
nociceptive stimuli inside of the central nervous system, we have to turn to the
peripheral sensory systems and to the neurochemical function of the nervous system.
Sensory modalities and sensory systems
In order to adapt to the external world and to react in an adequate manner to
the sensory inputs, living entities possess a vast array of sensors for light, sound,
temperature, pressure, vibration, taste, pain, pleasure, etc. These sensors are located in
the skin, tendons, muscles, ears, eyes, nose, tongue, etc. The exteroceptive sense
relates to the perception of stimulation by external agents. The proprioceptors
perceive the movements and positions of the body. The nociceptors perceive the
painful or noxious stimuli.
The skin contains a variety of sensory receptors. The Pacinian corpuscles
perceive deformation and pressure. The Meissner's corpuscles respond to mechanical
stimuli. The Merckel's discs respond to light touch; they are the first skin sensors that
appear during intrauterine life (approximately at 20 weeks of gestation). Ruffini's
endings are proprioceptors. The encapsulated endings are sensitive to cold, and the
free endings are sensitive to warmth, pain, and mechanical stimuli (Carpenter 1996:
75). This is a kind of rough taxonomy of the peripheral sensors, which do not reflect
the vast richness of our sensory perceptions (74).
The sensory input reaching any of these sensors travels to the spinal cord
through nerve fibres of different types: poorly or richly myelinated, large or small.
Myelin is an insulation coat around nerve fibres that speeds up the conduction of
action potentials. The gauge of nerve fibres also influences the speed of transmission
of inputs.
Myelination of the nerve fibres in the spinal cord begins in approximately the
fourth month of intrauterine life. Some of the motor fibres descending from the higher
brain centres to the spinal cord do not become myelinated until the first year of
postnatal life. Tracts in the nervous system become myelinated at about the time they
start to function (Sadler 2000: 421).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
66
The nociceptor system belongs to the poorly myelinated protopathic sensory system;
the proprioceptor system belongs to the heavily myelinated epicritical system.
The size of nerve fibres also plays a role, not only in the speed of
transmission, but also in the nature of the stimuli. Mechanical and proprioceptive
stimuli travel to the spinal cord through large fibres called Ap. Nociceptive stimuli
travel to the spinal cord through AB and C fibres. First pain (pricking pain or
immediate feeling) travels through the large and fast AB fibres. Second pain
(including visceral pain), which induces withdrawal, travels through slow C fibres
(Carpenter 1996: 84).
One should keep in mind that the sensation of pain may result from tissue
damage - that is, a noxious stimulus sensed by nociceptors- yet, many kinds of pain
are not associated with tissue damage at all. As Carpenter (85) reminds us:
The sensation of pain is itseIfvery complex ... the degree of pain that
is feIt depends to a large extent on the emotional state and on the
meaning that pain may have (e.g. frontalleucotomy). Sensing the
pain is not the same as feeling the pain.
According to the above data, it can be said that the human fetus acquires the
faculty of sensing light touch around the twentieth week of gestation. Around the
same time, the process of myelination starts. We now turn to the complex issue of the
neurotransmitters.
The Neurotransmitters
The coordination of a single-celled organism such as an amoeba is essentially
chemical. As Carpenter (1996: 3) puts it: "its brain is its nucleus, acting in
conjunction with its other organelles". In multicellular organisms, however, there is a
need for communication between different cell types with specialised functions in
order to coordinate the entire system in an adaptative manner. Where the system is
small and able to function properly albeit in slow motion, a chemical communication
is still possible. The larger the system the more speedy communication gains
importance. This is where the electrical transmission of in- and out-puts (the action
potentials) is crucial. In complex nervous systems (e.g. the human nervous system),
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the two modes of transmission of messages are operating in conjunction: electrical
and chemical. The latter is the matter of the neurotransmitters.
About fifty neurotransmitters and cotransmitters have been identified in the
human brain; some are inhibitory and others are excitatory (Changeux 1998: 148).
The main neurotransmitters are: acetylcholine, the monoamines, the neuropeptides,
and some amino acids. The monoamines comprise dopamine, noradrenaline (or
epinephrine), and serotonine (or 5-hydroxy-tryptamine). They activate the
monoaminergic (cholinergic, or adrenergic) receptors of the sympathetic nervous
system - that is, the autonomous nervous system, the regulator of the basic vital
systems (respiration, circulation, digestion, etc.). The main neuropeptides are the f3-
endorphins and enkephalins, the so-called natural opiates. Although the neuropeptides
might be involved in the transmission of pain messages, (some of the opiate receptors
are located in areas related to pain such as the centromedial nucleus, while others are
located in the striatum which is not involved in the pain processes) their role is far
from being fully understood (Carpenter 1996: 87). Finally, the amino acid gamma-
aminobutyric acid (GABA) is an inhibitory neurotransmitter (its decrease is linked to
the pathophysiology of epilepsy).
Each of the main neurotransmitters acts on a system called the diffuse
modulatory system (or DMS) - that is, acts preferentially and predominantly upon an
area of the central nervous system (there are areas of overlap). In other words,
neurotransmitters exert stimulatory and inhibitory action on a brain map located
mainly in the midbrain from where their influence fans in to and out of the forebrain
(Changeux 1998)(Fig.8).9 Since there are basically four main categories of
neurotransmitters, the DMS comprises four corresponding maps.
The dopaminergic DMS is located in the substantia nigra and in the ventral
tegmental area (viz., in the truncus cerebri, at the junction between the pons and the
pedunculi cerebri). It fans out to the frontal cortex, the limbic cortex, and the corpus
striatum (viz., the nucleus locus caudatus and putamen of the telencephalon). The
noradrenergic DMS is situated in the nucleus locus ceruleus of the mesencephalon
(midbrain). It fans out to the entire cerebral cortex, to the thalamus, the cerebellum,
and the spinal cord. The serotonergic DMS is located in the medulla oblongata
(hindbrain), more specifically in the raphe nuclei; it fans out to the entire central
nervous system. Finally, the cholinergic DMS, located in the brain stem (hindbrain)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
68
and at the base of the forebrain, fans out to the entire cortex, the hippocampus, and the
thalamus (Changeux 1998; Kahle et al. 1996).
As emphasised by Carpenter (1996: 238), these are complex structures whose
functions are uncertain. As with other parts of the central nervous system, the meagre
information we have about the functions are mostly derived from clinical observations
of the effects of damage in humans (239-240). A number of neurological and
psychiatric diseases have been linked to dysfunctions in neurotransmission in the
form of hyperactivity or hypoactivity. For instance, schizophrenia is attributed to an
overactivity of the dopaminergic system; it can be improved by antipsychotic drugs
that decrease the levels of dopamine in the brain. Parkinson's disease, on the contrary,
is a condition of hypoactivity of the dopaminergic DMS; it responds to drugs that
stimulate the production of dopamine (Globus 1995: 97). Alzheimer's disease is a
condition of cholinergic hypoactivity. Serotonergic hypoactivity results in depression
and sleep disturbances, whereas serotonergic hyperactivity might possibly be involved
in autism (Berkow et al. 1992: 2656; Lazorthes 1999: 157).
Catecholaminergic neurons within this aminergic system (the dopamine
mesocorticolimbic neurons of the ventral tegmental area of the midbrain) project in
the prefrontal cortex and the nucleus accumbens of the limbic system. They constitute
what Changeux (1998: 159) calls the "reward circuits in the brain". The former (viz.,
the projections to the prefrontal cortex) contribute to motivation, planning, temporal
organisation of behaviour, attention, and social behaviour; the latter (viz., the
projections to the limbic system) contribute to emotion, hedonic pleasure, and
memory (ibid.).
An illustration of Carpenter's warnmg (i.e. that our knowledge of brain
functions is incomplete and fragmented) is Lazorthes' (1999: 159) view on
Changeux's reward circuits of the brain, which Lazorthes calls the "mesencephalic
dopaminergic pathways" (situated in the archencephalon). It comprises the following
pathways: 1) the mesocortical (from the locus niger to the prefrontal cortex)
participates to arousal, decision-making, and behavioural patterns; 2) the
nigrostriaturn (from the locus niger to the nucleus caudatus and from the nucleus
lenticularis of the thalamus to the corpus striatum) "controls" (sic) the initiation and
the tone of movements; and 3) the meso limbic (from the ventrotegmental area to the
nucleus accumbens and the olfactory bulb) "controls" our moods. The same system,
called by Carpenter (1996: 283) the "reticular activating system", has thalamic relays
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that influence the neural circuits of the cerebral cortex, altering the level of activity by
controlling the inflow. It also may prevent cortical activity from getting out of hand.
Concluding remarks
As mentioned in the introduction, this sketchy overview of very rough data on
the evolution of the brain among animal species, the intrauterine development of the
human brain, and some functional aspects of the mature human brain can only give us
a faint idea of the intricacies of the matter of the brain. Knowledge of the function of
the brain is still largely incomplete. Most of what we know about the structure and
function of the brain of the unborn is extrapolated from information gathered from
fetal lambs - the most utilised experimental model to study fetal physiology
(Nathanielsz 1992). It would be very contentious to draw firm conclusions about the
alleged presence or absence of such an elusive thing as sentience and to draw amoral
theory from it. If one only thing should appear clearly from the above is the fact that
the biologically well-informed would shy away from the biologically ill-informed
deductions made by some moral philosophers about sentience.
There seems to be no clear evidence to support Peter Singer's claim (1995: 54)
that animal behaviour is convincing evidence that they suffer (at least down to fish,
reptiles and other vertebrates). First, contrary to the claim that human and nonhuman
animal brains are similar (Singer 1993: 96) is the evidence that there is a great variety
of vertebrates and a great variety of brain anatomy amongst them. Second, contrary to
the claim that enkephalins and endorphins are present in the nervous system as a
prove of sentience (Sumner 1997: 109), current neuroscientific evidence is far from
having defined the function of these and other neurotransmitters. Third, to use pain
and suffering synonymously, as Singer does, is arguable. Rachels (1995: 68) reminds
us: "As Hume observed, normative conclusions cannot legitimately be derived from
factual premises ... for factual premises can never by themselves entail evaluations". In
this case, the alleged facts presented by Singer and others are not substantiated by
scientific evidence. Even if they were, would it follow that sentience qua sentience
endows an entity with rights? My claim is not that nonhuman animals (and embryos
and fetuses for that matter) do not deserve moral respect. On the contrary, my claim is
that moral consideration should even extend beyond the world of sentient beings and
include so-called insensate beings. The thing is that the concept of sentience and what
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it entails (the concepts of pain and pleasure) might need to be placed in a wider
perspective as, for instance, in Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair, where J. Baird
Callicott writes:
Pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to do with good and evil if our
appraisal is taken from the vantage point of ecological biology.
Pain is primarily information ... Pleasure appears to be, for the most part
(unfortunately it is not always so) a reward accompanying those activities
which contribute to organic maintenance ... or to social solidarity ... or to the
continuation of the species ... The idea that pain is evil is a primitive notion.
To live is to be anxious about life, to feel pain and pleasure in a fitting mixture,
and sooner or later to die (1995: 247).
Something similar might be said about the insistence on the concept of rights,
a point made by Val Plumwood (1995: 200-201):
Rights seem to have acquired an exaggerate importance as part of the prestige
of the public sphere and the masculine, and the emphasis on separation and
autonomy, on reason and abstraction. A more promising approach ... would be
to remove rights from the centre of the moral stage and pay more attention to
some other less dualistic, moral concepts such as respect, sympathy, care,
concern ,compassion, gratitude, friendship, and responsibility.
The point I am trying to make is this. Even if or when neurobiologists or
neuroscientists manage to unravel the complexities of brain function and provide a
final prove that this animal species is sentient, or that at a specific stage of intrauterine
development the human embryo/fetus is sentient, it should not make a difference in
the way it should be treated. One can argue at length whether sentience entails rights,
intrinsic values, preferences, or interests (as animal liberationists do). Paraphrasing
Tom Regan (1995: 74), "Many people who perform abortions are not cruel, sadistic
people. But that fact about their character and motivation does not settle the terribly
difficult question about the morality of abortion", one could say: many people who
work on cattle farms, abattoirs, fisheries, animal experience laboratories, etc. are not
cruel, sadistic people. This, however, does not settle the morality of animal rights,
moral humanism, and exemptionalism. Equally, it would not settle Steinbock's (1992)
controversial stance that nothing matters to insensate entities. As stated by Harley
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Cahen (1995: 300), "Nonsentient organisms - those not capable of consciously taking
interest in anything - have interests [and thus are candidates for moral considerability]
in achieving their biological goals". This view is echoed by Paul Taylor (1996: 127),
who writes: "We can act in a being's interest without it being interested in what we are
doing to it in the sense of wanting or not wanting us to do it". Neither would it settle
Aldo Leopold's (quoted in Baird Callicott 1995: 241) position: "A thing is right when
it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is
wrong when it tends otherwise". By biotic community Leopold refers to individual
animals and plants, and the whole ecosystem that sustains them.
Where should we stand amongst all these ethical claims? Can mere rationality
reach a consensus amongst so many conflicting claims? Is sentience the last word? Or
shall we conclude with Taylor (1995: 127): " the concept of a being's good is not
coextensive with sentience".
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5 The birth of the brain
Science without philosophy is blind, and
philosophy without science is paralysed.
Paul Cilliers (l998: 13)
Introduction
Nothing is more complex than the brain. In the past, ratiocination about what
is called higher-brain functions - that is, perception, reasoning, emotion, aesthetic
preferences, planning, decision-making - was part of the realm of theology and
philosophy (Rakic 1999: 90). With the "birth of the clinic", to use Michel Foucault's
vocabulary, or the implementation of empirical sciences to the understanding of
diseases as well as of physiology, our "gaze" into brain function is becoming less and
less blurred. This is not to say that the complexity of the functions of the brain is now
fully understood. On the contrary, the more we know about it the more complex it
appears to be, and even more complex than one ever imagined.
Brain sciences now involve at least 18 disciplines (Mountcastle 1998: 3).
Amongst them is what is called neurophilosophy, "a loose term for attempts to
formulate ideas about our humanity by reconciling biological facts about the brain
with abstract and historical concepts about behaviour" (Frackowiak 1998: 105). It
provides an alternative vision of human moral and social nature through "carving and
recarving world and mind into new categories" (Paul Churchland quoted in Sutton
1999) using meta-neuroanatomy (Sutton 1999). This is not without the risk of giving
in into new "exuberant neuromythologies", or "misplaced physics-envy of
overzealous reductionism" (Sutton 1999). On the other hand, the temptation to reject
new paradigm shifts and new ways of thinking should equally be seen as a real risk to
be avoided.
Thus, the quest is now for a balance between the hard empiricist view of the
brain as a tabula rasa, and the hard nativist view of the brain, also called Platonic
neuralism (Gazzaniga 1998). The hard empiricist view claims that neural activation is
a necessary condition for the proper development of the brain in terms of both its
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structure and of its function. The hard nativist view, inspired by Plato's theory of
recollection or doctrine of anamnesis in the Meno, claims that we do not learn but
merely recollect the knowledge already present in the brain (Knowles 1988: 36). A
similar innatism was advocated by Gottfried Leibniz in Nouveaux essays sur
l'entendement humain (1704). He compared the mind to a block of marble; the
sculptor's work is to uncover a shape that is already present in the structure of the
stone. On this view, the newborn is said to be armed with established brain circuits
already able to process the necessary information enabling it to function in the
physical world. In other words, the hard wiring of the brain is genetically encoded and
regulated, leaving only a limited plasticity within the boundaries set by the constraints
of genetic development (Gazzaniga & Gallagher 1998).
In between the two antipodean positions many contemporary neuroscientists
have rather adopted the view that the way the brain operates borrows from both
genetic factors originating from the process of evolution, and from sensory
experience. Synaptic plasticity is the buzzword. Thus, to a large extent, many
neuroscientists (and neurophilosophers alike) are moving away from the computer
analogy (Mountcastle 1998: 29) in the direction of a "complex selectional system"
(Edelman 1999: 50), or of "biologically realistic nets" (Globus 1995: 64).
The fundamental question is to try to unravel what it is to have a mind - that
is, to be (self-) aware, to be (self-) conscious - and what type of brain structure and
function is necessary for these high-level activities to take place (Edelman 1992: 4-7).
The manner in which neurosciences have so far shed some light on these questions
will be useful to understand the neurological development of the human embryo,
fetus, and infant. We need a grasp of basic evolutionary, embryological, and
neurological data to understand neurophilosophical arguments, since, by definition,
neurophilosophy bases its arguments on neuroscientific data.
Tbe evolutionary development of tbe brain
The first attempt at understanding the evolution of species is credited to
French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, chevalier de Lamarck
(1744-1829). In order to explain the evolution from simple to complex organisms,
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Lamarck suggested his theory of transformation or of descent. His main thesis was
that evolution is an adaptative process. Lamarck's motto was "la fonction crée
l'organe" - that is, a specialised organ results from a protracted specific use thereof to
accomplish a specific function. Two of Lamarck's well-known examples were the
growth of webs between the toes of ducks resulting from swimming, and the
elongation of the neck of the giraffe from grazing the leaves from the top of the trees.
Lamarck's theory was "the first important rupture with the previous idyllic conception
of a finished world of a great chain of being with man on top" (Changeux & Ricoeur
2000: 178). Although we may smile at the naiveté of the Lamarckian examples, the
concept behind his theory has been vindicated by contemporary neurobiology, that is,
that the use of the brain strengthens its connections (Hebb's rule). There is thus still a
trace of Lamarckism in contemporary neurosciences.
In 1859, English physician and naturalist, Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882)
published his theory on the evolution of species based on the concept of natural
selection: the fittest survive. His theory was that the central motor of evolution
requires self-reproduction and heritable variation. Once these occur, natural selection
will cull the fitter from the less fit (Kauffman 1995: 72). Although current views on
the Darwinian theory of evolution suggest that the order of the biological world has
evolved from natural selection sifting among random mutations is incomplete (vii),
Edelman's neural Darwinism is part of the contemporary dominant views on the
evolution of the brain. A few years later, in 1874, German naturalist Ernst Heinrich
Haeckel proposed the theory of "basic biogenetic law" that embryogenesis is a short
recapitulation of phylogenesis. In other words, during the development of the human
embryo (embryogenesis) some stages of past evolutionary steps (mainly of the
amphibians and fishes) are recapitulated. As a matter of fact, contemporary
embryology shows that during the first five to six weeks after fertilisation the human
embryo goes through morphological and structural changes common to fishes and
amphibians; a rodent embryo also shows huge similarities with a human embryo
(Sadler 2000: 415). During phylogenesis (the evolution of a specific species) and
during ontogenesis (the development of an individual) the components necessary for
the primary vital functions appear first (Kahle et al. 1996: 14). For instance,
concerning the development of the embryonic brain, it is the function of the hindbrain
(or rhombencephalon) and of the brain stem (the locus of the neurovegetative
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automatic functions) that appears first. The full structure of the forebrain -the cerebral
hemispheres and more specifically the future cortex - appears relatively late in
pregnancy (during the second half of gestation). In other words, what appears first is
the neural equipment needed for basic vegetative life; higher brain functions are not
necessary (and arguably not even possible) during intra-uterine life (Lazorthes 1999).
Interestingly, it is said that Ernst Haeckel inspired Frederick Engels' essay, The Part
Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man (Scarry 1985: 252). Engel's
hypothesis was that it was not the size of the skull and of the brain that was crucial in
the transition from ape to Homo sapiens, but rather the use of hands, the instrument to
make tools.
The role played by heredity was unknown to Darwin. He was not and could
not have been aware of the groundbreaking observations made by Brother Johann
Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) crossing peas in a Moravian monastery. Darwin rebutted
Lamarck, and Louis Bolk debunked Haeckel. Bolk's theory of neoteny (i.e., the
extension or retention of youth), presented in 1920, rejected Haeckel's theory of
recapitulation in favour of the idea that some features of the young animal persist in
the adult. For instance, humans share a list of features in common with young but not
with adult chimpanzees. On this view, the young chimpanzee should be seen as a
humanoid, or, conversely the adult human should be seen as a neotenic chimpanzee.
Instead of having a fast recapitulation of the stages of evolution, neoteny claims that,
on the contrary, the evolution of the individual is instead a slowing down process. In
other words, the higher an animal is situated in terms of evolution, the slower its
phylogenesis. For instance, in humans, gestation is longer and growth is slower than
in chimpanzees. The newborn infant's brain is only a quarter of its final volume; at the
age of six months, the infant's brain reaches the size of a newborn chimpanzee's brain.
This would mean that, theoretically, humans should be born after 15 months of
gestation if the intra-uterine development of the human brain were to be similar to that
of the newborn chimpanzee. But that would be incompatible with the pelvic size of
women (the fetal head would never be able to go through a woman's pelvis)
(Lazorthes 1999: 194-195).
What we can see so far is that each of the scientific acquisitions or theories
made independently during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Lamarck,
Darwin, Mendel, and Haeckel was a step in the right direction. The synthesis between
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evolution and genetics (selection by mutation), "the two constructors of evolution"
(Lorenz 1979: 73) had to wait for the end of the twentieth century to be made.
But let us go back to the facts and leave the theories on evolution momentarily
aside. Somewhere in the evolution from protozoa (unicellular organisms without
neural system, like the amoeba) to multicellular organisms, two types of living
organisms did appear: the hyponeureans and the epineureans. The hyponeureans -
that is, worms, mollusks, crustaceans, and insects - are characterised by the fact that
their nervous system develops underneath (hypo) - that is, between the digestive tract
and the abdominal wall. For this anatomic reason, the mouth becomes an obstacle to
any possible cephalad (in the direction of the head) extension and development of the
neural system. There is no brain because there is simply no space for it to develop.
The hyponeureans possess only a diffuse network of sensory and motor nerves
allowing only for basic reflex arcs, the simplest neuronal circuits linking a stimulus to
a response (like a tendon-jerk) (Carpenter 1996: 206). The epineureans, on the other
hand, the ancestors of the vertebrates, have their nervous system located above (epi) -
that is, between the digestive tract and the back. Thanks to this feature, room becomes
available for the primitive neuronal network to grow anteriorly and allows for a
possible further development of the brain.
Amphioxus, the first known vertebrate, appeared 600 million years ago, the
time of the Cambrian explosion. It is the ancestor of the so-called lower vertebrates:
fishes, reptiles, and amphibians. Lower vertebrates posses what is called an
archencephalon or rhombencephalon (hindbrain)' that allows them to process sensory
data. Contrary to higher vertebrates that have both electrical and chemical
(neurotransmitters) synapses, lower vertebrates possess only electrical synapses
(Kahle et al. 1996: 24). Their behaviour is operated by a "fixed programme", that is
purely reflex in nature (Lazorthes 1999: 24-29). In primitive single-celled organisms,
the coordination is essentially chemical (Carpenter 1996: 3), and also purely reflex in
nature.
The first mammals are said to have appeared 180 million years ago (about 65
million years after the Permian extinction of around 96 percent of all existing species
that appeared with the Cambrian explosion). In addition to the lower vertebrate's
hindbrain, these mammals possess a paleoencephalon or mesencephalon (limbic brain
or midbrain). This important addition to the brain provides the ability to adapt to the
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environment - that is, a minimal capacity of learning and of memory. The
hippocampus, a component of the archicortex and of the limbic brain, is considered to
playa role in the process of memory.
The first primates made their appearance 70 million years ago, a few million
years before the extinction of the dinosaurs (estimated to have happened about 60
million years ago). With the first primates, appeared a second addition to the
hindbrain: the neoencephalon or prosencephalon (forebrain). This forebrain has two
components: the diencephalon (comprising the eyes, hypophysis, epiphysis, thalamus,
and hypothalamus), and the telencephalon (the cerebral hemispheres). From now on,
the stage is set for the possible appearance of higher brain functions. It will, however,
take 62 million years before the hominoidae will evolve into hominidae, the
precursors of the pre-human Australopithecus (the first to have adopted an upright
stance) and of the pongids (apes and chimpanzees) (Mountcastle 1998: 9). The further
steps will be from Homo habilis to Homo erectus, and finally to Homo sapiens. The
latter is said to have appeared around 40 000 to 50 000 years ago. This slow process
in the evolution of the brain through natural selection allowed the development of the
frontal lobes of the brain, signaling "the birth of the mind" (Lazorthes 1999: 99).
Let us now briefly examine what are the current mainstream theories of the
mind. A basic view on the two main tendencies in the field is helpful to understand to
what extent the fetal brain might be able or not to function, or what kind of function
might be possible.
Brain and mind
Sciences of the mind attempt to know how the brain enables the mind. Two
major schools of thought have arisen in philosophy of the mind: functionalism
(cognitivism), and connectionism (neural networks).
In the functionalist perspective initially pioneered by Hilary Putnam (but who
no longer supports it, because psychological states cannot be described by the
computational model) (Edelman 1992: 223; Cilliers 1998: 30), the brain operates like
a Turing machine/ (the computational theory of the mind). On this view, the brain (the
physical substrate) constitutes the hardware, which can run different programs, the
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software (the mind, the mental thing). The system follows pre-established rules or
algorithms. On this view, mental states can be defined by three relations: 1) what
typically causes them; 2) what effects they have on other mental states; and 3) what
effects they have on behaviour (Blackburn 1996: 150-151). Functionalism, however,
raises serious problems about representation, mainly the adequacy of a physical
system to adapt to functional states, and the meaning-giving ability of a physical
system (Cilliers 1998: 61). Because of the difficulties involved in functionalism, Paul
Churchland (1989: 12-14) compared it to alchemy: "an outrage against reason and
truth ... a smoke screen for the preservation of error and confusion". Notwithstanding
this reservation, he accepts functionalism while acknowledging its "methodological
problems" (44); he strongly believes that neuroscience will come up with an
explanation of how the brain functions (54). On Miklos' (1998: 207-208) view, the
difficulty with the computer analogy is dual. First, in the computer-like view, a brain
does not construct its world by interacting with it but "rather stamps itself on the
brain". In reality, he says, "the world is 'unlabelled', changing and not prefigured". In
other words, as expressed by Changeux (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 91), there is no
Platonic world of pre-established Forms and Ideas, it is by a process of selection [by
the brain] that the world comes to be labeled (117). Second, in view of the
documented continuous loss of synapses (e.g., 30 000 synapses are lost per second in
the cortex of macaque monkeys), if it were a computer it would shutdown (Miklos
1998). Third, the nervous system is a parallel-processing device (whereas the
conventional computer is serial). Signals are processed at the same time in different
networks and interactions between neurons are non-linear and modifiable so that new
properties emerge, and emergence is a central feature of complex systems (Lewin
1997: 164).
In the connectionist perspective, on the other hand, the neural network is
constantly adjusting the weights of signals (input) to adjust the output to the
circumstances. There is no hard wiring or pre-established programme to process
information; the brain is a self-tuning net. According to this view, brain states "evolve
under tunable constraints" (Globus 1995: x). The system operates through the
interaction of its components. It is distributed - that is, there is no hierarchy, no
homunculus or femincula, and no pontifical cell (in Jamesian vocabulary). The
distributed functioning of the brain provides an "uncentered brain" (Kinsbourne 1998:
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248). We have thus moved from phrenology (the attribution of functions to specific
sites, or maps, in the brain) to neophrenology (brain maps are still there but they
interact through what Edelman calls reentry). Churchland sees connectionism as
follows:
an approach to human cognitions that is at once naturalistic, reductionistic,
and capable of explaining both the radical plasticity of human consciousness,
and its intricate dependence on the extended cultural surround. It resides at the
interface of computational neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and artificial
intelligence (1989: 130).
What thus basically opposes the two views is that functionalism sees the brain
operating in a linear fashion (the input is proportional to the output, like in a Turing
machine); whereas connectionism views the brain within a non-linear perspective (a
very small input can cause large changes in output, like the butterfly effect). The
former operates in equilibrium conditions, and the latter is subject to complexity far
from equilibrium (Cilliers 1998). The processing of information by the brain is thus
radically different from the conventional digital computer (Churchland 1989: 156). To
make matters even more complex, Globus (1995: 60) sees in connectionism two
tendencies, which he calls conventional and radical connectionism. Conventional
connectionism, he says, is still computational since it views information processing
through representation (even if representation is distributed). Globus' radical
connectionism claims to be non-computational because unlike with computation, the
results are unpredictable, chaotic, non-representational (72, 99). Like Miklos, he
claims that the outside is not re-presented inside. He goes even further saying that "it
no longer makes sense even to talk of representation", for:
The input influx (both from the environment and from the endosomatic
instinctual and emotional sources) provides a shifting constraint on the
self-organising process, together with other flowing constraints due to
chemical modulation of connectivity, connection weights, transfer functions,
parameters and neurotransmitter expression. The outside is not re-presented
inside but participates on the inside as but one constraint on a self-organising
process (67).
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For Globus (101), "the brain is an autopoietic, autodynarnic, self-organising,
nonlinear dynamical, complex system". He strongly claims his affinity with
continental philosophy, more specifically with Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.
From Heidegger he borrows the concept of Dasein, the way we are in the world: "no
brain, no Da-Sein; no Da-sein, no brain" (36). From Derrida he borrows the concept
of différance:
The difference of différance is like the difference in neural nets: in both there
are nodes, which are foci of relatedness embedded in a complex network of
relationships. These nodes open two ways to the whole: the whole fans in on the node
and the node fans out to the whole. Différance is not present meaning, the condition
for the possibility of meaning. Connection weights are the conditions for the
possibility of meaning in neural nets. The difference of différance can be found in
neural nets, as a function of the connection weights (54) ... The "postmodern brain"
which meshes with Derrida's sheaf of différance is a connectionist system whose
processes are spontaneous, unpredictable, non-logical, self-organising, self-tuning and
holonomic (59).
The main focus of the present essay is to analyse the concept of sentience, to
find out what neural equipment it requires, and to investigate it's appropriateness as a
criterion of moral standing. Functionalism much more than connectionism can be
traced in the views expressed on sentience in human and non-human animals.
Sentience is not like an action-reaction formula, a binary phenomenon, on or off, a
Skinner box. There are degrees of it. The behaviour of a rat (a sentient nonhuman
animal) to external stimuli is predictable; to predict the behaviour of an ape (a sentient
nonhuman animal) we need to have some insight into what it desires and thinks
(Mitchell 1997: 16).If functionalism should be viewed as a rather simplistic
explanation of the function of the nervous system, it can be said that the moral
considerability attributed to the faculty of sentience (as presented by their advocates)
is inspired by functionalism and is simplistic and naïve. The thesis presented in this
essay is rather inspired by a connectionist view on the structure and function of the
nervous system, including the complexity of qualia. The aim is to show that there is
more to sentience than it might appear prima facie. Or, in Jean-Pierre Changeux's
words:
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
81
A naïve neural model for the Epicurean position would thus be that we have in
our brain "pleasure centers". The situation is not that simple (1998: 157). But let us
once again consider what the advocates of sentience have to say. The argument is
roughly as follows. A living entity that possesses the ability to feel is an entity that is
able to suffer, to feel pain (and to enjoy, to feel good). It is wrong to inflict pain to any
living being that is able to feel pain. Killing inflicts pain to a sentient being.
Therefore, it is wrong to kill a sentient being (but, arguably, permissible to kill that
same being before it has acquired sentience). This is, in a nutshell, the argument
developed by L. Wayne Sumner in The Morality of Abortion (1983). In Animal Rights
(1975), Peter Singer develops a similar argument but basically in favour of nonhuman
animals. Human and nonhuman animals are sentient, able to experience pain and
pleasure. It is in their interest to experience pleasure and to avoid pain. To inflict pain
to a sentient being is acting against its interest. Therefore, it is wrong to inflict pain to
nonhuman animals.
More will be said about the ethical argument. In this section I wish to focus on
the neuroanatomical and neurofunctional requirements for sentience as an indicator of
awareness (primary consciousness) or of self-awareness (higher-level consciousness).
In other words, to feel pain requires a basic neural equipment needed for the
awareness of that feeling. To suffer or to feel pain as being mine (self-awareness)
needs more than a basic and coarse neural equipment. For it is one thing to claim that
a living entity is sentient, but it is altogether another thing to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that that being is sentient in the sense of suffering, of experiencing pain as its
own suffering. The prove or disprove has to rest on proper neuroscientific evidence to
be valid. If the claim about sentience cannot be substantiated the alleged
neurophilosophical argument will collapse. In order to prove or disprove anything
about sentience we need a minimum understanding of neurophysiology and
neuroanatomy.
Basic neuroanatomy and neurophysiology
The neuron (nerve cell) is the basic unit that constitutes the entire nervous system,
peripheral and central. The neuron consists of a cellular body (a cell membrane, a
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nucleus, and a cytoplasm with its organelles) and its extensions. One pole of the
neuron has dendrites (from the Greek dendron, tree) resembling the branches of a
tree; the other pole has an axon. Peripheral nerve dendrites receive the inputs, and the
axons transport the outputs in the form of action potentials to the central nervous
system (i.e. the spinal cord and the brain).
Neurons communicate at the level of the synapses (a word coined by
Sherrington, Nobel Prize laureate 1932) (or end-plates) through electrical signals
(action potentials) or chemical signals (neurotransmitters). There are four classes of
neurotransmitters and more than 50 known neurotransmitters and cotransmitters
(Changeux 1998: 148). Only for a small proportion of synapses in the central nervous
system, it is known which transmitter is doing exactly what (Carpenter 1996: 58). As
a general rule, however, it is known that as a result of a transmitter release, electrical
signaling not only takes place but also leads to changes in the biochemistry and even
in the gene expression of target neurons (Edelman 1998: 41). Synapses do not only
transmit messages, they also contribute to the maintenance of the cells they contact
(Carpenter 1996: 67). In other words, only what functions persists (Lazorthes 1999:
109).
There are two types of neurons: the excitatory and the inhibitory neurons. The
predominance of either of the two results in either the strengthening or the weakening
of connections (synapses) during development and during the process of learning
(Gazzaniga & HutsIer 1999: 131) - that is, Donald Hebb's rule' or "unsupervised
learning rules" (Bear & Cooper 1998: 136). This synaptic plasticity is an important
factor in the ontogenic development of neural circuits in the cerebral cortex; it is
largely influenced by activity-dependent competition in all brains, young or old
(Mountcastle 1998:7). The first stages of synaptogenesis during intra-uterine life are
genetically encoded; the progressive attunement of synaptogenesis is conditioned by
the interaction with the environment (Lazorthes 1999: 109-110). The level of
activation of a neuron is thus a function of four factors: 1) the number of connections;
2) the weight of the connections; 3) their polarity (stimulatory or inhibitory); and 4)
the strengths of incoming signals (Churchland 1998: 160).
The take home message, so far, is that one should beware of simplistic views
on neurobiology. With the short overview given of some basic neurophysiological
data it already appears that a morphologically similar looking cell, the neuron,
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operates in a large variety of ways and under a wide spectrum of influences." To see
neurons as simple reflex arcs is simplistic, naïve, and ill-informed. There are some 28
billion neurons in the brain, and each one receives and gives an average of 104
synaptic connections. The brain contains one to ten trillion synapses (Edelman 1998:
38; Mountcastle 1998: 5). It is very unlikely, says Edelman, that the entire circuitry is
encoded in the genes. According to Kauffman (I995), the linear sequence of genes in
a genome does not specify the genesis of form in an embryo. The genes only produce
component parts of the system, within a range of values. The next step is "dynamics
generating geometry and geometry modifying dynamics"(Lewin 1997: 36).
Furthermore, experiments in mammals show that connections can be altered by the
pattern of neural activity resulting in the maintenance of useful connections and the
loss of useless or unused connections - the prove that the brain is capable of self-
organisation (Carpenter 1996: 66-67). And self-organisation, says Kauffman (1995:
185), "may be the precondition of evolvability itself', because "only those systems
that are able to organise themselves spontaneously may be able to evolve further". In
1977, David H. Hubel and Torsten N. Wiesel showed that even when the genetically
determined visual apparatus of the Macaque monkey is intact at birth, the organism
must be exposed to visual stimuli after birth, after which visual education becomes
less important. There is, in other words, a critical period for vision, says British
professor of neurobiology Semir Zeki (1998: 81), "just as there appears to be for
emotional development". He further argues: "The brain needs to be visually nourished
at critical periods after birth so as not to remain almost indefinitely blind". One may
wonder whether emotional development after birth needs equally to be nourished at
critical periods to prevent the disappearance of emotions.
Another fascinating example of brain plasticity was shown by Sur et al
(quoted in Churchland 1989: 267). They induced the axons in the optic nerve of
neonate ferrets to project in the auditory pathway instead of leaving them in the visual
pathway (where they normally belong). This resulted in the fact that the auditory
cortex became driven exclusively by information sent from the eyes. These animals
did nevertheless develop significant visual function. This shows, says Churchland,
that "the processing features specific to our adult sensory systems are not
endogenously specified, but rather are developed over time in a highly plastic system
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that is shaped by the long-term characteristics of the sensory input they receive from
the periphery".
Having now a basic idea about how neurons function and interconnect, let us
now consider more specifically current views on how the brain neurons are
interconnected. This is the topic of the so-called brain maps.
Brain maps
Franz-Joseph Gall (1758-1828), a neuroanatomist and the father of phrenology
(etymologically, the science of the mind; from the Greek phren, mind), was the first
to represent the human cerebral cortex as a geographical map. His idea was that
bundles of nerve fibers unite on the surface of the brain; each area was supposed to
function as a distinct organ representing each of the 30 human mental and moral
faculties. While the concept of brain maps still remains, Gall's view was in William
James words:
Phrenology hardly does more than restate the problem. To answer the question,
"Why do I like children?" by saying, "Because you have a large organ
of philoprogenitive ness", but renames the phenomenon to be explained (1890: 28).
Pierre Flourens (1794-1867) debunked phrenology's concept of the brain as
composed of independently functioning areas with specific functions; he was the first
to claim that brain function is distributed throughout the cortex. The concept of
distributedness of brain function still prevails. The true founder of cerebral
localisation was French anthropologist and surgeon Pierre Paul Broca (1824-1880),
who, in 1861, localised the cortical center of speech where it really is: the third
convolution of the left frontal lobe. In his enthusiasm, Broca wrote: "if it is
established that an intellectual faculty is located in a specific area of the cerebral
hemispheres, it is highly likely, if not absolutely certain, that each convolution is
involved in a specific function" (quoted in Lazorthes 1999: 77). It remains still true
that the Broca area plays a fundamental role in speech. Also to Broca's credit is the
concept of the dominance of one of the two cerebral hemispheres.
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In the following years, interest and research in the anatomy of the brain and in
the patho-physiology of brain diseases brought about a large amount of knowledge in
the field of neurosciences. Not only were human neurological diseases the subject
matter of extensive investigation; the most amazing, not to say appalling, experiments
were run in animals (mainly frogs, dogs, cats, and monkeys), as vividly described by
William James (1890). The concept of brain maps, suggested by Gall and confirmed
by Broca (in a more scientific and more relevant sense), received a new impetus with
German neurologist Korbinian Brodmann's preliminary descriptions, first published in
1909 (Rakic 1999: 90). His final "architectonic map", published in 1923, comprises
52 distinct areas. Brodmann's maps are still used and illustrated in contemporary
textbooks of neuroanatomy. What has changed is the explanation of their origin and
of their connections. Brain maps are no longer considered the exclusive site of the
function of, say vision, audition, speech (as suggested by Gall's phrenology); maps
interact and integrate various types of inputs to ensure the most adequate output or
response (Edelman's concept of reentry). In Andy Clark's words:
The concept ot: for instance, the "somatotopic map" in which a dedicated neural
subregion governed each individual digit ... .is a tidy, easily conceptualized solution
to the problem of finger control. But it is the engineer's solution, not (it now seems)
that of nature (1998: 260).
Gall's phrenology has been re-christened neophrenology: it emphasises, in
Pasko Rakic's (1999: 90) words, "the importance of being well placed and having
right connections". Rakic's interest, as a neurobiologist, is mainly the "protomap
hypothesis of brain development". Let us now tum to the development of the feta]
brain.
Fetal brain development
The protomap is the embryonic/fetal precursor of the cortical maps; the
challenge is to find out how these maps come into existence. Are they purely
genetically programmed (viz., the nativist view), or are they also influenced by
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external signals (viz., the empiricist view)? Before answering these questions, we have
to have a look at the intra-uterine development of the human brain. In what follows
only a very general overview on brain development is presented. More details and
pictorials are available (notes 2 to 12).
John L. Casti writes: "The greatest unsolved problem in biology, the real terra
incognita of the field, is the enigma of embryology". The challenge is to find a
rational explanation for "how the local genetic coding in individual cells could cause
the global unfolding of the embryo"(1994: 69). Mathematical models have been
proposed by René Thorn (1972), the father of the catastrophe theory, and by Alan
Turing (1952). Turing suggested the theory of morphogens, or chemical gradients to
explain the interaction between cells in the growing embryo (69, 71). The fact is that
from one single cell, the zygote, an estimated 256 different (that is, differentiated or
specialised) cell types do arise, and that despite the fact that each single cell contains
the same genome the specialised cells express some genes and suppress others. This
can be explained only by a "spontaneous order that selection then goes on to
mold ... an emergent property of complex networks of genes controlling one another's
activities", like in a Boolean network (Kauffman 1995: 18-19). The fitness is
determined by the number of genes in the species (the elements of the network) and
their interaction (the number of connections between the elements). By tuning the
connectedness of the genes, the fitness of various combinations changes and produces
a new "landscape" (Lewin 1993: 57).
The first evidence of the future central nervous system is the appearance of the
primitive streak on day 15-to-16 after fertilisation (the embryo proper stage). It
consists of a small depression bordered by ridges at the caudal end of the embryonic
disk. Progressively this process of neurulation extends cephalad. At this stage, the
neural groove deepens and the ridges approximate and fuse to produce a neural tube.
The closure of the tube is complete at day-27 (4 weeks after fertilization, or 6 weeks
after the last menstrual period), but there is no "brain" yet. The cephalic end of the
neural tube dilates; although there is still no demarcation into distinguishable vesicles,
it is theoretically already subdivided into three portions called respectively the
forebrain (prosencephalon), the midbrain (mesencephalon), and the hindbrain
(rhombencephalonr'. It is not before day-32 (4Yz weeks, or one month after
fertilization) that the dilatations exhibit incisures and three distinct dilatations, the
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primary brain vesicles, can be observed." At 8 weeks (56-day embryo), when the
embryo measures 27 mm, the cerebral hemispheres exhibit a small protrusion, the
olfactory bulb; the diencephalon (the future eyes, hypophysis, epiphysis, thalamus,
and hypothalamus) starts taking shape.' Two distinct regions make their appearance in
the hindbrain: the metencephalon (the future cerebellum and pons), and the
myelencephalon (the future medulla oblongata).
So far, homeobox or HOX genes, determining the position and the identity of
the neural structures, exclusively regulate the patterning of the central nervous
system. Further differentiation will occur under the influence of growth factors, key-
signaling molecules (Sadler 2000).
In a lO-week fetus, the cerebral hemispheres exhibit a flat surface.' It is only
during the final part of fetal life (when it has grown up to a body length of more than
30 cm, i.e. during the sixth month (Kahle et al. 1996) or seventh month (Sadler 2000:
425) of intrauterine life, that the surface of the cerebral hemispheres grows so rapidly
that a number of convolutions (gyri) separated by fissures (sulci) will start appearing
on its surface (to accommodate with the size of the skull).
The cerebral cortex develops in waves of neuroblasts (immature and
undifferentiated nerve cells) coming from the pallium (coat) located laterally to the
primitive thalamus and primitive hippocampus of the S-weeks embryo. The
subsequent waves of neuroblasts migrating to the cortex cover the previous waves; the
early-formed neuroblasts obtain a deep position in the cortex, and the later-formed
neuroblasts migrate to a more superficial position. The final layout of the cortex is
that of a sheet made up of six layers of cells and fibers. The main output (through the
axons) from the cortex comes from the large pyramidal cells of layer V to their
subcortical destinations (mainly the thalamus); the dendrites branch out in all
directions to connect with the other layers (functional association) (Carpenter
1996:226-228). The thalamic fibers have been said to connect with the human neo-
cortex at about 22-23 weeks of gestation (Flower 1985). According to Grobstein
(1988: 55), "an adequate neural substrate for experienced pain does not exist until
about 30 weeks". He, however, conceded that "a provisional boundary at about 26
weeks should provide safety against reasonable concerns" (130).
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One should, however, take these statements with caution. Peripheral pam
receptors have afferents through the spinothalamic tract. The ascending fibres
concerned with first pain (pricking pain) go to the somatosensory thalamus and from
there to the cortex, particularly the Sll area of the somatosensory cortex. The
pathways for second pain (burning pain) are older and more diffuse (Carpenter 2000:
85). Neurophysiologist RHS Carpenter writes:
The relation between the type or intensity of a stimulus and the degree
of pain that is felt is a highly variable one that depends to a large extent
on the emotional state of the subject and on any implications or meaning
that the pain may have ... One of the clearest pieces of evidence that
there is a degree of separation between peripheral neural discharges and
the objective sense of the existence of a noxious stimulus on the one hand,
and actually feeling pain on the other, comes from patients who have
undergone frontalleucotomy to relieve intractable pain (85).The central pathways
for pain are in fact rather complex and poorly understood, partly because
the sensation of pain is itself very complex (85).
In other words, it is not enough to state that some connections between the
thalamus and the cortex are established to conclude that the fetus is able to feel pain.
Connections must be established with the prefrontal associative cortex to give pain a
meaning. The "emotional" facet of sentience is to feel pain as my pain. Emotions are
part of long-term memory. And long-term memory is located at the level of the
various pathways that unite the frontal cortex with the limbic brain, and most
especially the amygdala (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 140). The following important
point is made by Changeux:
Connections between nerve cells are gradually established over the course
of development by a process of trial and error. The selection and elimination
of such connections are regulated to a substantial degree by the newborn's
interaction with the environment and with itself (6).
It can safely be said, I think, that the fetus' interaction with the environment
must be rather limited. Some type of reaction has been observed when an intense light
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or a noise is applied on a pregnant woman's abdomen. It is not clear whether this
proves anything more than a certain ability to hear and to see. To quote Changeux
agam:
The human child is born with a very immature brain, whose synaptic network
is incompletely established and therefore ready to receive traces of the environment.
At birth, his brain produces mental objects of a particular type that might
be called prerepresentations (or preliminary representations) (112).
Rakic's protomap hypothesis of brain development states that in the phylogeny of
the cerebral cortex some genes (the above mentioned HOX genes) are expressed in a
region-specific manner prior to, or in the absence of, input from the periphery. In
other words, the coarse mapping of the cerebral cortex is encoded in the genetic
equipment; this general structure of the brain needs no input from the outside to get
established. The function of the brain - that is, the determination of the size and of the
synaptic characteristics of the cerebral cortex - needs afferent signals from extra-
cortical sources. It has been shown that after birth, in humans, synaptic density
increases rapidly until it reaches a peak in early childhood (Rakic 1999: 104). It is
now quite well established that "genetic and environmental influences interact in
defining the connectivity within and between cortical microcircuits and the
specification of architectural fields" (Mountcastle 1998: 9). Now, part of the activity-
dependent processes of axonal growth, synaptic remodeling, and refinement of
connectivity, may occur in the absence of extrinsic stimulation - that is, during REM-
sleep, active or paradoxical sleep (Borbély & Tononi 1999: 187). Knowing that the
fetus spends most of its time in REM and non-REM sleep" (186), it may be
hypothesised that some synaptic growth and maturation of neuronal circuits does
occur in the fetal brain in the absence of extrinsic stimuli. The newborn, says
Kinsbourne:
has a full complement of neurons; further development proceeds by selective
death and elimination of synaptic connections. The biological chisel prefigures
the microgenesis of brain states .... The fact that a neural system is in place does not
guarantee that it will participate in the control of behaviour; it needs to be switched on, or
activated (1999: 246, 252).
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In addition to the above, one has also to distinguish automatic from non-
automatic processing systems. According to Marcus Raichle:
The non-automatic processing system [for more difficult and novel tasks] is
sub served largely by the frontal cortex, and it takes that area of the brain some
time to develop fully after birth .... The child's immature brain finds it difficult
to make an adaptation and to change a habitual response (1999: 115-116).
Let us now summanse what we have learned so far from developmental
neurosciences. The embryonic/fetal brain acquires a coarse network of cerebral neural
connections mainly under the influence of specific genes. The cortico-thalamic
connections (which playa role in the ability to feel, in its broadest sense) have been
said to start to be established the earliest around 22 weeks (Flower 1985). However, a
structure might be in place without having yet the ability to function. Some fine-
tuning of the neuronal network is likely to occur during fetal sleep without the
intervention of external stimuli. The automatic processing system ofthe brain is ready
to function at birth. The non-automatic processing system that allows adaptation to
new situations is far from being ready. Sentience, in its broadest sense of the ability to
feel, may be present the earliest at 22 weeks; qualia, the consciousness of feelings and
emotions, are unlikely to be present in a fetus.
Concluding remarks
Heraclites of Ephesus (died after 480 BCE) is principally remembered for the
doctrine of the "flux" of all things: 1taVta psi - everything flows, nothing can be
categorised, the wind cannot be caged. Even the flux cannot be captured in words. His
follower, Cratylus (5th century BCE), reached the logical conclusion that the right
course is just to stay silent and wag one's finger (Blackburn 1996: 87). Two and a half
thousand years later, Heraclites has made a come back. The title of one of Gerald
Edelman's books, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (1992), is a reference to Heraclites' theory
of the four elements: fire, air (breath, the stuff of which souls are composed), earth
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and water. Gordon Globus, in The Postmodern Brain (1995), refers to Heraclites as
"the progenitor of non-linear brain dynamics". Much water has flown under the
bridges during the 2500 years from Heraclites to contemporary neurosciences. Many
paradigm shifts have taken place.
Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) dismissed the traditional Ptolemaic theory
of geocentrism and replaced it with the theory of heIiocentri sm. Although not popular
at first, heliocentrism was confirmed by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), and later by
Johannes Kepler (1571-1630). Both may be considered as the founders of proper
scientific observation as the true source of knowledge of the physical world, as
opposed to traditional authority, dogmatism, and speculation. Isaac Newton (1642-
1727) followed in their footsteps, but with some restrictions though. In his opus
magnum, the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687), he argued: "It is
not to be conceived that mere mechanical causes could give birth to so many regular
motions" (quoted in Blackburn 1996: 261). In other words, the laws of nature, the
order of the universe, the causes of the law of gravity, cannot be explained without a
Supreme Being, a Creator. This illustrates the difficulty people (even sometimes the
authors of a paradigm shift) may experience in accepting all the consequences of a
paradigm shift. The same applies to the ontologie problem of the mind. Is it a purely
physical thing (e.g., reductive materialism), or is there an essentially nonphysical
thing, with no matter, shape, and position in space? Neither materialism nor dualism
can yet explain all what has to be explained (Churchland 1999: 12, 18).
Darwin brought about another paradigm shift. As though it was not enough to
have displaced the center of the universe from the planet earth to the planet sun,
Darwin dethroned Man from his central place in the animal kingdom. The new horror
provoked by Darwin was, in Mary Midgley's (1994) words, the question: "How can
we, without degradation, suppose the more admirable features of human life to have
arisen out of something that was not human?" Friends and foes of speciesism are still
alive and well".
The twenty-first century is, in the eyes of neuroscientists, the century of the
brain. The new paradigm shift is that modem linear, rule-governed, and logical
thinking, with "hidden great wells of passion and spirit of domination" (Globus 1995:
122) is loosing terrain in favour of postmodern thinking. The postmodern brain, to
use Globus' vocabulary, is plastic, constantly restructuring itself, in relentless flux. Is
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there anything like a "brain birth", as suggested by Bonnie Steinbock (1992)? The
answer seems to be no. There is, in the ontogenesis of the embryonic/fetal brain, no
clear marker event that would indicate a time when the structure and the function of
the brain have reached a kind of accomplishment that would be enough to say: yes,
from this stage on the brain is born. The hard nativist view is very unlikely. The hard
empiricist view has a better chance of being representative of how the brain really
functions. The difficulty might be to accept facts as they are. Aren't we scared of
reductionism? Can the mind be reduced to complex brain chemistry? Can we accept
the idea that the embryonic and fetal brain is not a miniature adult brain? And yet, it
surely isn't.
The greatest challenge to man is the proverbial "Know thyself'; and the aim of
philosophy, said Wittgenstein, is to clarify our ideas. Konrad Lorenz (1979: 189-190)
believes that there are three main obstacles to the command to "Know thyself': 1) our
reluctance to accept our evolutionary origin (especially the close relationship to the
chimpanzee); 2) our reluctance to accept the fact that our own behaviour obeys to
laws of natural causation (for we tend rather to believe that we possess a free will);
and 3) the heritage of Western idealistic philosophy that appeals to man's spiritual
pride. So, we are caught between vitalism, a mystically inclined observation of nature,
which does not really explain the process in question (41), and reductionism, a
reaction against ontological dualism (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 20). The
contemporary neurosciences taken as a whole do raise the spectrum of a reduction of
life processes to physico-chemical processes, which they undoubtedly are. It would,
however, be wrong, said Lorenz (1979: 197), to assert that life is essentially only a
physico-chemical process. Nonetheless, he adds: "to regard man ... as the final and
unsurpassable achievement of creation ... is certainly the most arrogant and dangerous
of all untenable doctrines".
This leaves us with the open question raised by Paul Ricoeur (Changeux &
Ricoeur 2000: 8): "How can neuronal man be a moral subject?" (an allusion to
Changeux's book, Neuronal Man). One may extrapolate the same question to the
unborn: How can neuronal fetus be a moral subject?
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6 Three moral philosophers on sentience
Nature has placed mankind under
the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure.
Jeremy Bentham (1789)
Introduction
The thesis that an entity's ability to feel pain and pleasure must be taken into
consideration in the moral deliberation about how that entity deserves to be treated, is
a basic tenet of classical utilitarianism. The implications of this tenet on the morality
of abortion and on the so-called animal rights started to be explored thoroughly only
in the second half of the twentieth-century.
In Erwin Straus' (1963: 317) view, sensing is an all-inclusive road of access to
the world in its generality. The fabric of sentience, said Straus, is this experience of
generality or of signals, which points to a kind of consciousness "also to be found in
animals". He further wrote (1966: 247): "Experiencing is synonymous with
experiencing-the-world and with experiencing-oneself-in-the-world [it] cannot be
translated into or replaced by the sequence 'stimulus and response' ".
These quotes are relevant to the topic of this chapter, which is mainly to
explore the concept of sentience and its link with "a kind of consciousness", for it is
used in the argumentation about the moral standing of the unborn by L. Wayne
Sumner, and of the justification of animal rights by Peter Singer.
Sentience, as will be discussed, is part of the so-called qualia. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty writes the following about the qualia:
A certain form of external experience implies and produces a certain consciousness
of one's own body ... [perception presents itself] as a re-creation or re-constitution
of the world at every moment ... Sensations, 'sensible qualities' are then far from
being reducible to a certain indescribable state or qualia ... they are enveloped in a
living significance (1999: 206-207).
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Both VIews, as expressed by Straus and by Merleau-Ponty, see a link between
sensation or sentience, and some kind of consciousness. In order to understand this
link one has, first, to explore both concepts, and second, one has to investigate if and
how they are linked. If this link can be established, it remains to be seen whether it
can be used as an argument about the moral standing of beings endowed with
sentience.
In this section, I will first explore the concept of qualia versus sentience. This
will be followed by the analysis of Sumner, Singer, and Steinbock's views on
sentience as a criterion of moral standing.
The 'qualia' conundrum
In Paul M. Churchland's words:
'Qualia' is a philosopher's term of art denoting those intrinsic or monadic properties
of our sensations discriminated in introspection .. 'Qualia are not an ineffable mystery ...
they are physical features of our psychological states ... On the view argued here,
the nature of specific qualia will be revealed by neurophysiology, neurochemistry,
and neurophysics (1989: 23, 31).
Churchland's definition of qualia is somehow in line with Gerald Edelman's (1992:
114) viewl that qualia are phenomenal or felt properties as "they constitute the
collection of personal or subjective experiences, feelings, and sensations that
accompany awareness". In other words, qualia refer to "how things seem to us"
(ibid.). This implies that the understanding of the qualia experienced by another
individual is limited by their subjective character and by the fact that the observer
himself or herself is not qualia-free. However, since human beings are self-conscious
animals (as opposed to non-human animals that are conscious but not self-conscious,
as will be discussed later) the subjectivity of qualia does not preclude the scientific
investigation of the phenomena of consciousness, of which qualia are part of (ibid.).
What, in Edelman's view, is required for having qualia is the possession of higher-
order consciousness (115), for to have qualia one needs higher-order categorisation'
(116). To posses higher-order consciousness is "to be conscious of being conscious" -
that is, to have a minimum of "an emerging consciousness of the distinction between
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the self and other entities classified as non-self' (125). Higher-order consciousness, he
claims, is more than the primary consciousness of biological identity (133). Finally,
on Edelman's view, qualia do require the possession of the "appropriate morphology
and experience" (135).3 This, however, does not mean that non-human animals - that
is, those with only primary consciousness - do not experience qualia. The difference
between the qualia of entities with higher-order consciousness and the qualia of
beings with primary consciousness only is that "if they [qualia] occur [in beings with
only primary consciousness] they exist only for the duration of the remembered
present of the scene" (135).4 Our assumption that non-human animals with primary
consciousness do experience qualia, says Edelman, derives from the observation of
behavioural responses (ibid.). Those entities can neither report qualia nor reflect on
them; they experience them (as we assume they do) "solely in the remembered
present" (151) - that is, as an ongoing experience without awareness of past
experience (167).
One may argue that Edelman's attribution of qualia to non-human animals
confuses the issue. For he writes: "They [qualia] are phenomenal states - 'how things
seem to us' as human beings" (114). And also: "The qualia assumption distinguishes
between higher-order (i.e. direct awareness in a human being who has language and a
reportable subjective life) and primary ... consciousness". If qualia require the
possession of a concept of time (past and future) and language, it follows that entities
with primary consciousness must be qualia-free. And any living entity that does not
possess qualia can only possess sentience in its primary sense of the ability to feel
without being able to introspect on that feeling.
Paul Churchland (1989: 31), who believes that "qualia are not an ineffable
mystery", claims that their nature "will be revealed by neurophysiology,
neurochemistry, and neurophysics". He argues against Thomas Nagel's (1974) view
that even if one would have total knowledge of a bat's neurophysiology and its
interaction with the world, one could still not know nor imagine "What is it like to be
a bat?". For Churchland (66), "the elusiveness of the bat's inner life stems not from
the metaphysical emergence of its internal qualia, but only from the finite capacities
of our idiosyncratically human brains". Recently, however, Nagel (1998) has
conceded that it would be "overconfident to conclude, from one's inability to imagine
how mental phenomena might tum out to have physical properties that the possibility
can be ruled out in advance".
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This is not the place to enter into the endless debate between dualism and
monism. Nevertheless, we should acknowledge with Chuchland (1999: 21) that "We
are creatures of matter and we should learn to live with that fact". This needs not to
result in the claim that mental states are no more than physical states of the brain or
that qualia do not really exist. One could agree with Paul Ricoeur's view:
I propose that we say that the brain is the substrate of thought (in the broadest sense
of the term) and that thought is the indication of an underlying neuronal structure.
Substrate and indication would thus constitute the two aspects of a dual relation,
or correlation (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 47).
For our purpose, what is of importance to the discussion is that the concepts of
sentience, qualia, and consciousness, as referred to by some moral philosophers, seem
to be used in a much broader sense, not to say in an intuitive sense, than by neuro-
scientists. It should now appear more clearly that one should make a clear distinction
between sentience (the ability to feel pain) and self-consciousness (the awareness of
feeling pain) (Lewis 1940: 131). In other words, it is one thing to have a succession of
perceptions - Edelman's remembered present - but it is altogether another thing to
experience pain as being "my pain" (or "my pleasure" for that matter)(Pence 1995:
205). Whenever these distinctions are blurred, conceptual problems do arise, and ill-
defined concepts are erroneously ascribed to certain entities to make questionable
arguments. In the next sections, I will illustrate what has just been said by the claims
made by Sumner, Singer, and Steinbock about sentience.
L. Wayne Sumner's sentiendsm
According to Helga Kluge (1998: 209), sentientism is the thesis that only
sentient beings have moral standing. L. Wayne Sumner's thesis, in The Morality of
Abortion (1983), is that the possession of sentience is what ascribes moral standing to
a living entity, and that this moral standing ascribes the right to life and the right not
to be inflicted pain. He defines sentience as follows:
In the most primitive form it is the ability to experience sensations of pleasure
and pain, and thus the ability to enjoy and suffer. It's more developed forms include
wants, aims and desires (and thus the ability to be satisfied and frustrated); attitudes,
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tastes, and values; and moods, emotions, sentiments, and passions
(emphases added) (1997: 108).
It is quite clear from this passage that Sumner recognises the existence of different
types or rather levels of sentience: a primitive, and a developed level of sentience.
Referring to Edelman's distinction between primary and higher-order consciousness,
one could suggest that what is called by Sumner primitive sentience requires primary
consciousness and that the so-called developed sentience is linked to the presence of
higher-order consciousness. Unfortunately, the confusion arises where Sumner goes
on saying:
Consciousness is a necessary condition of sentience, for feelings are states of mind
of which their owner is aware. But it is not sufficient; it is at least possible for beings
to be conscious (percipient, for instance, or even rational) while utterly lacking feelings
(1997: 108).
This passage obviously refers to entities with higher-order consciousness. At the same
time, however, it deepens the confusion by the introduction of the concept of
consciousness and its link with rationality (which should perhaps rather be called self-
consciousness) or with perception (sentience?). Let us briefly remember Sumner's
argument: the possession of sentience is what ascribes moral standing - that is, a right
to life - to human and non-human animals. Without sentience, there is no moral
standing and hence no right to life. The difficulty is not that much to define sentience
(although two levels of sentience may have to be acknowledged). The problem is to
define consciousness versus self-consciousness. A sentient being with only
consciousness (in the sense of primary consciousness as defined by Edelman) is not
equal to a sentient being with self-consciousness (in the sense of Edelman's higher-
order consciousness). Therefore, unspecified sentience may not be good enough for
the ascription of moral standing. Sumner seems to be aware of the difficulty, for he
further states: "If rationality embraces a set of cognitive capacities, then sentience is
rooted in a being's affective and conative life" (ibid.). What this means is that
rationality should not be seen as a necessary condition of sentience, for rationality
cannot exist without cognition, the faculty of knowing independently from emotion
and volition. Sentience, on the other hand, he says, is how one feels emotionally and
the capacity of willing or rejecting what causes these emotions.
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This view on sentience takes us then back to Sumner's distinction between
what he calls the "primitive" and the "developed" levels of sentience. An affective life
with volition (read developed sentience) is, however, something more than a sensory-
motor reflex to a physical stimulus (read primitive sentience). But this distinction
would result in limiting sentience to entities with higher-order consciousness (self-
consciousness) and in depriving so-called lower animals and pre-sentient fetuses from
moral standing. Sumner does reach this conclusion with regards to pre-sentient
fetuses. He is in trouble with the lower animals, for we do not really know enough
where the threshold of sentience is situated in the animal kingdom. In view of this
difficulty, Sumner needs to modify the concept of sentience:
It is in virtue of being sentient that creatures have interests, which are compounded
either out of their desires or out of the experiences they find agreeable (or both).
If morality has to do with the protection and promotion of interests, it is a plausible
conjecture that we owe moral duties to all those beings capable of having interests.
But this will include all sentient creatures (1997: 108).
The twist in the tail is that, instead of higher-order consciousness (too exclusive) and
instead of primary consciousness (which, on Sumner's view, would still be
compounded by sentiments and volition), the concept of sentience has to be watered
down to the concept of interest. One may argue, however, that the mere fact of having
interest in experiencing as much pleasure as possible and in avoiding pain still
involves desires, intentionality, and volition. If the experience of pain and suffering is
to some extent a passive experience inflicted against the will, the fact remains that one
has to be pro-active when it comes to pleasure. One has to do something, and has to
be willing to take some steps in order to have a pleasurable experience. In addition, it
is not self-evident that one has the moral duty to promote someone else's pleasure.
Neither is it self-evident that one has a moral duty to relief someone else's toothache
or migraine headache. If I have some aspirin tablets available, it is a nice thing to
share them to alleviate the other's pain. This is not a moral obligation. It is a very
different thing to inflict voluntarily pain to a living entity. The right not to be tortured
is the only absolute and unrestricted human right acknowledged by the 1947
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. According to Wennberg (1985: 69), the only
right linked to sentience is the right not to be tortured. Most of us would have no
problem extending those same rights to non-human animals, whatever is known about
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their level of sentience. None the less, if the argument is based on sentience/interests
(as Sumner does), it is not enough to feel that one should not inflict pain, for we know
very little about nonhuman animals' and fetuses' level of sentience.
It would appear that the confusion in Sumner's argument follows from treating
as unitary, what in fact is composed of three distinct things. In other words, what is
sentience? Is it a univocal concept? Or what are the levels of sentience? Those
components are described as follows by Eilan et al.:
First, there are internal proprioceptive systems, namely those channels of information
whose source is the body. Second, there is proprioceptive information, understood
to include all the information available to the body. Third, there isproprioceptive
awareness, where this is taken to be conscious experience of the body, characterized
as experience of the body as from inside. We would like to suggest that any talk of
a specific body sense will need to take into account the distinctions between those
three things (1998: 14).
What is said of proprioceptive stimuli and responses can equally be said of
nociceptive" systems, information and awareness. The sensory nervous system is what
allows an entity to become and to be aware of events in the body, producing a sense
of ownership. In an evolutionary perspective, the neurological equipment has adapted
to the milieu in order to be able to cope the best possible. The way a mosquito has to
cope with the environment differs from an oyster, and an oyster differs from a
mammal. The perception of nociceptive stimuli and the reflex arc' in response to it
may be a simple spinal nerve reflex in so-called lower animals, but it may borrow
very complex loops and feedbacks between the peripheral receptor and the brain of
higher animals. What we perceive as being a pain reaction in lower animals may well
be a behavioural pattern resembling the reaction to pain of a so-called higher animal.
Both pains may look similar to us as qualia-laden observers; there is, however, no
reason to think that they are similar. The problem, then, is to find out what level of
sentience is linked to what type of consciousness, or self-consciousness, and
awareness, or self-awareness.
Sumner tries to answer that question. The capacity for sentience, he says,
requires some neurological equipment to guide us in "locating a threshold in the
phylogenetic continuum" (1997: 110-111). He writes (1983: 143): "Biologically
[sentience] is marked by the emergence of the forebrain (the primitive ancestor of the
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human cerebral hemispheres) in the first vertebrates"." The forebrain - that is, the
cerebral hemispheres, thalamus, hypothalamus, and amygdala - he claims,
especially the cerebral cortex, is the site of cognitive, perceptual, and voluntary
motor function. Sensation (pleasure/pain), emotions, and basic drives are
controlled by subcortical areas ... Although the nerves that transmit pleasure/pain
impulses are routed through the cortex, their ultimate destination is the limbic
system (amygdala, hypothalamus). The most primitive forms of sentience are thus
possible in the absence of cortical activity (1997: 110-111).
Sumner is correct in saying that the brainstem and the midbrain play no direct role in
conscious life. He is also right when he states that the limbic system is what is called
the hedonic center. He is, however, mistaken when he claims that subcortical areas
control emotions (unless subcortical is to be understood as a generic term for any
brain structure that is not the cortex). Current views on brain function reject the
concept of any control centre. For instance, Ronald Melzack writes:
It is traditionally assumed that pain sensation and response are sub served by
a "pain centre" in the brain. The concept of a pain centre, however, is totally
inadequate to account for the complexity of pain. Indeed, the concept is pure
fiction, unless virtually the whole brain is considered to be the pain centre,
because the thalamus, hypothalamus, brain stem reticular formation, limbic
system, and frontal cortex are all implicated in pain perception. Other brain
areas are obviously involved in the emotional and motor features of pain (1973: 93).
Edelman (1992: 106) clearly states: "The frontal portions of the cortex functions are
related to behavioural planning and emotions". Edelman further states that "animals
without cortex or its equivalent lack primary consciousness" (123) and, therefore, lack
true qualia (135). In addition, whereas Sumner correctly acknowledges that the nerves
are routed through the cortex, he then pulls back and ignores that essential anatomic
feature to conclude that the cortex is not necessary to the most primitive form of
sentience.
What is of concern, to say the least, is that Sumner boldly makes in a couple of
sentences a summary of the neurophysiology of pain, a topic neurobiologists have a
hard time to fully understand. We can assume that by the subcortical areas, Sumner
refers to the diencephalon. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the diencephalon is a
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complex structure composed of a multiplicity of nuclei interconnected by internal
feedback loops, and connected with the entire cortex through afferent and efferent
pathways. From animal experiments, human pathology, and brain imaging, we have
just started to gain some insight in the complexity of the brain. Furthermore,
subcortical areas do not control emotions; the mere concept of a "control centre" is at
odds with the current views on distributedness and reentry." Without the "cognitive
function" of the cortex and especially the major role played by the prefrontal cortex,
there could not be any slightest hint of higher-order consciousness. If the most
primitive form of sentience is "the ability to experience sensations" (this is what it
really is), we can agree that an amoeba is sentient. To say that sentience entails "the
ability to enjoy and suffer" is to ask for a leap of faith, from mere sensing to the
possession of qualia. Let us recall that the amoeba simply has no brain.
On should bear in mind that Sumner's book is an argument to support what he
later called a "Third Way". He argues that early abortion is permissible, and that late
abortion is morally wrong. Early abortion is permissible because the embryo/fetus is
pre-sentient"; late "abortion" (in reality, a misnomer since it should be called
termination of pregnancy, for abortion refers to the pre-viable stages of pregnancy) is
morally impermissible because it inflicts pain to a sentient fetus. He is, however, not
sure when a fetus becomes sentient. Therefore, he sets an arbitrary threshold
corresponding roughly to the onset of viability!' - that is, around 24 weeks of
gestation. Because of the scientific uncertainty concerning the onset of sentience in
human fetuses, Sumner acknowledges that there is a gray-area ranging from roughly
18 to 24 weeks. Now, Sumner wants to avoid to be charged of speciesism. Therefore,
and to stick to the logic of his argument, namely that it is morally wrong to inflict pain
to a sentient being, he has to include all sentient non-human animals in his theory on
moral standing. Any sentient being has a moral standing and a right to life derived
from it. But where does this lead us in the animal kingdom? Here again, one needs a
bottom-line, a threshold that is, the neurological equipment that is sufficient and
necessary to possess sentience. The difficulty now arises with the use of ill defined
and unconvincing allegedly neuroscientific data. The theory is in trouble. Instead of
tricky qualia, let us then rather talk of interests: it is in a sentient being's interest to be
given a maximum of pleasure and to avoid being inflicted pain. Intuitively this sounds
a good thing. But how does this apply to a fetus?
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With the popularisation of sonography in pregnancy, physicians show
pregnant women how the fetus moves, sucks his or her thumb, exhibits chest motions
called breathing (although there is no air to breath!).12 Anti-abortion, or so-called pro-
life, activists use these pictures to illustrate the happiness of the fetus. On the other
hand, pictures and videos are shown of fetal bodies dismantled by abortive
procedures. The "sufferings" of undesired but innocent fetuses have a tremendous
emotional impact. But do they suffer? Who knows? Is, in all fairness, an embryo or
fetus equipped with the necessary neurological apparatus to "suffer"? Or, does it
merely behave like a living entity with qualia and higher-order consciousness?
Talking again about pain, why then is there no mention of the "pain" and "suffering"
of the fetus squeezed through a woman's birth canal at the time of childbirth, but only
of the pain endured with abortion? Is it morally permissible to have all those babies
going through that ordeal? Shouldn't we rather deliver them all by Caesarean section
to give them a painless birth? The rules of logic state that to draw a valid conclusion
the premises must be true. If the first premise - that the fetus is sentient - is true, and
if the second premise - that it is wrong to inflict pain to a sentient fetus - is true, the
conclusion should be that a normal vaginal delivery is morally impermissible. Now
that sounds absolutely outrageous. Therefore, the premises, or at least the first
premise cannot be true.
Peter Singer's sentiemism
Hugh Lafollette has encapsulated Singer's thesis as follows:
Creatures deserve moral consideration, he claims, not because they can think,
reason, envision a future, have obligations to others, or are a subject of life,
but simply because they suffer ... Equality demands that the similar suffering
of each [a college professor, an infant, or an adult with Down's syndrome]
count similarly (1997: 114).
This sounds very much like a paraphrase of Jeremy Bentham's dictum: "The question
is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?" and "Everybody to
count for one, nobody for more than one". These are the two basic tenets of
Bentham's utilitarian stance: what is morally right is what results in the greatest
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happiness for the greatest number, taking into account that every one's
pleasure/happiness carries the same weight in the hedonic calculus. An important
point, not reflected in LaFollette's summary, is Singer's (1993: 850) advocacy of
animal rights linked to their sentience: "If a being suffers, the fact that it is not a
member of our species cannot be a moral reason for failing to take its suffering into
account". This is Singer's anti-speciesist position. In short, sentience is what ascribes
moral standing to a living entity; therefore, it is morally wrong to inflict pain to any
sentient being. Singer's position is thus different from Sumner. Sumner goes one step
beyond Singer's thesis in the sense that sentience does not only grant moral standing,
but also the right to life. As it will be discussed, Singer has no definite position in this
regard.
The main argument is about sentience. What does Singer mean by sentience?
It is, he says, "a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to
suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness" (1997: 120). Stedman's Medical
Dictionary (1997: 792) defines sentience as the capability of sensation (from the Latin
sen/ire: to feel, to perceive). According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995:
1261), a sentient being has the power of perception by the senses. So, we have
different understandings or concepts of sentience. To possess senses is to have the
faculty of perceiving external sensory stimuli (light, sound, odours, tastes, and
touches) and to perceive proprioceptive stimuli (the awareness of the position of the
body and of the body parts). It seems like a reductionist approach to limit sentience to
the "capacity to suffer" -that is, to feel pain - the ability "to experience enjoyment or
happiness". Sentience as the capacity to feel entails a wide range of different kinds of
perceptions. Moreover, the temptation to place pain as the mirror image of pleasure (a
utilitarian view) may have to be resisted. Thirdly, as suggested by Jamie Mayerfield
(1999: 129), suffering needs to be distinguished from both physical pain and the
frustration of desire. C.S. Lewis (1940: 131-133) made a similar point saying that one
should distinguish between sentience (the ability to feel pain) and self-consciousness
(the awareness of feeling pain). All animals are conscious, he argued, but only human
beings are also self-conscious.
What is pain? What is the intensity of pain? Blackburn writes this about pain:
[Pain] a favourite example of an experience that seems to resist reduction
in terms of behaviour. Although pain obviously has behavioural consequences,
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being unpleasant, disruptive, and sometimes overwhelming, there is also
something more than behaviour, something 'that it is like' to be in pain, and
there is all the difference in the world between pain behaviour accompanied
by pain and the same behaviour without pain. Theories identifying pain with
neural events subserving it have been attacked on the grounds that whilst
a genuine metaphysical identity should be necessarily true, the association
between pain and any such event would be contingent (1996: 275).
What is important in this quote is that it addresses the behavioural aspect of pain,
which must be distinguished from experiencing pain as "my pain", and that it refers to
the eternal mindlbody dichotomy. Is pain just a bodily unpleasant experience, or does
it all happen in the mind? Does one need a brain/mind to feel pain? Is another's pain
something an observer can talk about? Or does one need a personal experience of pain
to gain some insight in another's pain? The latter seems to be John Stuart Mill's point:
What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains,
or the intensity of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage
of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are
homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure (1972: II).
What might have to be distinguished are the pain affect and the pain intensity. The
pain affect is "the emotional arousal and disruption engendered by the pain
experience" (Jensen & Karoly 1992: 143), that is, the effect of pain on a person's
overall feeling. At most, they say, it refers to the contribution of physical pain to
suffering. This, again, suggests that pain and suffering are two different things.
Stedman's Medical Dictionary (642) defines pain as "an unpleasant sensation
associated with actual or potential tissue damage, and mediated by specific nerve
fibers to the brain where its conscious appreciation may be modified by various
factors". This confirms the idea that the physical pain needs to be integrated or
processed by the mindlbrain to result in suffering. The pain intensity, on the other
hand, is something perhaps more objective, as it is said to be quantifiable by humans
on "self-report scale" (Jensen & Karoly ibid.).
Having made the above distinctions, let us return to Singer's argument.
Singer's crusade in favour of animal rights argues basically against industrial animal
farming methods aimed at producing more animal proteins for the consumers. His
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main claim is that animals suffer from factory farming procedures. They suffer from
the way they are treated (crowding, forceful feeding, lack of sleep, etc.), but not that
much from the way they are killed. If, say, a chicken is allowed free range, Singer
would have no fundamental objection against keeping a couple of chickens in the
back yard; as a vegetarian, however, he would not have a bite of it at the Sunday
dinner table. He is "less certain about [killing animals] than about the issue of
suffering" (1993: 281). For instance, he claims (1993: 282) that if useful and
necessary animal experiments are possible without inflicting pain (if the experiment is
run under general anaesthesia and if the animal is killed while still under general
anaesthesia), they might be permissible provided also that there would be no
alternative experimental model.
Why is it morally wrong to inflict pain to animals? The answer is: Because it
is in that entity's interest to avoid pain and to experience pleasure (1993: 851). And
what is a prerequisite to have interests? It is "consciousness, or the capacity for
subjective experience" (ibid.). The next question then is: What grounds do we have
for believing that animals are conscious? This is Singer's answer:
We do believe that other people are conscious ... on the basis ofa perfectly
reasonable inference from similarity of their behaviour to ours when we are
in pain. When we tum to nonhuman animals, we find that within those species
most nearly related to our own, the situation is fundamentally the same as it is
with humans (1993: 285) (emphases added).
Let us unravel the argument. The behaviour of an animal, provided it is close to us
humans, reacting to pain is similar to the behaviour of a conscious human reacting to
pain. Therefore, higher animals (apes and cetaceans) are conscious and suffer exactly
the same as their human counterparts. Now the behavioural reaction to a nociceptive
stimulus says little, if any thing, about the real nature of the perception of pain. If, say
by accident, I cut an earthworm in two, the severed parts are twisting "as if' the
earthworm was in pain. The poor animal has not even anything that compares to a
brain structure (each of the severed parts can live on its own and has its own nervous
structure for independent life) (Lazorthes 1999: 15). It would sound outrageous to
claim that the earthworm is in pain, although it reacts as if it were suffering.
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Moreover, as Paul Churchland reminds us, we should beware of arguments from
analogy saying:
How do we appreciate the psycho-behavioural connections at issue
if we don't possess the concepts for making identifying judgements
and a grasp of the meanings of the terms such as 'pain'. And we know
that these concepts rest on assumptions (1999: 69).
Second, to separate the higher animals from the so-called lower ones might be seen as
species ism in disguise, or perhaps a type of weak species ism - that is, that the human
species is extended to include some higher animal species, "those most nearly to our
own", whilst different criteria apply to the rest of the animal kingdom (not so closely
related to us). Does this not contradict the title of his chapter All Animals are Equal
(1997: 119)? Third, Singer assumes from a similar behaviour that there is a similar
mental state to process the pain into suffering: consciousness (whatever that may be).
Let us now unpack Singer's argument about consciousness. He claims that
consciousness is equivalent to "the capacity to experience pleasure or pain" (283).
Singer now goes on with distinguishing consciousness from self-consciousness (or
self-awareness). Self-consciousness, he claims, includes and requires a "minimally
rational understanding of the world", as well as the need "to be aware of oneself as
existing over some period of time, however brief' in order to be "capable of having
desires about its own future" (296). In other words, the argument claims that to be
self-conscious (or self-aware) an entity needs: (1) some rationality; and (2) some
degree of memory. It is this "minimal" degree of consciousness that is sufficient and
necessary to have interests. And the mentioned interest is to have at least the right not
to suffer. If the argument is taken as it stands it follows that not the entire animal
kingdom meets the conditions set by Singer. A waiver is needed:
The capacity to feel pleasure and pain is something that we might be able to
separate from self-consciousness in theory, but in the world as we know it a
self-conscious being will always be a being capable offeeling pleasure and pain (296).
In other words, since it is not possible to prove that nonhuman animals do possess
self-consciousness, that is a certain degree of rationality and memory, we need no
further argument but to say: look around. Isn't it obvious that nonhuman animals
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
107
suffer? The argument misses the point. We have no doubt that self-conscious beings
(perhaps that includes the higher animals) do experience qualia (even if it is hard to
know what they feel like when they are experienced by others, more especially when
there is no language to express it). The point is: are nonhuman animals conscious or
are they self-conscious? This distinction makes all the difference about sentience,
qualia, pain, and suffering. What is Singer's answer to that question? He states: "That
some animals, at least, are self-conscious appears to have been shown by experiments
in teaching American Sign Language to apes" (301). And: "If language is required to
be a person with reflective thought, nonhuman animals are conscious but not self-
conscious"(302). This looks like the collapse of the entire edifice.
Like others (Sumner, Tooley) Singer then refers to neuroscientific data to
underpin (or rescue) his argument:
We know that all the mammals and birds have the same basic nervous system
that we have, and scientists have observed that they respond physiologically
to pain in much the same way that we do. Feelings and emotions are associated
with the diencephalon ... In the case of vertebrate animals, at least, the analogies are
sufficiently close to make it reasonable to SlIppose that they too possess consciousness.
Even crustaceans have complex nervous systems, and their nerve cells are very much
like our own (1993: 286) (emphases added).
Here Singer is asking from us a leap of faith. From mere assumptions and analogies,
we are requested to be reasonable and to agree with the conclusion that at least
vertebrates13 possess consciousness. We have sailed away from the dangerous high
sea of self-consciousness and reached the safe (or safer) haven of consciousness. We
have sailed away from Charybdis (the apes' self-consciousness, rationality and
memory) to Scylla (the vertebrates' consciousness). Are we not a bit like crustaceans?
Our nerves are pretty much the same!
On the other hand, in Practical Ethics he states:
[what is relevant to the wrongness of killing a human being] is characteristics like
rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness. Infants lack these characteristics ...
No infants - disabled or not - has as strong a claim to life as beings capable of
seeing themselves as distinct entities, existing over time (1993: 182).
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This passage is taken from the section Justifying Infanticide and Non-voluntary
Euthanasia (1993: 182). The argument is obviously very close to (if not simply
borrowed from) Michael Tooley's Abortion and Infanticide. It means that an entity
devoid of self-consciousness, that is unable to have a concept of a self that is different
from the rest of the world and not possessing some degree of memory, have no
intrinsic right to life and can be disposed of Abortion and infanticide are permissible.
This seems prima facie to be in contradiction with Singer's position on animal
rights related to the possession of sentience. The question is: What is it that ascribes a
right to life? We have seen that Singer's position on animal rights is that they have an
interest not to suffer provided they are able to experience pain and pleasure. He is less
clear on animals' right to life, for painless killing might be morally justifiable. The
contradiction or the inconsistency is that in Justifying Infanticide and Non-voluntary
Euthanasia, Singer argues that infants (or at least the severely disabled) can be
subjected to non-voluntary euthanasia. He claims:
Infants are sentient beings who are neither rational nor self-conscious ...
[and] the principles that govern the wrongness of killing non-human
animals who are sentient but not rational or self-conscious must apply
here too. As we saw, the most plausible arguments for attributing a
right to life to a being apply only if there is some awareness of oneself
as a being over time, or as a continuing mental self(1993: 183).
Now this is confusing. First Singer claims that it is wrong to kill a sentient being.
Second, he acknowledges that infants are sentient. It should follow that it is wrong to
kill a sentient infant. But that is not Singer's conclusion. He claims that only self-
conscious beings have a right to life. And infants, he says, are not self-conscious:
Self-consciousness ... is not to be found in either the fetus or the newborn infant.
Neither the fetus nor the newborn infant is an individual capable of regarding
itself as a distinct entity with a life of its own to lead, and it is only for newborn
infants, or for stiIl earlier stages of human life, that replaceability should be
considered to be an ethically acceptable option (1993: 188).
It seems inconsistent to use somewhere the concept of sentience to make a case for
animal rights, and, elsewhere, while acknowledging that fetuses and newborns are
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sentient (logically this would endow them with an inalienable right to life), to require
self-consciousness to protect the right to life. Now, since this is clearly inconsistent,
Singer shifts the argument to the concept of replaceability: "Instantaneous and
painless killing ofa being that will not be missed would be permissible" (Singer 1993:
306). In other words, if putting an end to the life of a sentient being has no impact on
the amount of suffering of his or her next of kin, that being, although sentient, can be
done away with. Another can replace it, because:
[For classical utilitarianism] killing is wrong ifit deprives the world ofa happy life,
but this wrong can be righted if another equally happy life can be created ... it regards
sentient beings as valuable only insofar as they make possible the existence of
intrinsically valuable experiences like pleasure (308).
But this seems in contradiction with any possible hedonic calculus. On the one hand
we have a sentient being that has the ability to experience pain; on the other hand, we
have sentient beings who do not feel anything for that sentient being, or, at least, make
the assumption that that being is not "likely to experience more pleasure than pain"
(309). Hence, the former one can be disposed of because it is assumed that it is qualia-
free! I fail to see the ethical permissibility of this calculus, which seems to be
incompatible with utilitarianism. Furthermore, is there any life possible without a
certain amount of pleasure and pain? When the amount and the magnitude of pain
become intolerable, it is the individual's judgement and decision to put an end to it if
he or she so wishes (voluntary euthanasia). Involuntary euthanasia remains a complex
ethical issue that cannot be addressed, much less solved, simplistically or intuitively.
Singer's so-called "pluralistic consequentialism" (Landman 1990) - a blend of act and
preference utilitarianism - is problematic when applied to abortion and infanticide.
Singer's quote about the resemblances of humans and non-human animals
raises also a series of questions. To be the guru of animal rights is one thing. To use
unjustified analogies between human and non-human nervous systems to make a case
is another thing. What does it mean that "mammals and birds have the same basic
nervous system that we have", and that "crustaceans have a complex nervous system,
and their nerve cells are very much like ours"? To say, "feelings and emotions are
associated with the diencephalon" (1993: 286) is just to tell us part of the story. It
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
110
does not do justice to the complexity of the brain nor to the intricacies and subtleties
of emotions and feelings.
Bonny Steinbock on sentience
Steinbock claims to be pro-choice on the basis of two different premises. She
advocates women's right to self-determination, and (contrary to other pro-ehoieers
who rest their case on a single principle - either women's rights or the absence of
moral standing of the unborn) the moral standing of the unborn or the lack thereof
What is pertinent to this essay is Steinbock's view on the moral standing of the
unborn.
The divide between the possession of moral standing, she claims, is whether
the unborn is sentient or not, because it matters to sentient beings how you treat them:
Pain is pain, no matter who feels it. So long as a being is sentient that is,
capable of experiencing pleasure and pain - it has an interest in not feeling pain,
and its interest provides moral agents with prima facie reasons for acting.
Sentience, then, is sufficient to give a being moral status (1992: 24).
The question then, is: When does the unborn acquire sentience? Like Sumner,
Steinbock acknowledges that we are not really sure about it. She says: "It is possible,
though unlikely, that a fetus of 20 weeks gestational age is sentient, but there is
virtually no chance that fetuses become sentient before the end of the first-trimester"
(193).
Another difficulty relates to the concept of sentience. In the above mentioned
quote sentience is clearly defined as the ability to experience pleasure and pain. Later
on Steinbock states that "the ability to feel pain would precede more highly developed
cognitive states, such as thoughts, emotions, and moods" (50), but "precisely when
fetuses attain conscious awareness is controversial and perhaps indeterminable" (40).
And: "Perhaps late fetuses, like babies, are capable of sensuous pleasure, from
sucking their thumbs, from the warmth of the womb, from the sound of their mother's
heartbeat" (69) (emphasis added). Now this looks like a to and fro. If sentience, in its
most primitive expression as the ability to feel/sense, appears somewhere around
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twenty weeks of intrauterine life, why should one wonder whether the late fetus might
perhaps experience features of basic sentience?
Finally, a last difficulty with Steinbock's view relates to her statement that
"some sentient beings may have lives that are more valuable than others" (70). Now
this seems to discredit her thesis that "it matters to sentient beings how you treat
them". Furthermore, it seems also to weaken the argument from sentience. If there are
degrees of sentience, and if sentience is the criterion of moral standing, it follows that,
there are also degrees of moral standing. And that is difficult to accept. Either one has
a moral standing or one does not. The same view on degrees of sentience and degrees
of moral standing was presented by Wayne L Sumner (1974) in his article Toward a
Credible View on Abortion: "[one] must allow for the gradual acquisition by the fetus
of the status of a moral person and the accompanying right to protection of life"
Concluding remarks
Sentience, together with the ability to move, says Hans Jonas (1996: 71-74),
are the manifestations of what he calls "the principle of mediacy" that separates the
animal world from plants. Plant survival is assured by organic function. Animals, on
the other hand, "distance themselves from nature". Animals have the ability "to move
about [pursuit/flight] and to perceive at a distance [transcendence instead of
dependency, to reach a distant goal] and the ability of emotion". Emotion means, in
this context, the desire (appetite) that is at the root of the chase, and fear that is at the
root of flight. In other words, the perception of a goal requires appetite - the intention
to reach the goal - and this, says Jonas, "involves the development of feeling";
"sentience, feeling, and motility are different manifestations of the essential
distancing nature of animal existence". Jonas further states:
The capacity for feeling is the mother-value of all values. The gain is double-edged
like every trait of life. Feeling lies open to pain as well as to pleasure (74).
It seems, thus, that on Jonas' view, feeling and sentience should be seen as one and the
same thing (as opposed to Sumner's position about feeling as being a state of mind of
which the owner is aware) - a "means of survival", a way to deal with the world and
"self-assertion of freedom" (71). This would then correspond to a primitive form of
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sentience. What would be emotions, and specifically human emotions, is when
"mediacy becomes reflective, an explicit relation between a self-conscious subject and
objects" (Il).
This brings us to the question of self-consciousness/self-awarenesslhigher-
order consciousness versus consciousness/awareness/primary consciousness. In other
words, the point is to try to clarify the distinction between basic or primitive sentience
(the mere ability to perceive a stimulus) and qualia, as defined by Paul Churchland
(1989: 23) as "the intrinsic or monadic properties of our sensations discriminated in
introspection". For, as pointed out by Gerald Edelman (1992: 135), "qualia are
discriminated through differences in neural structure and behaviour in different
sensory pathways". Or,
Qualia are categorisations by higher-order consciousness of the scenes and
memories provided by primary consciousness. They involve recategorical
relationships that are ultimately governed by how evolutionary selected values
interact with memory (151).
Animals with primary consciousness of the most primitive type respond to stimuli
with either consummatory or aversive responses. A more elaborated primary
consciousness allows to correlate value and perceptual categorisation, but without
long-term memory (the "remembered present"). Higher-order consciousness is the
"ability to construct a socially based selfhood, to model the world in terms of past and
the future, and the ability to be directly aware" (125), to be "conscious of being
conscious" (131).
Let us now see what is required from a living entity to possess either primary
or higher-order consciousness. What is required is specific neural equipment, the
nature of which results from evolutionary selection (natural selection), as well as from
somatic selection (what makes each and every nervous system something special and
not simply a replica). For the time being one of the most plausible theories to explain
what the brain is and how it functions, is Neural Darwinism, or Edelman's theory of
neuronal group selection (or TNGS for short) (1992: 81_89).14
The TNGS is the theory that the mind must have arisen as a result of natural
selection and somatic selection. The first tenet, i.e. natural selection, hinges on
Darwin's theory of evolution; it is hardly doubted. The mechanism of somatic
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selection is the main focus of the TNGS. In summary, it says the following. During
the development of an individual's brain, a first coarse brain map, or "primary
repertoire", is produced partly by genetic constraints and partly through the interaction
between the neurons themselves. This stage of development happens without neural
activity; it is a "topobiological" process where cells migrate and find their proper
place. This is what Pasko Rakic (1999: 90) refers to in his paper entitled "The
importance of being well placed and having the right connections" (although the
connections will take place only after the right place has been reached). In a second
stage a more refined brain map, or "secondary repertoire", is produced through the
strengthening or weakening of synaptic connections in response to the value of
incoming signals. This stage of development entails neural activity. The right
connections are being established. Finally, in a third stage, signals are exchanged
between the primary and the secondary repertoire that permit an adaptively valuable
behaviour. This is a global mapping made up of cortical maps and subcortical
structures; it exhibits recursive interaction (i.e., reentry), necessary for conceptual
categorisation and the integration of perception and behaviour.
In neurophysiological and neuroanatomic terms, the primary repertoire - the
brain "value system" - comprises the brain stem and the limbic system; it is
concerned with appetite, sexual, consummatory and defensive behaviour patterns (i.e.,
the automatic or vegetative processing system). The secondary repertoire is the
thalamocortical system that receives sensory inputs and gives motor outputs; it is a
key-structure for the connectivity responsible for the emergence of consciousness.
The interaction through key-reentrant circuits between the primary and the secondary
repertoire "transforms signals from the outside world into nonconscious perceptual
categories, or a value-category memory that allows the construction of an ongoing
scene but without a socially constructed self' (151). The full integration of brain
functions allowing higher-order consciousness requires reentrant signaling, enabling
the brain to integrate distributed functions (71). And, "reentry is the unique feature of
higher brains" (72)~ and this is the main point."
There is a general consensus among neuroscientists that high-level brain
functions depend particularly on the frontal cortex (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 85),
the main locus of non-automatic processing for more difficult and novel tasks
(Raichle 1999: 115). It is implicated in processes involving planning, choice, volition,
and memory (Frackowiak 1998: 119). The prefrontal cortex is directly associated with
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the capacity to interpret one's own behaviour and that of others in terms of inferences
about mental states (157). In other words, the prefrontal cortex should be what
Chalmers (1999) calls the cerebral correlate of the mind. It is now well established
that the frontal cortex "takes some time to develop fully after birth", and that "the
child's immature brain finds it difficult to make an adaptation and to change a
habitual response" (Raichle 1999:115-116). The density of synapses in the prefrontal
cortex before birth is only 15 percent of the density reached in early childhood (Rakic
1999: 105-106). This means that the prefrontal cortex of the unborn is still in a
condition that is hardly compatible with any significant cognitive function.
The prefrontal cortex is the cognitive component of the mind, says Jean-Pierre
Changeux (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 227), and the limbic system is the affective
component; "happiness links the cognitive of the prefrontal with the limbic affective".
If the link between the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system is severed (through
leukotomy or frontal lobotomy) the cognitive component of pain is dissociated from
the affective aspect of suffering (Mayerfield 1999: 26). Although the limbic system is
established in the unborn, the connections with the prefrontal cortex are still
extremely limited. It could be said that the unborn is close to a "frontal" being."
Therefore, it is very unlikely that a fetus could "suffer" although it cannot be ruled out
that a fetus might "feel pain". It is an obvious shortcoming of sentientism that pain
and suffering are not distinguished. As pointed out by Mayerfield:
Pain usually means "physical pain" - a disagreeable feeling that we locate
in our body. Physical pain doesn't cover the many mental kinds of suffering,
such as fear, panic, terror, grief, depression, humiliation, loneliness, anxiety, dread ...
Pain and suffering are not synonymous ... many factors affect the perceived "meaning"
ofsomebody's pain (1999: 24-25).
And mental states, says Changeux (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 140) - that is, desires,
intentions, beliefs, knowledge, emotions - are part of long-term memory. Memory is
the ability "to recreate an act separated by a certain duration from the original set, i.e.
a form of recategorisation (not of replication)" (Edelman 1999: 77). And without
long-term memory - that is, without a fully mature and fully functional prefrontal
cortex and its connections with the limbic system - pain is "stripped of its meaning
for the future" and of its "emotional threat" (Carpenter 1996: 250). Hence, a fetus
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might feel pain but does not suffer; it does not have yet a neural correlate of higher-
consciousness.
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7 Utilitarianism and moral theory on sentience revisited
Doth God take care of oxen?
Paul, 1 Cor 9:9
Introduction
Moral theories ascribing moral considerability to sentience are inspired by the
utilitarian principle that an action is good if it produces the greatest utilitylhappinessl
pleasure for the greatest number affected by that action. Conversely, an action is
wrong if it produces disutility/unhappiness/pain for those affected by the action. To be
sentient is to possess the ability to feel pleasure or pain; to be insensate is to lack this
property. The importance of being sentient is that it matters what is done to you; on
the other hand, it is said (arguably) that nothing matters to an insensate entity. These
are, briefly, the premises supposed to lead to the conclusion that either it is in all
sentient beings' interest not to be inflicted pain (call it minimalist sentientism) or that
sentience qua sentience ascribes a right to life (call it maximalist sentientism).
In the first section, we will look at the roots of utilitarianism and at the various
interpretations of the basic principles of utilitarianism. In the second section, we will
focus on the concept of sentience with special attention to the suggestion that
sentience should be qualified. If, following ideal utilitarianism, there are degrees of
pleasure, there should be no reason not to support the view that there are degrees of
pain - that is, that pain should be distinguished from suffering. In the last section, we
will consider the issue of pain and suffering in the context of abortion.
Utilitarianism
Central to all forms of utilitarianism are the following three basic principles:
(1) the greatest happiness principle - the duty to maximise happiness and to minimise
suffering/pain; (2) the hedonistic principle - happiness (or absence of pain) is the
pleasure of all sentient beings, and suffering (or the absence of pleasure) is the pain of
all sentient beings; and 3) the principle of impartiality - that is, Bentham's "everyone
to count for one and only one" (the classical utilitarian calculus). As we shall see, the
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origin of these principles reaches back to early Western philosophy; the interpretation
of the principles varies, and has led to various subsets of utilitarianism.
Aristippus of Cyrene professed hedonism (from the Greek hedonê, pleasure)
as early as the beginning of the fifth-century BCE. For him, the question was: What
mode of life will supply the greatest amount of bodily pleasure? (Gordon 1990: 29).
He and his followers, the Cyrenaics, saw in hedonism the pursuit of mere physical
pleasure. Hedonism, in a Cyrenaic perspective, leads to a paradox, for if one follows
the strategy of maximising personal pleasure at the same time one decreases one's
chance of obtaining personal pleasure. Or, in Schweitzer's (1987: 279) words: "only
anticipated pleasure is really pleasure; in pleasure which is fulfilled its opposite is
already stirring".
In the Phaedo, where Socrates appears as Plato's mouthpiece, Socrates says:
What a strange thing what we term pleasure seems, my mends!
And what an odd relationship it has to pain which passes for its
opposite! They refuse to be brought together in man
(quoted in Rey 1995 : 38).
In the Eudaimian Ethics (1216 a 11), Aristotle wrote: "Some things that make life
worth living may debatably have to do with happiness" (quoted in Schweitzer 1987).
The notion that pleasure might provide a standard for evaluating action was widely
canvassed by Epicurus (341-270 BCE). Unlike Aristippus, Epicurus established a
hierarchy of pleasures: the natural and the necessary, and those that have to be
eliminated (honours, glory, and riches). He saw himself compelled at last to exalt the
absence of desire for pleasure as being itself the purest pleasure, leading him to an
ethics of resignation (Schweitzer 1987:119,154). He saw pleasure as the absence of
bodily suffering and of "troubles of the soul" (Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 226). For
Epicurus, "there is no profit in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the
mind" (Amato 1990: 35).
Epicureanism and Stoicism shared a common view on pleasure and pain. For
the Stoics "pain is not an evil", and "there is not evil but what is morally vile" (Rey
1995: 40). As far as pleasure is concerned, Cicero, in De finibus (III, VI, 20(2) 18),
wrote: "The pleasure we consider to be the supreme pleasure is the one we are
conscious of when every pain has been eliminated" (quoted in Rey 1995 : 68). Unlike
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later utilitarianism, their concept of pain and pleasure was devoid of any attempt at
collective transformation that would be one of Bentham's main emphases. It is
noteworthy to mention what Roman Emperor and late stoicist, Marcus Aurelius (121-
180 CE) wrote in his Meditations:
Treat as befits a man endowed with reason, that is magnanimously
and nobly, the animals that are not so endowed, and indeed all
whatever that can feel but have no reason
(quoted in Schweitzer 1987: 137)
Because of his conviction that nature has bound up together what is ethical and what
is advantageous both to the individual and to the community, Marcus Aurelius can be
seen as an "enthusiastic utilitarian"(Schweitzer 1987: 137).
The ancient roots of utilitarianism and the first appeal to sentience can thus be
traced back to the origins of Western philosophy. The modem roots of utilitarianism
appeared during the seventeenth-century. According to Hayry (1994: Il), the first
modem anticipation of what he calls "psychological utilitarianism" can be found in
Richard Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae (1672). In an attempt to refute Hobbes'
view of the law as founded upon nothing more than the will of the sovereign,
Cumberland stated that human beings are either inherently benevolent or can be
educated to be universally benevolent towards their fellow beings. He, like David
Hume would later, believed in universal altruism (18-19).
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John Locke defended
the view that ethical theories which rely upon moral intuitions are false - a view that
would later be opposed by Hutcheson. In Passive Obedience (1712), bishop George
Berkeley held the view that human beings are egoistic by nature. Therefore, he
claimed, only rewards can motivate them to do good, and only punishment can deter
them from doing wrong. Berkeley's view was in line with the traditional teaching of
the Church on reward and punishment, a form of "theological utilitarianism" (Hayry
1994: 12).
Frances Hutcheson, an Irish Presbyterian minister who became professor of
moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, is credited for writing the first
formulation of utilitarianism in his Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue (1725). For him, that action is best which procures the greatest happiness for
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the greatest number. His teaching was that the standard of moral goodness is the
promotion of the happiness of others and that moral sense is innate and directed
towards the approval of those actions that benefit human beings. His "descriptive
psychological utilitarianism", as Hayry (1994: 18-19) calls it, was further elaborated
upon by David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), and in An Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). In short, for Hume, human beings are
not motivated by reason or by any innate moral sense, but rather by approval and
disapproval. In the Enquiry he claimed that our natural sentiments of benevolence
"engage us to pay [regard" to the interests of mankind and society". He believed that
the average human being is only mildly benevolent; and that it is the principle of
sympathy that makes humans, by psychological association, moderately sensitive to
others' suffering and happiness. He further believed that egoism is not necessarily
incompatible with some degree of altruism, and that it is all in all beneficial to be
benevolent (Hayry 1994: 18-19).
The first full secular version applying the three basic principles of
utilitarianism is credited to William Godwin. In the Enquiry concerning Political
Justice (1793), he made the anarchistic claim that all apparatus of legal coercion
corrupts human nature. His "radical utilitarianism" stated that legislative and political
reforms need the implementation of the requirements of both altruism and
benevolence (Hayry 1994: 12). A virtuous agent, he claimed, should consider the
happiness or misery that might result from a chosen course of action, and should be
impartial (30, 34). Godwin illustrated these principles in his famous
Gedankenexperiment of the palace of Archbishop Fénelon being on fire. Two people
are trapped inside: the Archbishop and his chambermaid. The dilemma is this: the
rescuer has time to salvage only one of the two, either the Archbishop or his
chambermaid, who happens to be the rescuer's mother. Now, by natural inclination,
the rescuer would choose to save his mother. The right thing to do, however, should
be to save the Archbishop's life because that would bring more benefit to mankind.
The stage was now set for a group of radical English social reformers,
amongst whom Jeremy Bentham was one of the most influential. In The Principles of
Morals and Legislation (1789), he erected the three pillars of all forms of
utilitarianism: the greatest happiness principle, the hedonistic principle, and the
impartiality principle. As mentioned earlier, unlike Epicurus, Bentham thought that
happiness should be pursued by seeking the collective transformation of the world
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rather than by individually fleeing it (Amato 1990: 77). The greatest utility was for
Bentham "that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage,
pleasure, good or happiness". In his assessment of pleasure, Bentham stated that one
has to consider seven dimensions: its intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty,
propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, and purity. Although Bentham's axiological
foundation was about a balance of pleasure over pain, he made it clear that in ethics
the concept of pleasure was synonymous with benefit, advantage, utility, and good
(Hayry 1994: 9). Bentham's close friend and collaborator, James Mill, put emphasis
on the function of law and the rights of individuals in self-regarding matters. In An
Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829), he emphasized that the task of
an educator was to lead students to associate personal pleasure and the common good.
His son, John Stuart Mill, sophisticated the concept of happiness (lower and higher
pleasures) in Utilitarianism (1861), and the concept of individual freedom in On
Liberty (1859). His two alleged additions to Bentham's utilitarianism were, one, that
the quality of pleasure and pain should playa definite role in the hedonic calculus,
and, two, that legal regulation should not be extended to people's private matters.
According to Hayry (1994: 10), however, these two amendments can already be found
in John Locke's writings. Classical Benthamite utilitarianism is regarded as act-
utilitarianism. Mill's utilitarianism once is said to be closer to ideal utilitarianism
(because he gives more weight to higher pleasures, intellectual or spiritual pleasures),
or else is qualified as non-maximising-utilitarianism (that is, that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness) because it leaves room for
supererogation (Curzer 1999: 158). For Smart (1967: 173), Mill is a rule utilitarian
and a quasi-ideal utilitarian.
For Henry Sidgwick, ethical egoism and universal altruism are equally rational
alternatives, provided the moral agent is endowed with both intelligence and genuine
moral concerns. That is, in other words, the problem of taking advantage of
exceptions one can make to the rules when doing so is to one's benefit (a form of
restricted utilitarianism). He introduced in utilitarianism the distinction between the
rightness and wrongness of an action and the goodness or badness of the agent (Smart
& Williams 1973: 55). In his Methods of Ethics (1874), Sidgwick charged J.S. Mill's
argument about happiness as the summum bonum with the "fallacy of composition",
or natural fallacy - that is, to proceed from facts to norms without sufficient
conceptual justification (Hume's famous no ought from is).
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George Edward Moore, in Ethics (1903), claimed that some states of mind
have intrinsic value independent of their pleasantness (Aristotle said something
similar'); therefore, Moore's utilitarianism is labeled ideal utilitarianism (Smart and
Williams 1973: 12). He replaced the concept of happiness with the concept of good,
and the maximum net sum of good. He claimed that goodness is a simple,
unanalysable quality, fortunately known by intuition. He also defended the view that
where individual happiness ceases to be the only source of value, justice, virtue, and
social order acquire a different dimension. Finally, Moore is credited with the first
explicit and exclusive statement about act-utilitarianism: "A voluntary action is right
whenever and only when its total consequences are as good, intrinsically, as any that
would have followed from any action which the agent could have done
instead"(quoted in Hayry 1994: 68).
The distinction between act and rule utilitarianism was further worked out by
Richard B. Brandt in Ethical Theory (1959). Rule-utilitarianism holds that an action is
right if and only if it conforms to a rule that, if followed by all moral agents, would
maximise the good/utilitylhappiness. Other utilitarians, like Richard M. Hare (1987:
132,136), however, resist the separation: "There is a kind of rule-utilitarianism, which
is quite consistent with act-utilitarianism, namely that kind which, while insisting that
its rules be universal, does not insist on their being simple or general, but allows them
to become, through qualification in the light of particular cases, both complicated and
specific". As a non-cognitivist utilitarian', Hare (118) also claims "if two people
ought to be treated differently some difference must be cited as the ground for a
different moral judgement" (Aristotle said something similar!). Like Hare, Williams
(1993: 92) believes that "the application of a rule still has actual or particular
consequences"; moreover, he raises the question of cases where breaking the rule
would produce more utility. Utilitarians respond to that objection by saying, "the
overall pattern of behaviour in following the rules will have better results than if one
followed act-utilitarianism"(Sikora 1993: 105).
We can now add to the list of variations on the theme of the greatest utility or
happiness the offshoots called respectively negative utilitarianism, preference
utilitarianism, cooperative, motive, personal, restricted, and liberal utilitarianism. In
The Open Society and its Enemies (1966), Sir Karl Popper, advocated the view that
"we should concern ourselves with the minimisation of suffering" (negative
utilitarianism) - that is, "misery involving actual pain, not just unhappiness" (Smart &
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Williams 1998: 28). For Raphael (1994: 130), negative utilitarianism was ironically
expressed by Arthur Hugh Clough in his new version of the Sixth Commandment
"Thou shalt not kill, but need'st not strive officiously to keep alive", meaning that
conformity to prohibitions is not the whole of our moral duties. In Jonathan Glover's
view (1990: 95), negative utilitarianism's emphasis on negative duties is a variant of
the acts and omissions doctrine. Preference utilitarianism states that "a value
judgement ought to be based on the autonomous choices, or comparative assessments
made by individual human beings" (Hayry 1994: 59). In other words, the right action
is that which leads to the greatest number of satisfied desires (Gordon 1990: 160).
This is because practical decision-making is most of the time the result of weighting
people's preferences rather than of following rules. Co-operative utilitarianism states
that each agent must be ready to take part in a co-operative effort - that is, it is a
community's enterprise to be involved in "the business of producing good
consequences"(Regan 1990). Motive utilitarianism is rooted in Sidgwick's position
that the test of utility is to be applied directly not only to consequences, but also to the
agent's motives.' This is because "the perfect motivation is identified with an all-
controling desire to maximise utility"(Adams 1990: 237-238). Personal utilitarianism
is not concerned with making people happy but with making happy people. In other
words, "acts are only good if there are people who are made happier by them"
(Narveson 1990: 120). For restrictive utilitarianism, actions are to be tested by rules
and rules by consequences (Smart 1967: 172). Consequences are relevant only in
deciding what rules are good reasons for acting in a certain way in a particular case
(176).4 Liberal utilitarianism's claims are the following. First, it is always right to
promote basic need satisfaction when there is no conflict between the basic needs of
individuals and groups. Second, it is right to maximise the satisfaction of non-basic
needs provided it does not cause the frustration of more important needs. And, third,
when basic needs of individuals are not in conflict, liberal utilitarianism does not
assign clear-cut rights and duties to a moral agent because an exceptionIess utilitarian
theory is incompatible with intuitive acceptability. Conflicts should be solved by
"appeal to conceptual coherence and emotional acceptability'{Hayry 1994: 169).
Needless to say, that utilitarianism has its strengths and weaknesses. The
numerous variants of utilitarianism are various attempts to meet its shortcomings.
This is not the place to discuss the arguments pro and con. As Bernard Williams
(1973: 78) put it: "The first question for philosophy is not 'do you agree with
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Utilitarianism's answer?', but 'do you really accept Utilitarianism's way of looking at
the question?' ". The aim of this overview, in line with William's suggestion, is rather
to point to the fact that pleasure and pain, as well as egoism and altruism are old
companions of mankind. How to reach a compromise between them in a moral theory
that avoids the excesses of both has been a long endeavour of moral philosophers. It
seems that in the context of the abortion debate the utilitarian stance faces three main
objections: 1) the reliance on a "simple-minded" concept of sentience (that is, the
ascription of sentience to what might just be behavioural in nature)"; 2) the arguable
claim that nothing matters to insentient entities (against environmental ethics)"; and 3)
a "simple-minded" concept of pain (against the complexity of pain and suffering)."
Before closing this brief overview on utilitarianism, a word should be said
about Peter Singer's pluralistic consequentialism, a combination of classical
utilitarianism and preference utilitarianism (Landman 1990). Singer is an act-
utilitarian who draws on classical hedonistic utilitarianism. Moral standing is
conferred by sentience, and the best action is that that produces the maximum utility
for all concerned sentient beings. All sentient beings have equal weight in the
hedonistic calculus. Killing a sentient being reduces the sum total of happiness.
Therefore, killing a sentient being is wrong. On his view, the only moral objections to
killing non-personal sentient beings could be: (1) the side-effects on others (if I kill,
say, a dolphin then its next of kin wiIJ grieve); and (2) the decrease in the total sum of
happiness (with one dolphin less the total sum of happy dolphins is diminished by one
unit). Needless to say that this example is questionable, since one may claim that
dolphins (as well as whales and primates, for that matter) are endowed with
personhood. However, we do not reaIJy know the boundaries of personhood, as much
as we do not know the boundaries of sentience. Therefore, it is difficult to provide a
satisfactory example unless one designs a Gedankenexperiment that, too, has its
limitations. Now, since objections 1 and 2 are not really convincing, Singer introduces
the objection from preference utilitarianism that kiIJing thwarts the desire to keep on
living. The question then is: How does the desire to live of one entity outweigh the
preferences of others? Applied to the problem of abortion, preference utilitarianism
should have to answer the question: On what moral principle does the (alleged)
preference to live of the unborn outweigh the woman's preference not to be pregnant?
The continuation of an unwanted pregnancy, no doubt, does thwart this woman's
personal preference.
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It seems difficult to follow the logic of Singer' arguments. On the one hand, he
rejects speciesism: all sentient beings must be treated equally - that is, it is in their
interest that their pleasure be maximised, and their pain minimised. So far so good,
this is plain utilitarianism. On the other hand, Singer admits that infants (and late
fetuses) are sentient (1993: 183), and that "the principles that govern the wrongness of
killing nonhuman animals who are sentient but not rational or self-conscious must
apply here too" (183). He then goes on with the "replaceability argument", or "total
view" of utilitarianism, saying that infants are replaceable in much the same way as
non-self-conscious animals (186). He then gives an example: abort a defective fetus
and become pregnant again (186). It would thus appear that Singer is speciesist. It is
in the interest of sentient nonhuman beings not to be inflicted pain; however, a
sentient human fetus/newborn/infant is replaceable because of a lack of
consciousness. Even if it is true that, unlike other utilitarians, Singer, like Tooley,
does not link sentience with a right to life (but only a right not to be inflicted pain),
his position is at least counterintuitive and at odds with commonsense morality.
Furthermore, it is paradoxical to use different criteria for human and nonhuman
sentient beings and, at the same time, to reject speciesism. If a moral theory has to be
twisted to the extreme to justify an ethical position, there might be something
problematic with the theory. However, one could object (with Sumner) that a moral
theory is unavoidably complex.
This overview of utilitarianism has mainly stressed the variety In
interpretations, not to say the many ways it has to be salvaged through interpretation
and re-interpretation, of the principle of utility. If one restricts the discussion to the
two main variants, act and rule utilitarianism, two major differences do emerge. For
act utilitarianism, action-guiding principles are rules of thumb. For rule utilitarianism,
rules are firm (not mere rules of thumb) but non inviolable (Sikora 1993: 86). In other
words, it is usually wrong to break the rules; the rules should be followed as well as
one could expect actual people to do (105). This is supposed to provide "a basis for
determining which sorts of exceptions are acceptable derivative principles" (90). Rule
utilitarians claim that their view has three advantages over act utilitarianism: 1) it
avoids the counterintuitive consequences of act utilitarianism; 2) it maximises utility
more than act utilitarianism; and 3) it avoids the unpredictability of the consequences
of an act (105).
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In the context of this essay, let us now imagine an act and a rule utilitarian
approach to abortion. At issue is the basic principle of the right/interest of a (alleged)
sentient being, and the derivative principle of the right to life.
Sikora (1993: 94-96) makes the following rule utilitarian argument in defence
of abortion on demand. He states that one has to show that "killing fetuses is
permissible even though it is wrong to kill innocent individuals who are or have been
rational". This, he says, requires showing that the same reasons for refraining from
killing do not apply to fetuses and paradigm rational persons, and that there is not
other reason that should prevent abortion. To make the first point, Sikora claims that it
would be "disastrous" and "fatal for civilization" if the killing of paradigm rational
persons were not prohibited. This is the classical (and arguable) argument that the
breaking of socially accepted conventions would weaken the general faith in and the
respect for a rule or institution, with its usual equally arguable corollary of the
snowball effect or slippery slope (what if every one would ... ?). After this statement
Sikora sees no need for a further defence of the first point but in a footnote (108 n.ll),
where he states that the "indirect effects"(that is, the weakening of the general faith
and respect for a rule or an institution) resulting from killing innocent persons in
general would be enough to make it wrong. These indirect effects, he says, do not
exist with abortion. No reason is given. With regard to the condition that no other
reason should exist to prohibit abortion, he applies the hedonic calculus: in an
overpopulated world, an increase in population would decrease the sum total of
happiness. This reminds us of Bernard Williams' "unblinking accountant's eye of the
strict utilitarian" (Smart & Williams 1973: 113). Like other utilitarians, Sikora seems
more concerned with animal rights (or rather pleasure for that matter) than with the
right to life of the unborn and infant, sentient or insentient, healthy or handicapped.
Paradoxically, however, for a self-confessed rule utilitarian, Sikora claims:" our moral
rules for the treatment of animals should be different from those applying to persons,
and closer in some respects to act utilitarianism"(97). If utility/happiness/pleasure is
to be promoted and if any sentient creature has the same weight in the hedonic
calculus, it is inconsistent to apply different rules to animals and to humans. Is
utilitarianism not against any discrimination and against speciesism?
For act utilitarians, the best action is the one that produces the most
utility/good/happiness for all concerned, that is, for all sentient beings. An action is
wrong if it maximises dis utility/unhappiness for all concerned. Let us assume that you
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are an act utilitarian. You have two children. Your job provides you with an income
that allows you just to make ends meet. Your wife has a heart condition that would
worsen with pregnancy. Therefore, she was sterilised. Sterilisation by tubal ligation is,
however, not fool-proof" Now she is pregnant. Her health would be seriously
threatened, perhaps even her life. Your budget cannot afford an additional child. A
third child would seriously jeopardise the well-being and the education of your two
children. Since you are an act utilitarian you adjudicate. The sum total of happiness
would be achieved through an abortion, regardless of the fact that the unborn is (or
might be) sentient.
It thus appears that the rule utilitarian argument (at least the one presented by
Sikora) in favour of abortion on demand is unconvincing. It is unconvincing because
even if overpopulation should be considered very seriously, it should not be solved
through the globalisation of abortion. Abortion is a personal moral problem. The
global aspect of abortion lies with education, and family planning policies."
The appeal to act utilitarianism (at least the plausible one presented above) in
defence of abortion needs to ignore the emphasis put on sentience. In a hedonic
calculus, the pain of the unborn does not outweigh the disutility inflicted to the
woman and her next of kin.
If one agrees with Holmes Rolston III (1993: 271) statement that "all ethics
seeks an appropriate respect for life", one should perhaps tum to Smart's (1967: 172)
restricted utilitarianism. The basic principle is that "actions are to be tested by rules
and rules by consequences". This implies that "in every case if there is a rule R the
keeping of which is in general optimific, but such that in a special sort of
circumstances the optimific behaviour is to break R, then in these circumstances we
should break R". And, "let us go down to realities, human happiness and misery, and
make these the objects of our pro-attitudes and anti-attitudes"( 181).
Sentience
Having briefly overviewed the mam thrusts of utilitarianism and of its
multiple variations let us again focus on the concept of sentience and sentient beings.
Although this essay is about the use of sentience as a criterion of moral standing for
the unborn, and not a manifesto for animal rights, it is impossible to dissociate the
issue of sentience from its use by animal rights activists. If the general principle of
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utilitarianism is that we have a moral duty to maximise the pleasure of all sentient
beings, we should clarify the concept and the category referred to, and, importantly,
the boundaries thereof. As Mary Anne Warren put it:
If sentience is the criterion of moral standing then not even a fly should be
killed without some good reason ... If killing people is harder to justify than killing
rabbits, it must be because people have some moral standing that is not based
on sentience alone (1991 : 309).
Marcus Aurelius recommended respect for all sentient creatures. Nevertheless,
he does not appear to have had much impact on the way animals were treated for
centuries. For René Descartes, "animal non agit, agitur" (animals do not act, they are
activated like a puppet)(Lorenz 1979: 42). Animals are ultimately only res extensa,
merely fleshy machines; their apparent pain behaviour is not a true reflection of real
pain. Only beings with mental states, res cogitans, do really feel pain (Pence 1995:
203-204). Immanuel Kant (1963: 239) wrote in Lectures on Ethics: "animals are not
self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end". Jeremy Bentham's dictum,
"what matters is not whether they can reason or talk but whether they can sutTer" is
supposed to mean that there is no good reason for excluding the pleasures and pains
of animals from the ethical calculus. Bentham also recognised that it is perfectly
possible to slaughter animals painlessly (Baird Callicott 1993: 349). However, like
Marcus Aurelius, he too had no real impact on the recognition of animal rights during
his lifetime. The earliest manifesto for animal rights is probably the one by Berlin
physician Wilhelm Stem in his Foundation of Ethics as a Positive Science (1897). He
wrote:
All ethics are an affirmation oflife, the characteristic of which is determined
by perception of the danger to existence which living beings experience
in common ... The whole animate creation is to be included within the basic
principle of the moral. The fundamental commandment of ethics, then, is that
we cause no suffering to any living creature ... unless it is to effect some
necessary protection to ourselves (quoted in Schweitzer 1987: 259-260).
To be consistent with the three basic principles of utilitarianism one has the
moral duty to refrain from inflicting pain to any sentient being, and to promote the
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pleasure of all sentient entities. For many utilitarians that includes nonhuman animals.
Singer states his "principle of equal consideration" as follows:
So where human and nonhuman animals share an interest -as in the case
of the interest in avoiding physical pain - we must give equal consideration
to similar amounts of felt pain, and what this is will vary from case to case (1993: 852).
These two quotes, once again, raise the difficulty that follows the equation of pain
with suffering. Ideal utilitarianism is distinguished from classical hedonistic
utilitarianism tor having elaborated a sort of sliding scale of pleasures: the pushpin
equal to poetry against a pig satisfied and Socrates unsatisfied. It seems that what is
lacking from utilitarianism is a sliding scale for pain and suffering. As we have seen
earlier, both friends and foes of sentience are borrowing from alleged neuroscientific
data to either ascribe or to deny sentience, and keep the concept within the narrow
boundaries of the ability to feel pain and pleasure (with the main emphasis on the
ability to feel pain).
The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995: 1261) defines sentience as "having the
power of perception by the senses". This is similar to Stedman's Concise Medical &
Allied Health Dictionary (1997: 792) definition: "capable of characteristic sensation".
Sensation is defined as "a feeling; the translation into consciousness of the effects of a
stimulus exciting any of the organs of sense"(791). In the glossary of Embryo
Experimentation edited by Peter Singer et al (1990: 252), sentience is defined as
follows: "strictly, the ability to sense something; but in ethics the term is normally
used to refer to the ability to feel (at least) pain". This contrasts with Scarry's (1985:
22) view on "human sentience" as "the felt-fact of aliveness that is often sheerly
happy". In addition, Scarry writes: "pain is like other forms of sentience but devoid of
self-extension that is ordinarily the counterpart of sentience"(162); "pain enters into
our midst as at once something that cannot be denied and something that cannot be
confirmed"(13).
The pursuit and the promotion of pleasure is a fundamental feature of
hedonistic utilitarianism. Some of its advocates have elaborated on the concept of
pleasure leading to the two notions of the so-called lower and higher pleasures. Other
utilitarians have given more weight to the duty not to inflict pain to any entity capable
to feel. It would appear, however, that sentientism falls short from establishing a
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hierarchy of pain. Is pain just pain? Is pain always bad? Is feeling pain synonymous
with suffering? Is there a threshold or minimum neural equipment that demarcates the
category of beings only able to feel pain from those able to suffer? If so, what are the
criteria? Alternatively, is sentientism just an argument from emotion? One may also
wonder whether the thesis of sentientism is tenable. Is it a version of the doctrine of
the sanctity of life - every sentient being is sacrosanct. It appears that some of the
advocates of sentientism do recognise that such a rule is not tenable and see the need
to qualify the concept of sentience. For instance, for Steinbock (1992: 23), it is in a
sentient being's interest not to experience pain. However, to support her "interest-
based approach", she feels it necessary to argue that the possession of interests
requires "the capacity of conscious awareness"(13). If this is the case, we return to the
suggested links of pain/primary consciousness against suffering/higher-order
consciousness. It then follows that pain and suffering are not synonymous and that
mere sentience would only confer a kind of low-ranking moral considerability (as
suggested by Mary Anne Warren's quote). An alternative position has been defended
by Tom Regan in The Case for Animal Rights (1983). Regan argues that
consciousness is not necessary for having interests and that sentient beings can be
given treatment which is good for them, for their own sake. His postulate is that
animals have inherent value not only because they are sentient but also because they
are "subjects of life". This view sounds very close to Henri Bergson's thesis of
vitalism - "the mystically inclined observation of nature" (Lorenz 1979:41); the view
that a living entity is not reducible to a physico-chemical machine, but that there is
something supervenient, a property of some kind added to the physical substrate,
something like Bergson's élan vital, Aristotle's psyche, Spinoza's conatus (the desire
to exist), or Schweitzer's will-to-live. In the same line of thought, Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin said:
Life, iffully understood, is not a freak of the universe - nor Man a freak oflife.
On the contrary, life physically culminates inMan, just as energy physically
culminates in life (quoted in Lewin 1993: 141).
The battle between vitalism, reductionism, and emergentism IS not over.
Neuroscientists are charged of reductive materialism - that is, that the mind and the
brain are one single thing, a complex network but still just a network of neurons, a
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purely physical thing. This is in contrast with emergentism that holds that "life, at all
its levels, is but the result of a common, fundamental, internal dynamic" (Lewin 1993:
179). On this view, "the assembly of a living organism is subject to physical law" , but,
contrary to reductionism, "the product is not derivable from the laws
themselves"(ibid.). Emergentism is an attempt to explain the order in nature in a
holistic perspective, a quest for an "internal self-organising principle", a global
property, an emergent structure that results from the interaction of entities in a
complex system (188).
I am not arguing that it does not matter how you treat any living entity.
Neither am I arguing that it does not matter how you treat a sentient being (whatever
sentience might be). I am arguing that sentience as a criterion for moral standing -
whether linked only with the right not to be inflicted pain and/or the right to life - as
it is presented by its utilitarian advocates - does not seem convincing, and, moreover,
might not even be tenable. It is as untenable as the doctrine of the sanctity of life. If
life is sacrosanct, real practical daily life is impossible. If the sanctity of life applies
only to human life, we have no choice but to be speciesist (and why not racist, machos
or whatever kind of ideological supremacist?). It seems more conceivable and realistic
to consider life in all its manifestations in the perspective of "respect for life".
Sentientism, as portrayed by some utilitarians, is unconvincing in the way they
underpin their thesis with weak or unsubstantiated alleged neuroscientific arguments.
Finally, it also suffers from a lack of attention to the difference between pain and
suffering.
The issue of pain and suffering has attracted much attention especially since
the end of World War II. What happened in the concentration camps (not to mention
the Soviet gulags, the Armenian genocide, etc.), everywhere in the world, when
revealed after the armistice, has rightfully horrified us and led to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. In medicine, interest in the pathophysiology of pain is
only about one century old. In 1903, French neurologist Jules-Joseph Déjerine
presented two cases of "thalamic syndrome" - instances where in the absence of
cortical control of the body (hemiplegia), the paralysed half of the body is the site of
sharp and persistent pain, an indication that the thalamus is a major relay station for
sensory nervous pathways, as it was confirmed by Gustave Roussy, in 1907. In 1911,
Henry Head and Gordon Holmes concluded that the thalamus is the pain center, the
locus of conduction, control, and regulation of the body's sensory afferents. When the
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tuning role of the thalamus is lost (as it is in the thalamic syndrome) it results in
unbearable loud and painful sounds (Rey 1995: 264,279). Against William James'
reduction of emotion to a physical expression or behaviour, Walter B. Cannon's book,
Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage (1915), was an argument in defence
of the thesis that pain is not a mere sensation, but rather a sensation pregnant with
emotion.
Influenced by Henry Head's work on the thalamic syndrome, McGill
University pain researcher Ronald Melzack published a trilogy: The Puzzle of Pain
(1973), The Challenge of Pain (1983) (a revised edition of the former, published with
Patrick D. Wall), and Gate-Control Theory of Pain. With W.S Torgerson he
developed what has become known as the McGill Pain Questionnaire, a tool to assess
the quality and intensity of pain in clinical practice. Melzack's main emphasis,
expressed in the gate-control theory of pain, is that the perception of pain is affected
by psychological processes - such as past experience, attention, emotion, etc. - that
open and close the spinal gating system. He insists on the distinction of pain affect
and pain intensity. The pain affect is "the emotional arousal and disruption
engendered by the pain experience" - that is, the contribution of physical pain to
suffering. The pain intensity is "the dimension of pain as measured on a scale" - the
scale being the McGill Pain Questionnaire (both quotations in Mayerfield 1999: 62).
The difficulty with physical pain is that "it differs from any other sensory
perception by not having an object in the external world ... it is itself alone"(Scarry
1985: 161). Physical pain cannot be denied and cannot be confirmed. Pain does not
occur in isolation; it elicits an affective reaction, a quale, without which it is not pain
in the true sense of suffering. As Melzack (1973: 47) put it: "If injury or any other
noxious input fails to evoke negative affect and aversive drive the experience cannot
be called pain". It should be stressed that Melzack is a pain researcher who, as such,
focuses on the pathophysiology of the human body in pain. He is not expressing
himself in philosophical or phenomenological terms. When he talks about the affect
of pain he is, in fact, talking about suffering.
If the wrongness of abortion rests on the premrse of the wrongness of
inflicting pain, a series of questions need an answer. This is what we are now turning
to.
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The "pain" of abortion
The issue of abortion cannot be addressed in vacuo. Abortion involves two
aspects: medical and non-medical. The medical aspect of abortion is about the
different categories of abortion, and the way they are handled in strict medical
terms." The non-medical aspects of abortion are social, psychological (or psycho-
somatic in the sense that there is undoubtedly physical pain and psychological affect),
legal, and ethical. In addition, pregnancy is by its nature a very special and unique
condition where two human beings are intricately and undissociably involved.
Equally by virtue of its nature, the end of a pregnancy, be it an abortion (in the
general medical sense of an interruption of pregnancy prior to the viability of the
conceptus) or a delivery, is a painful event. Women experience uterine contractions as
painful; they feel "labour pains" (the term used in labour wards to refer to uterine
contractions). In proper medical conditions, good clinical practice requires these pains
to be alleviated. The nature of labour pains, however, is such that in the best
conditions - that is, a planned pregnancy, an uncomplicated labour, and the
psychological support of the consort (and attending staff) - they do not have an
untoward psychological effect on women. In other words, there is no real suffering
involved. This is not to say that even in these ideal conditions adequate pain relief
should not be administered.
Abortion (spontaneous or induced), however, should be seen in a different
light. With abortion, there are uterine contractions, and they too are painful. The
difference is that these pains occur in a very different psychological context. The
spontaneous abortion of a planned pregnancy thwarts a woman's desire to bring to life
a new human being. In societies where a woman's ability to bear children is
paramount for her status, both in the family and in the community, an abortion is
undoubtedly a cause of deep suffering. On the other hand, one should not minimise
the agony of women who have no choice but to terminate an unwanted, unplanned or
forced upon pregnancy. There is little doubt that even in societies where abortion is
used as a method of family planning, abortion leaves scars.Il
These points are not difficult to make and to understand. We are talking about
women, persons, people with rationality, who are sentient, able to feel pain and
pleasure (lower and high), and able to suffer and enjoy, as we are. We know that their
brain has reached the structure and function needed to reason, to feel emotions, to
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
133
expenence painful stimuli and to integrate all these things that make what
philosophers would call a paradigm mature person. The question, now, is: Can we say
the same about the unborn?
The thesis of the "soft pro-choicers" is: 1) nothing matters to the pre-sentient
fetus; and 2) it is in the sentient fetus' interest not to be inflicted pain. It follows that
the pre-sentient fetus can be aborted. So far so good, in a utilitarian perspective.
Statement 2, however, raises questions. First, it has not yet be proven beyond
reasonable doubt that sentience is actually acquired, at least before the stage of fetal
viability. Second, what do we know about the pain allegedly inflicted to an allegedly
sentient fetus? Moreover, third, with respect to the hedonic calculus, whose
pain/suffering takes precedence? Is it the one we know of, or is it the one we only
might suspect? Is the choice in favour of a harmless, defenceless, and innocent unborn
not purely emotional?
Emotions run high around the issue of abortion. One of the latest examples
making headlines in the United States is the so-called "partial birth abortion" - a non-
medical term for second trimester abortion, where allegedly the fetal body is
dismembered and the skull suctioned out to allow the passage through the cervix."
This is not only a misrepresentation of the real facts about abortion, but also a
misrepresentation of the character of women seeking an abortion and of the providers.
Another good example is the "hit list" (sic) of The Nuremberg Files (sic) accessible
on http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocityl. Abortionists are equal to the mass
murderers on trial at Nuremberg! Women are not less callous! The use ofmisoprostol
and of mifepristone to medically induce the termination of a pregnancy is called
"chemical genocide". Is this purely emotional or is it not rather fundamentalism,
intolerance, and ill-conceived ideology?
Let us look at the straight facts. Before the availability of the medical drugs to
induce uterine contractions, say, for the purpose of abortion 13, abortion was achieved
instrumentally. So-called "unsafe" (backstreet, illegal, septic, or "criminal") abortions
were practiced by introducing all sorts of tools/instruments poking inside of the
uterus. This, for sure, was "damaging" the embryo/fetus, not to mention the physical
and psychological damage to the woman. Needless to say that these procedures were
(are) done "live". If the embryo/fetus were sentient, this sort of procedure would be
painful. On the other hand, the use of "uterotonics" (agents inducing uterine
contractions) results in contractions, dilatation of the cervix and expulsion of the
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uterine contents, just the same as with a normal delivery. What probably differs is that
the embryo or early fetus is unable to withstand the decrease in oxygenation that
occurs during the uterine contractions. As a result, at the time of expulsion the
conceptus is mostly already dead. Did it suffer? Did it feel pain? A comparable
situation is encountered in case of stillbirth, an intra-uterine death after viability. A
macerated stillbirth is an intra-uterine death that occurred at least 24 hours before
birth; a fresh stillbirth is an intra-uterine death less than 24 hours before birth, usually
during labour. The former may be due to congenital malformations or to intra-uterine
infections; the latter is usually the result of asphyxia, a lack of oxygenation. Was the
death painful? We do not know. In fact, we do not even wonder! What we know
definitely is that the woman suffers from the loss; we know hardly anything about the
pain/suffering of the unborn.
Concluding remarks
A hard pro-life position follows the rule "thou shalt not kill" an
exceptioniess categorical imperative. This kind of stance motivates what could be
called a "restrictive" pro-life attitude in the sense that it means usually that the
commandment applies to the sanctity of human life. In a much broader sense, the rule
applies equally (and even more strongly) to the position advocated by environmental
ethicists who extend the value of life beyond the world of sentient beings. For
instance, Rolston (1993: 271) argues against sentientism for, in his view, it limits the
world of ethics to what he calls "mammalian ethics" (or "vertebrate chauvinism" for
Baird Callicott) - "an extension of humanistic ethics to mammalian cousins". He
further argues against sentientism and its view that nothing matters to insentient
beings. He writes:
Nothing matters to a tree, but much is vital to it ... Something more
than physical causes, even when less than sentience, is operating
within every organism ... Without it, the organism would collapse
into a sand heap (277).
In other words, sentience does not mark the boundaries of life and of the type of life
that warrants respect. On his view, "all ethics seeks an appropriate respect for
life"(271); this does not mean that all life is sacrosanct. Rolston's position is similar to
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Schweitzer's (1987: 311) claim: "thoughtless injury to life [is] incompatible with
ethics". It is quite paradoxical that, for instance in the United States, conservative
politicians use the anti-abortion/pro-life platform to be elected, and that the same
conservatives are reluctant to implement the international agreements that would help
to protect the environment. Such a position is not only shortsighted, but also unethical
and contradictory.
It is not clear to me what the soft pro-life stance really does bring to the
abortion debate. Like the casuistry of the doctrine of double effect and of the doctrine
of self-defence it makes, in my view, no significant contribution to solving the agony
and the complexity of the issue at hand.
The soft pro-choice stance claims to have contributed to a new approach - a
"Third Way". Nothing matters to the pre-sentient embryo/fetus (hence early abortion
is permissible and morally neutral). Everything matters to the sentient fetus (and to
the non-human sentient animal). What matters is: one, that the sentient fetus should
not be inflicted pain (because it is alleged that abortion inflicts pain to the sentient
fetus) (no mention is made of the ordeal of the birth process); and two, that a life full
of happiness is awaiting him or her (no mention of suffering during extra-uterine life
as though only a blissful life is ahead of all fetuses). Besides the arguments made
earlier - that we hardly know anything about the fetus' ability to feel pain (much less
to suffer); that we know nothing about the alleged pain endured by the fetus during
abortion; that there is a grey area or a transition period between insentience and
possible sentience - it seems that the thesis of sentientism is no more than the
argument from potentiality in disguise. And the argument from potentiality can be
seen as the use of a utilitarian premise in a deontological argument (Wennberg 1985:
93). Sentientism assumes that there is a pre-sentient stage followed by a gradual
acquisition of sentience. The latter is not a marker event in the sense that sentience
would appear suddenly out of the blue. Sentientism assumes that there is a sliding
scale from non-sentience, through partial sentience, to full sentience. In other words,
the pre-sentient entity is potentially sentient. Sumner, a self-confessed "moderate"
classical utilitarian, writes:
A prethreshold fetus, unlike an oyster or a radish, has sentience in its future.
For classical utilitarianism, the future matters, indeed it is all that matters ...
Once it is capable of being harmed, the future awaiting a human fetus is
highly relevant to the extent to which it can be harmed (198 I: 22 I,227).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
136
Is this position different from the claim made by the argument from potentiality that,
since the embryo/fetus is a potential person, it deserves the same right to life as a real
person? Like the soft pro-choicers, the soft pro-lifers admit that there is a stage where
the pre-embryo is not yet an individual, a person (hence not even a potential person),
and that abortion of the pre-embryo is morally neutral. Hence, it can be argued that
there is no fundamental difference between the two arguments, and that the "Third
Way" is a pro-life stance in disguise rather than a genuine pro-choice advocacy.
Kenneth Goodpaster (1978) has argued that sentience is not an end in itself but
evolved as a means to further the goal of survival. Therefore, since sentience is
ancillary to life, the capacity to live should be the criterion of moral considerability.
He suggested that a living being might be defined, for the purposes of ethical analysis,
in terms of conations - an inherent tendency, direction of growth, and natural
fulfillment (something like Aristotle's telos). Holmes Rolston III (1988) argued that
sentience adds a "value bonus" to conativity; the richer an entity's sentience, the more
intrinsic value it possesses (in addition to being a subject of life). For Baird Callicott
(1993: 354) "minimal moral considerability doesn't mean rights". It could then be
said that the claim that sentient beings have a right to life should be replaced by the
claim that sentient beings are intrinsically valuable.
In conclusion, Susan Dwyer's comment on the gradualist view (footnote 7) is
worth quoting:
It is worth noting here that not all philosophers think that the moraI standing
of the fetus is determined by the fetus' intrinsic properties. Some argue that
the fetus' moraI status is aIso function of its relational properties (I997: 5).
On this phenomenological view, advocated by Catriona Mackenzie (1997: 175-193),
the pregnant woman and the unborn are a single entity. Therefore, "the moral status is
determined not only by features it lacks or possesses but also by the relations in which
it stands to others" (Dwyer 1997: 10). And the first relation in which the unborn
stands to others is nobody else than the pregnant woman who says: "I invite you in"
(to use Judith Jarvis Thomson's expression, although out of the context of her
argument), or "I grant you moral status". This view then becomes rather what Rorty
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(1998: 38) says about personhood, "an acceptance of another being into fellowship
rather than a recognition of a common essence".
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8 Post-structural neurophilosophy
Happily to endow inanimate nature with sentience and
a capability of moral action is one of the severest tests
of the poet.
Edgar Allan Poe (1850)
Introduction
In this section, the concept of sentience will be posited in a broader
perspective than the mere ability to feel pain and pleasure. As we have seen, sentience
is mostly portrayed as a property of living entities, human and nonhuman. Moreover,
sentience is linked with rights - more specifically, the right not to be inflicted pain
and the right to life by a number of moral philosophers. I wish to argue that the
concept of sentience, as it is appealed to in the moral philosophy of sentientism, is
part of a deterministic algorithm. In other words, the advocates of sentience categorise
and dichotomise the living world into sentient and insensate beings; the former have a
moral standing and the later lack it. The advocates of sentience see it as the sine qua
non qualifier of moral considerability. They regard sentience as a physical state of the
machine (the nervous system) that realises a certain functional state (the ability to
feel). Therefore, sentientism is stuck with the inescapable "either/or" dilemma and its
metaphysical commitment. Finally, sentientism belongs to one of the traditional rule-
based views on abortion with its own master key for unlocking the dilemma: pro-
life/pro-choice, anti-choice/pro-choice.
In order to escape from the metaphysics of presence (the ability to feel is
present or is not) one has to relinquish the simplistic, reductionist and functionalist
view on sentience. To my mind, sentience cannot fit into a simple unifying discourse.
Sentience and pain are much more complex than portrayed by sentientism. As an
alternative, I propose to deconstruct the concept of sentience to show that it can be
supported, not proven. Furthermore, I will argue that fixing the boundaries of moral
standing - that is, sentient vs. insensate - is not only impossible, but leaves out of our
moral consideration a vast world of entities with moral considerability.
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Connectionism and sentience
As we have seen in Chapter 4, the two mainstream contemporary theories of
the mind - that is, how the brain (the anatomical substrate) allows the mind (the
function) - are functionalism and connectionism. The former can be qualified as rule-
based, deterministic, and algorithmic. Put simply, the brain is equivalent to the
hardware of a computer, and the mind is the software. In other words, the brain is
hard-wired, pre-programmed; it interacts in a linear fashion with the information
originating from the outside. Connectionism, on the other hand, sees the brain-mind
unit as a fluid, flexible, non-linear, non-algorithmic, soft wired, non-pre-programmed,
non-deterministic, complex system.
In a functionalist perspective, an input produces a predetermined specific
output. A blow on the head produces pain. Indeed, this is how it goes, but only partly
though. An input produces an output depending on the structural and the functional
condition of the body. For instance, when a physician taps the patellar tendon of the
knee wit a patella hammer a tendon-jerk is elicited, provided the synaptic connections
within the spinal cord, the motor nerves and the descending motor pathways are
intact. Similarly, the Babinski sign (the extension of the big toe with fanning of the
toes) in response to stroking of the lateral aspect of the foot sole is also a spinal reflex
but it indicates an upper neuron lesion (i.e. brain damage). What this means is that the
presence of a reflex reaction to a stimulus may be indicative of a well functioning
nervous system as well as of a malfunction. Advocates of sentience do not seem
aware of these simple and basic neurological facts, for they interpret a reaction to a
stimulus as a clear indication that the entity is sentient and able to feel pain and
pleasure. However, this is no more than a mere assumption. Similarly, concerning
pain, sentientism fails to address the complexity of pain. Pain is not just pain.
Indeed, pain is "a complex subjective phenomenon made up of sensation
indicating real or potential tissue damage and the affective response it
generates"(Berkow et al. 1992:1407). Furthermore, there is acute and there is chronic
pain. Acute pain is a biological signal, short-lived, aimed at avoiding a potential
injury or at signalling an established injury. Acute pain is accompanied by anxiety and
by hyperactivity of the sympathetic nervous system (i.e. accelerated heart rate and
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respiratory rate, sweating, dilatation of the pupils, and increased blood
pressure)(ibid.). Chronic pain is further subdivided into nociceptive (an ongoing
activation of pain-sensitive nerve fibres), neuropathic (a nerve tissue damage), and
psychogenic pain (without organic lesion as, for instance, the Munchausen
syndrome)( I408). This is only a very limited overview that can only give a glimpse
on the complexity of pain (seen from a neurological point of view, not to mention the
affective aspects of pain) and point at the shortcomings of sentientism. What is it to
have the ability to feel pain? What does a sentient entity really feel? What does a so-
called lower animail feel (assuming that it does)? What is the affective response to
pain, if any, of a lower or higher animal? What is the affective response, if any, of an
embryo or fetus to the alleged pain inflicted by abortion? The list of unanswered (if
not unanswerable) questions could be extended at libitum. As long as the concept of
sentience remains unqualified (if ever it can be) or limited to the mere alleged ability
to feel, sentientism is bound to fail as a neurophilosophical argument. Even if
(perhaps one day) the neurosciences were advanced enough as to unravel the mystery
of sentience and qualia, would it change our ethical behaviour towards insensate
entities?
It is my contention that a connectionist approach to sentience stands a better
chance than functionalism. The point is not to deny that the ability to feel pain should
be taken into consideration. We should be neither blind to nor blinded by sentience.
The point is rather to acknowledge the complexity of sentience and to expand the
attribution of moral considerability beyond the boundaries of a shaky and ill-defined
concept of sentience. The question is: Can we analyse sentience? Can we dissect
sentience into elementary components? The answer is no, because sentience is a
dynamic interaction between the elements that make what it is. The concepts of
sentience and pain are complex and we must admit that, to a large extent, we do not
understand them. Sentience has most of the characteristics of complex systems
described by Cilliers (1998). It is a system characterised by a large number of
elements that transfer information in a non-linear fashion. The interaction can be
increased or decreased. There are loops and feedbacks. Sentience is an interaction
with the environment. The elements constituting sentience 'inter-interact'.
What distinguishes connectionism from functionalism is the acknowledgement
of complexity. Complex systems are characterised by two vital properties:
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representation and self-organisation (Cilliers 1998: 11-12).2 Representation refers to
the mode of "storage" of information for future use, and self-organisation refers to the
ability to cope with unpredictable changes in the environment. Representation is the
fact that "a certain pattern of activity will be caused in the system each time a specific
cluster (i.e. the values of the weights in the network) is present"(93). For instance, "if
a certain state of affairs regularly causes harm to the system, the system will associate
that condition with harm"(ibid.). In a neural network, representation involves that the
structure of the system is not determined by the outside but involves elements from
the inside and the outside, and that the previous states of the system are of vital
importance. Sentientism dwells on the idea of a closed system, of a distinction
between the inside (the ability to feel) and the outside (the infliction of a painful
stimulus). It looks at sentience in a synchronic manner and in terms of deterministic
rules. The concept of sentience should rather be seen in a diachronic perspective (how
the state of the system was arrived at), and in terms of a relationship.
A neural network has to be trained. Training allows the system "to 'evolve' in
the direction of a solution"(28). This might suggest that the first experience of
harm/pain needs repetition in order to learn what it is to feel pain (or pleasure). In
other words, representation is a learning process that requires training of the network,
the neural network of the brain that is.' The mesh of the network comprises nodes
(viz. like the knots in a fishing net). The strength (or the weight) of the connection (or
the synapse) between an input node and an output node depends on its positive (or
excitatory) or negative (or inhibitory) connections. The weights characterise the
network. A strong fishing net can catch big fish and a weak one only a few sardines.
With holes in the net, you catch nothing. A single knot is not a net, but each knot of a
net contributes to the overall strength of the whole fishing net; the quality (the
strength) of the net is distributed throughout the mesh and the knots. The analogy
ends here because you cannot train a fishing net to catch fish, and the fishing net is
unable to repair itself It is unable to self-organise; it needs a designer. Connectionism
rejects the concept of a designer, and favours self-organisation.
It should be clear from our current knowledge and understanding of the
neurosciences that the concept of distributed representation is incompatible with
Gall's concept of phrenology. The brain contains no pontifical cell and no
homunculus. Although the brain does possess areas where a specific function is
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predominant (e.g. Broca's speech centre in the left temporal lobe of the brain), it is
now obvious that none of these "centres" operates in isolation. They are
interconnected mainly through the associative cortex in a manner similar to the hidden
layer of a neural network. Therefore, the argument of the presence of a "pleasure
centre" that the utilitarian animal lover has the moral duty to stimulate to make his or
her pet happy has no leg to stand on. Interestingly, no such "centre" is claimed (and
actually does not exist) for pain; the loci involved in the perception of pain are
scattered throughout the peripheral and central nervous system. They are truly
distributed and in reciprocal contact through loops and feedbacks.
The other leg of complex systems is self-organisation, which refers to the way
an internal structure handles new situations, "the way in which a complex system
develops organised structures" (12). It is obvious that if the brain were hard-wired and
pre-wired it would be impossible to adapt to new circumstances and to learn. If that
were to be the case, living entities, human and nonhuman, would be no more than
automatons. There would be no way to learn that a specific stimulus results in a
specific reaction. It would be impossible to avoid to be repeatedly damaged or to
repeat a pleasurable experience. We have seen in the previous chapters that the brain
is in constant reorganisation. Cells die. New connections are established all the time.
Synaptic plasticity is an ongoing process. If this were not the case, the brain would
shut down. In Kauffman's (1995: 25) view, self-organisation "is the root source of
order". Against the Darwinian theory of natural selection (that ontogeny - the
development of a fertilised ovum into an adult is spontaneous) where stability arises
after a series of evolutionary experiments, Kauffman argues that "this stability cannot
be imposed from outside by natural selection ... but from within as a condition of
evolution itself'. Ontogeny, he says, "is a natural expression of the self-organisation
that abounds in very complex regulatory networks" (25). Self-organisation, "order for
free", lies in "the ordered regime between order and chaos, a phase transition between
order and disorder... a web of compromises ... with no certainty about the next step"
(26). A small cause can have huge consequences like in Per Bak's experiment with the
sand pile."
It is safe to say that the contemporary neurosciences have a strong leaning
towards connectionism. Therefore, a neurophilosophical argument about the moral
implications resulting from the ability to feel pain should take the neuroscientific
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evidence into consideration rather than to rely on folk psychology - belief-desire
psychology.
In the following section I wish to argue that the misconception of sentience
has wider implications than could be imagined if sentientism were pushed to its
philosophical limits.
Sentience and global issues
Thomas Malthus' Essay on Populations (1798) had an undermining influence
on the Enlightenment belief in unlimited possibilities of human progress. His thesis
was that since the natural tendency of populations is to grow faster than resources this
would inevitably lead to famine. In Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair (first
published in 1980), Baird Callicott (1995: 243) holds a similar argument: "A global
population of 4 billion persons and showing no signs of an orderly decline presents an
alarming prospect to humanists, but is at present a global disaster for the biotic
community". At the time of the present writing, the world population is close to 7
billion! Does it follow that, in Garrett Hardin's (1995: 334) words "freedom to breed
is intolerable"? What is worse: unrestrained population growth, followed by crash and
die-back, or stringently imposed population control limiting reproductive rights
(Battin 1998: 161)? Cornucopians argue that the earth's resources are not in danger,
and that the planet could sustain up to 1,000 billion people. However, this view does
not take into consideration the problems posed by pollution, waste disposal, water
supply - the most burning issue, so to say, to face in the near future -, etc. The
levelling-off assumption does not take into consideration that it is unlikely to happen
in the least developed nations, and that where it happens economic development
brings with it dramatic increases in rates of consumption (155-156). The situation
leads to the utilitarian dilemma of the highest average level of welfare versus the
greatest aggregate total of welfare. Margaret Pabst Battin reminds us:
Neither coercive population control, nor cavalier acceptance of
die-back, nor naïve acceptance of optimistic but unfounded
Comucopian hopes is a satisfactory solution. The population issue
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is a real one, with massive human consequences ... What if everybody,
both male and female, were to use long-term reversible, 'automatic'
contraception, so that the sustaining or siring of pregnancy required
a positive choice, rather than simply a negative choice to prevent it?
Such a picture would be morally acceptable ... ifit were genuinely
universal. .. [no effective effort to control population at all] is potentially
starker and more cruel than any form of rigorous population control
at all, since it involves widespread crash and die-back - that is,
human death or non-reproduction on a widespread scale, either from
starvation or other population-related causes ( 1998: 160).
Battin's argument is that family planning does not work because it is a negative
decision. One has to decide not to procreate. Her suggestion is that every one should
be on a contraceptive method, and make the positive choice to stop it when deciding
to procreate. Although the argument is debatable, she has a point in that the
population issue is a real problem one has to face. Each act of procreation has moral
consequences, not only on the individual that is created but also on society and the
planet. John Stuart Mill stated, in On Liberty (quoted in Ladd 1996: 68), that to bring
a child into existence without fair prospects of a happy life is a "moral crime" because
of the wrongness of bringing needless, avoidable suffering in the world. He (arguably)
considered that it was the State's duty to take care of such children. One could argue,
like Harris (1996: 68), that the right to found a family "might involve constraints on
the sorts of people judged fit to produce and rear children" for the sake of securing the
interests of the next generation. One of Harris' arguments is that in the case of
adoption "we think it matters that people establish that they are fit and proper
potential parents before we permit them the custody of children" (79). Why not, then,
would the same not apply to genetic parents? Archer (1996: 112) argues: "the right to
bear children is not absolute and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an
objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producers". Unlike
Lafollette (1980), who defends the view that parents should be licensed to rear
children for it is a potentially harmful activity that requires skills, Archer extends the
argument to a licence to procreate (115). To determine the "fitness to parent" would
raise enormous difficulties. This is not the point of Neo-Malthusianism. The point of
Neo-Malthusianism is rather whether the planet earth will be able in the near future to
sustain the exponentially increasing world population and provide it with a decent
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quality of life (the global view on procreation). In other words, it raises the question
asked by Melinda Roberts (1998: 145):"Can existence make someone worse off than
non-existence". Instead of someone, one should say the world population. If the
prospects of the planet are what futurologists and environmentalists suspect -
overpopulation, depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, water shortages, and
famine - the morality of procreation needs serious attention. To bring into existence
"wrongful lives" that is, living human beings with prospects of suffering pain and
harm rather than an acceptable level of quality of life - is worth our moral
consideration.
As I have said earlier, it is unlikely that contraception or family planning will
eliminate the need for or the fact of abortion and of the disposal of frozen embryos. I
would agree with the abovementioned reasons pointing at a need to limit the
population explosion. Even in the (hypothetical) event that all pregnancies were
planned, there is and will be nevertheless a need or a request for genetic screening
(e.g. Down's syndrome, thalassaemia, Tay-Sachs disease, Duchenne muscular
dystrophy, etc.) and the ensuing request for abortion. Anencephalic babies will still be
born. Reproductive technologies will still be needed to help infertile couples (with the
resulting supernumerary embryos, or the need or request for fetal reduction).
Responsible reproduction is one thing (direly needed). Pregnancy-related ethical
dilemmas will remain with us in spite of contraception. The difficulty is to reach an
acceptable and decent ethical stance. Commenting on John A. Robertson's (quoted in
Roberts 1998: 186) words, "amorphous concerns regarding subtle indignities
experienced by entities whose ethical status is at best unclear would not weigh in at
all" (viz., the frozen embryos and stem cells), Roberts says the following. What
matters is not the "profound respect" due to human embryos or the "prima facie
demands" regarding their treatment, "but rather [the effect] on the flesh-and-blood
children that are produced" (187). Quoting Konrad Lorenz again:
The fate of humanity hangs on the question whether or not responsible morality
will be able to cope with its rapidly growing burden. We shall not lighten this
burden by overestimating the strength of morality (1979: 218).
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This passage, first written in 1963, is about the world population. As an ethologist, he
writes basically about nonhuman animals but makes inferences about human
behaviour (as compared to nonhuman animal behaviour). In the case of rats, he writes,
reproduction stops automatically when a certain state of overcrowding is reached
(204). Should we then hold the renegade view that rats are cleverer than we are?
Perhaps this section on the global consequences of sentientism should conclude with
Hans Jonas' (1996: 19,37) words:
The moral worth oflife only comes into being with the phenomenon
of obligation, and obligation requires the evolution of a being
capable of moral responsibility ... To be against biotic egalitarianism
(or radical nonanthropocentrism) is not to say that we should
not extend our existential interpretation to the biological world,
because it helps us to acknowledge the continuity and kinship
among life-forms and to appreciate what we lose when we
cut ourselves off from them.
Sentience and complexity, or the complexity of sentience
The leitmotiv of sentience has been repeated almost ad nauseam throughout
this essay. The leitmotiv of sentientism is to provide us with a metanarrative that
gives order and meaning to the realm of sentient beings: once it is established that an
entity possesses the ability to feel pain and pleasure it ipso facto is endowed with the
right not to be inflicted pain and the right to pleasurable experiences. In addition, for
some, this also entails the right to life. Sentientism is thus the quest for the
overarching narrative that provides the master key to unlock Pandora's box, the
intractable question of the sanctity of life of human and nonhuman living entities.
It is sentientism's claim that sentience is present or absent. If it is present, the
entity has an interest in experiencing pleasure; therefore, the (utilitarian) moral agent
has a duty to promote or facilitate the sentient entity's pleasurable experiences.
Conversely, the moral agent (utilitarian or otherwise) has the duty to refrain from any
action that would inflict pain to the sentient being, including the pain that would result
in death (e.g. the alleged pain inflicted to the unborn by the procedure of termination
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of pregnancy). If the entity is insensate, nothing matters. If this argument is taken to
its logical conclusion that since nothing matters to the insensate entities anything can
be done to the environment and even to the products of human craft. Obviously, this
would be extremely controversial, not to say unacceptable. Therefore, regardless of
the neuroscientific weaknesses of the defence of sentientism, the moral theory based
on the concept of sentience leads to ethically doubtful conclusions.
Besides the claim made by Baird Callicott (1995: 240) that "[instead of
sentience] sensibility would be a more precise word choice", one could also argue
with Paul Taylor (1995: 127) against the view that nothing matters to insensate
entities. If being morally considerable means to have intrinsic value (Goodpaster
1978), one should expand the circle of moral considerability or moral standing
beyond the ill-defined boundaries of sentience. To conceive of sentience as the
possession of interests (to experience pleasure and to avoid pain) does not take into
consideration the fact that "we can act in a being's interest or contrary to its interest
without its being interested in what we are doing to it in the sense of wanting or not
wanting us to do it" (ibid.). This view is a reflection of the environmental ethical
argument against the atomistic view of competition for moral standing held by animal
liberationists and in favour of the principle of "equal consideration" (Baird Callicott
1995: 242). This means that even insensate entities possess intrinsic value (and not
only instrumental value). It is quite clear, however, that "the question of ultimate
value is a very sticky one ... for all ethics"(ibid.). One view, held by Harley Cahen
(1995: 300), is that "nonsentient organisms - those not capable of consciously taking
an interest in anything - have interests (and thus are candidates for moral
considerability) in achieving their biological goals". This is encapsulated by Holmes
Rolston III (1993: 277) as follows" "Nothing matters to a tree, but much is vital to it
... Organisms have ends, although not always ends in view".
It then could be said that sentientism is a "closed system" that denies or
overlooks the complexity of the matter by clinging to an oversimplified notion -that
is, the relatively undefined concept of sentience - to categorise the world in which we
live. In doing that, sentientism excludes from moral consideration the insensate world
without which sentient beings could not even exist. An "open system" would entail
the expansion of moral considerability beyond the boundaries of sentience without
denying the moral weight that sentient beings deserve. On this view, the ability to feel
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is no longer the ultimate, the last word, the master key, the overarching principle to
guide our moral acts and decisions. If we are concerned about the current life and the
prospects for life of sentient beings, we have no choice but to pay moral attention to
the insensate world that sustains and will sustain the sentient entities. This, then, leads
us to a "life-centred environmental ethics" where "the well-being of the Earth's biotic
community is a end in itself' (Taylor 1995: 126). This view, in tum, leads to the
nagging question whether life qua life is the ultimate moral value (the principle of the
sanctity of life). It has been suggested (Chapter 2) that the principle of sanctity of life,
as opposed to the principle of reverence for life, is untenable and anthropocentric.
However, "how exactly to express or manifest respect. .. is a difficult and delicate
question" (Baird Callicott 1995: 274). If one shares Rachels' (1995: 71) view that
"there are good Darwinian reasons for thinking it unlikely that any other support for
human dignity [i.e. that man is made in the image of God, or that man is a uniquely
rational being] can be found", it would follow that "inherent value, then, belongs
equally to those who are the experiencing subjects of life" (Regan 1995: 77). In other
words, there should be no reason to assign preferential value to human life. On the
contrary, if human life is given more weight than nonhuman life, the planet earth is
unavoidably on the path of a disaster. The question then is: How can we prevent this
impending catastrophe? In addition: What is our moral duty to prevent it?
For reasons already mentioned, neither the absolute pro-life nor the absolute
pro-choice answer to abortion (and population control) is satisfactory. The soft pro-
choice stance based on sentience lacks scientific grounding. Christine Pierce and
Donald VanDeVeer (1995: 3) remind us that "what are needed, so it seems, are
normative or moral principles as well as empirical assumptions ... ethic requires our
best efforts at ascertaining the most reasonable understanding of the world and our
best efforts at ascertaining which principles of morality deserve our allegiance". It has
been my endeavour to give a reasonable understanding of the issue of the brain. The
brain is complex; it is the epitome of complexity. We have so far only some clues
about its evolution, its embryologic development, and its mature function. We know a
little more about its dysfunction. We are grappling with the mind/brain problem. Will
we ever know "what it is like to be a bat"? Our inquisitive and rational minds want to
find explanations. We try to explain what is complex by dissecting it into little bits. It
seems that the advocates of sentience are still in the eighteenth century when Luigi
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Galvani (1737-1798) and later Alessandro Volta (1745-1827) demonstrated the
twitching of frogs' legs when in contact with certain metals. As emphasised by Pierce
and VanDeVeer (1995: 2-3), "the central province of science is the investigation of
empirical claims ... that are not logically true or false ... it must be compatible with and
embody the best scientific understanding". In my mind, our scientific understanding
of the function of the brain has made dramatic progress but still has a long way ahead.
None the less, in the current state of our (or at least my) knowledge, it might
be honest to say with Goethe: "It is the greatest joy of the man of thought to have
explored the explorabIe and then calmly reverse to the inexplorable" (quoted in
Lorenz 1979: 201). Most of what we know about sentience is drawn from what we,
qualia-laden observers, believe by association that other living entities feel (what Paul
Churchland coined folk-psychology, or what could be Goethe's inexplorable). There is
little doubt that the ability to feel pain and pleasure and that the capacity to suffer and
to experience "higher pleasure" depend on the structure of the central nervous system
and its experience-dependent functional development.
I have been at pains to show that sentientism has no neurophilosophical leg to
stand on. Furthermore, it is my contention that far from being a good anti-speciesist
argument, sentientism meets two fundamental objections. First, it establishes an
arbitrary division between allegedly insensate lower animals and allegedly sentient
higher animals (including human animals and "post-threshold" fetuses). Second, it
promotes an arbitrary concept that nothing matters to insensate living entities. On this
suicidal view, the "members of the Earth's biotic community" (to use Paul Taylor's
vocabulary) - that is, Nature with all it comprises - are not worth of our moral
consideration. As Baird Callicott (1995: 274) reminds us: "The land ethic does not
cancel human morality, neither does it leave unaffected". When I first thought of
investigating the relevance of the concept of sentience in the abortion debate, I was
far from thinking that it would lead to the topic of land ethic and its correlate, the
population explosion. In my mind, the latter follows the former.
Having deconstructed the simple-minded concept of sentience, we have to
now to tum to its sister-concept, pain.
The complexity of 'pain'
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In this section, I wish to show the shortcomings of sentientism's views on pain.
To be fair to sentientism one should give pleasure its fair share. However, in the
context of this essay, the main focus has been placed on sentient beings ability to feel
pain and the moral duty that ensues. But what is it to feel? The verb to feel and the
wordfee!ing are ambiguous. We have feelings oflove, hatred, empathy, hunger, thirst,
and so on. We feel softness, smoothness, roughness, etc. We feel like eating a
hamburger, and we do not fee! like waking up and go to work. There is a whole subtle
world of feelings. Sentientism focuses on the ability to fee! pain and pleasure.
Alternatively, should we say, reduces the world of sense perception to the mere ability
to have two opposed sensations. It follows, they claim, that we have the moral duty to
maximise utility/pleasurelhappiness and to mmmuse
disutility/displeasure/unhappiness/pain. How do we maximise the pleasure of a
sentient being? Which pleasures do we maximise? Bodily sensuous "lower pleasures"
or intellectual, spiritual "higher pleasures"? How do we maximise the pleasure of an
ant, oyster, porcupine, human embryo or fetus? It is notoriously tricky to come up
with an answer to these questions. Therefore, sentientism dwells rather on the mirror
image of pleasure. This is no less problematic. A normal human being would agree
that torture is morally wrong and that killing of an innocent evil. Torture is wrong not
so much because of the infliction of physical pain, but rather because of the pain
affect, the suffering it causes.
It seems that the advocates of sentience equate two different things: pain and
suffering. This is problematic. As Roselyn Rey puts it:
Isn't an in-depth analysis of pain also a means of probing the
relationship between mind and body, and of examining the
dualism that somehow underlies our various ways of thinking?
It is spontaneously evident in the opposition between pain, which
is physical, and suffering, which can be considered moral. ..
But if we take a closer look at the linguistic meaning of the terms
pain and suffering, a second distinction can be superimposed on
the first: the word suffering seems more to refer to the subject
while pain seems more the objectification of this suffering, which
legal parlance translates perfectly when it evaluates the "pretium
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doloris" ... The etymology of the verbs from which the nouns pain
and suffering are derived provides another perspective on their
specialised meanings: to suffer, for instance, from the Latin sufferre,
means to bear, to endure, to allow, or so many verbs, which necessitate
an active subject or even more, a person; the older French verb se
douloir (to feel physical pain, to complain) could be constructed
with an inanimate subject because its Latin root, doleo, could use
an impersonal form or, more often, the painful member itself became
the subject: "caput do/et", i.e. my head feels pain (1995: 1-2).
This quote clearly emphasises the fact that pam and suffering have different
connotations. Pain has individual, social, and cultural characteristics. Pain has its
roots in anatomy and in physiology; it is, according to Frey (5), a commonality that
manifests the human condition's universality and the species' biological unity. It
should be noted that Rey's book, The History of Pain, is about the history of human
pain as perceived throughout Western civilisation and tradition (it does not address
the nonhuman pain). The point with this quote is to emphasise the importance of the
objectification of pain, and the reference to pain as a price to pay (pretium dolorisï.
The latter connotation can also be found in the etymology of the word pain: "the fact
that the very word 'pain' has its etymological home in 'poena' or 'punishment' reminds
us that even the elementary act of naming this most interior of events entails an
immediate mental somersault out of the body into the external social circumstances
that can be pictured as having caused the hurt" (Scarry 1985: 16). Like Frey, Scarry
writes about human pain/suffering in the context of torture (and not about nonhuman
pain or human purely physical pain). The point, however, I want to make again with
this quote, is that sentientism not only fails to make a distinction between pain and
pain affect, but also attributes the ability to feel pain in an anthropomorphic manner or
by analogy. In other words, for Singer, for instance, animal behaviour is convincing
evidence that they suffer. Singer also argues that language is not necessary for the
ability to feel pain (Pierce & VanDeVeer 1995: 45-50).
The issue of pain is about a sensory perception, an internalisation (a "mental"
affect), and an externalisation (a bodily expression such as a scream, a withdrawal,
etc.). The neurophysiological aspect of pain has received a lot of attention in Chapter
4. The mental affect of pain - the quale is something we know about from personal
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experience and from language (to communicate, share, and compare the experience).
It is notoriously difficult to express pain linguistically. As Scarry put it:
This brief array of examples illustrates the benign potential
of the language of agency, its invocation by those who wish
to express their own pain (Melzack's patients), to express
someone else's pain (Amnesty, Sophocles), other people's pain
(Walzer); and a detailed examination of any of these uses
would confirm the critically important point stressed earlier,
that in order to express pain one must both objectify its felt
-characteristics and hold steadily visible the referent for those
characteristics. That is, the image of the weapon only enables us
to see the attributes of pain ifit is clear that the attributes we are
seeing are the attributes of pain (and not something else). The deeply
problematic character of this language, its inherent instability, arises
precisely because it permits a break in the identification of the thing to
which the attributes belong. While the advantage of the sign is its
proximity to the body, its disadvantage is the ease with which it can
be spatially separated from the body (1985: 17).
In Fruits of Sorrow. Framing Our Attention to Suffering, Elizabeth Spelman
(1997) analyses the concept of the Greek lupe that can mean pain of either body or
mind. She emphasises: "We should not treat grief, suffering, pain, and unhappiness as
synonymous"( 17). In Suffering and Moral Responsibility, Jamie Mayerfeld (1999)
makes a similar point: " There is widespread confusion about the meaning and the
measurement of suffering, which in tum breeds confusion about its moral
relevance"(l). "Suffering can have sources other than physical pain" (62), and "There
is a latent ambiguity in the word pain, such that we are not sure if a 'pain sensation' is
pain in the true sense of the word if the person experiencing it truly does not mind it
or is able to put it out of his mind"(28). With regard to animals, he writes: "To
understand the feelings of animals attention needs to be paid to the organisation of the
nervous system"(59) (a view to which I have subscribed earlier in this essay and that,
to my mind, applies to the unborn as well).
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Then there is the value (or disvalue) of pain. From a purely biological point of
view, pain is positive; it is an important signal. Take your hand from the fire if you do
not want to loose the use of it. John Baird Callicott writes the following:
Pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to do with good and evil
if our appraisal is taken from the vantage point of ecological biology.
Pain in particular is primarily information ... Pleasure appears to be, for
the most part (unfortunately it is not always so) a reward accompanying
those activities, which contribute to organic maintenance (1995: 247).
On the other hand, the pain inflicted by a torturer is morally evil. Pain from
cancer has no apparent positive value; it causes physical pain and suffering. It is a
sign that the body is decaying combined with the understanding that life is coming to
an end (the time dimension of the pain affect). Does it have any moral value other
than the duty of health care workers to alleviate it? Believers (in life after death) argue
that human pain and suffering has a redeeming value. It is the price to pay to gain
access to paradise. Others, like Baird Callicott, argue against that view:
Not all suffering makes us better ... even ifit would it does not disprove
the claim that suffering is intrinsically bad. It's bad, period. It is self-evident (86).
I do support the view that it is morally wrong to inflict pain and suffering. One must
insist on the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain and suffering. One must
equally insist on the distinction between the pain affect (suffering) and pain (physical
pain). In order to experience the pain affect one needs a neural equipment that allows
at least what Edelman calls primary consciousness, which, in turn, requires a specific
brain structure. Edelman might not agree with this view. If the experience of pain
affect requires the faculty of memory (and primary consciousness allows only
memory of the present, a very short chunk of time, the "remembered present" says
Edelman), then non-human animals (and the unborn human) are unable to suffer. But
this does not mean that we can harm entities with no higher-level of consciousness.
Gerald Edelman is a neuroscientist, not a moral philosopher. He, and other
neuroscientists alike, tries to unravel the structure and the function of the brain. What
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I have tried to do is to find out whether, based on my understanding of the current
state of the art in the neurosciences, it is fair to say that the embryo/fetus is sentient (at
least the post-threshold fetus). Based on my understanding, there is no prove beyond
reasonable doubt that this is the case. Collaterally, there is evidence that nonhuman
animals down to a certain level in the animal kingdom -that is, those with a brain- do
possess the ability to feel pain and pleasure.
The nagging question then is: Is there a moral divide between the sentient and
the insensate entities? My answer is no. If that is the case, the argument from
sentience does not help to address the morality of abortion.
The morality of abortion revisited
The abortion debate is intractable. It involves the moral standing (or the lack
thereof) of the unborn. It involves the conflict of rights (women vs. unborn). It
involves demographic issues. It involves public health problems. It involves economic
and educational aspects. The list of problems could be extended. An issue that has so
many facets cannot be solved by one single moral theory without the risk of leaving
out one or more important ethical, health, and socio-economic aspects. The Neo-
Malthusian demographer would solve overpopulation with drastic contraceptive
methods at the expense of human liberty. The Cornucopian, on the other hand, would
allow procreation to go wild at the expense of ecology. The fundamentalist liberal
would go for an onslaught. The fundamentalist Roman Catholic would condemn
without reservation any contraceptive method (unless "natural" of course). The public
health policy maker would support "safe" abortion on request. The animal
liberationist would populate the world with pets and free-range farm animals. The
land ethicist would rather see nature populated with wild animals (and much less
people). The reproductive scientist would like to use unclaimed frozen embryos to
harvest stem cells. Sick or disabled people are looking forward to seeing a cure for
their disease thanks to the advances gained by stem-cell technology. Is it really more
ethical to dump unclaimed frozen embryos down the drain than to give diseased or
disabled people a chance to alleviate their pain and suffering? Is the two, three or four
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day pre-embryo not suffering from being frozen or from drowning in the sewer? This
is a pretty provocative question.
Is abortion wrong because it inflicts pain to a sentient entity? This is the thesis
of the advocates of sentience. The pre-threshold embryo/fetus is insensate. Nothing
matters to an insensate entity. Therefore, abortion of the pre-threshold unborn is
permissible. Conversely, they say, the post-threshold fetus is sentient. Itmatters what
is done to it - that is, it is in its interest to feel good and not to feel pain. Therefore,
abortion of the post-threshold fetus is impermissible. As we have seen, the argument
from sentience suffers from two major flaws. First, it has so far not been established
neuroscientifically beyond any reasonable doubt if and when sentience is acquired
during intra-uterine life. Second, if some degree of sentience were acquired during
gestation, it would not appear before the stage of viability. A viable fetus, sentient or
not, cannot be aborted in the strict sense of the word. Abortion refers to the
spontaneous or induced termination of a pregnancy before the stage of viability; once
a fetus is viable, the pregnancy can be terminated giving birth to a viable though
preterm infant. This is not casuistry but a biological fact. And if a moral theory relies
on a biological property, the facts must be set right.
Argumentation in moral philosophy is about the strengths and weaknesses of
the purported theory. Like all moral theories, utilitarianism has its pros and cons.
Sentientism, an offshoot of utilitarianism, has its pros: it commands our sensitivity to
the pain of others. However, in my analysis, even the alleged strength of sentientism
is too weak so to speak. It is weak because it denies moral standing to a vast portion
of the world we are living. It is also weak because it does not provide a proper answer
to the central question of this essay: Is abortion (always/sometimes/never)
permissible? If the permissibility or impermissibility is a matter of inflicting pain to
the unborn, a utilitarian cannot ignore the physical and psychological pain of the
pregnant woman (not to mention the possible side-effects on her immediate
entourage) who makes the choice of terminating an unwanted pregnancy. The hedonic
calculus requires fairness and justice. This does not appear in the sentienrist defence
of abortion. The balance tips on one side only.
Concluding remarks
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Konrad Lorenz (1979: 247) said that there are three unconditional values: Art,
the pursuit of beauty; Science, the pursuit of truth; and Medicine (a combination of art
and science), the attempt to mitigate human suffering. One might find somewhere
amongst the three a place for neurophilosophy as a combination of pursuit of truth -
the neuroscientific facts - and beauty - the awe inspired by the beauty of Nature,
animate and inanimate, human and nonhuman. In tackling the thorny issue of
abortion, one may add to the value of neurophilosophy the attempt to mitigate human
suffering.
Michael Tooley's impeccable logic leads to the "repugnant conclusion" that
only conscious life deserves moral consideration. Wayne L. Sumner and Bonny
Steinbock's argument leads to indecisive conclusions. Baruch Brody's argument is
acceptable only to the supporters of the principle of sanctity of (human) life. Peter
Singer's argument has the merit of calling attention to the value of nonhuman animals,
but falls short of an equally "repugnant conclusion" about the value of disabled human
beings. Sentientism places arbitrary limits to what is and what is not morally
considerable, and, therefore is speciesist. Rights rhetoric leads to an impasse; not all
rights can be protected. Rights conflicts are inescapable.
As already mentioned in the former chapter, but is worth mentioning again,
Jonathan Glove, has encapsulated the dilemma in the following terms:
Pursuit of personal ideals is a large but bounded part of morality, and in
desperate cases the right action can be the one that most revolts you. The
cultivation of your own character is something that should sometimes
take second place to the plight of others (1990: 153).
The ideal is that ideal people live in an ideal world. All would have the right moral
character and make the right moral decisions. We know that neither the world nor we
are ideal. The world is messy. Messy decisions are made. To decide to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy is messy. To practice abortions is messy. For a vast array of
reasons, the reality of abortion is there. For a large number of reasons unwanted
pregnancies are not prevented and unwanted unborn are created. Traditional moral
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
157
philosophy has not yet been able to come up with a satisfactory answer. For Glover,
the two mainstream moral theories - deontology and consequential ism -lead to three
possible attitudes: 1) uncomplicated or simple deontology (thou shalt not kill, full
stop); 2) uncomplicated consequential ism (the hedonistic calculus provides the
answer); and 3) "whichever choice I make I'm appalled" (153). Let us now apply
these options to the problem of abortion. Choice 1) is the easiest; I preserve my
integrity, what happens to pregnant women is none of my business. Choice 2) boils
down to saying that, in any case, somebody will be willing to help women to abort,
and that, if it is not performed in proper medical conditions, the consequences might
be disastrous (severe sepsis and even death). Therefore, I practice abortions with a
clear conscience; my integrity is not at stake, my hands are clean. Choice 3, presented
by Glover, does not really fit into deontology or consequentialism, neither into any
blend of both doctrines. It betrays part of me, of my deepest feelings; gone is my
integrity. It leaves one with the question on what moral grounds choice 3 might rest.
It is relatively easy to reach the conclusion that an answer can be found in one
of the overarching principles - sanctity of life, moral standing of the unborn, women's
right to dispose of their body - to justify a pro-life or a pro-choice stance. This is what
moral theories on abortion have done so far. The difficulty is, however, that none of
these stances takes into account the complexity of the issue. Therefore, none of them
is satisfactory. I have been at pains to try to show the complexity of the abortion issue.
To be pro-choice is not simply a matter of getting rid of an unwanted appendage. To
be pro-choice in a responsible (and hopefully respectful and respected) manner
requires from us to think things through. It needs a virtuous character of the woman
and of the health professional. It needs a thorough consideration for duty to oneself
and to others. It necessitates weighting of the consequences. It appeals to conflicting
rights. It requires respect for life in all of its aspects. It faces us with the problem of
death, overpopulation, famine, pollution, etc. There is no ethical issue more complex
than abortion.
In the centre of the Tibetan Buddhist "Wheel of Life" are pictured a pig, a
rooster, and a snake. These are identified respectively as the "three poisons":
ignorance, attachment, and hatred, the central causes of suffering infecting all sentient
creatures (Elder 1998: 158). Ignorance of the complexity of the abortion issue,
attachment to overarching principles and hatred of opposing views has obscured the
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debate. Expanding our options and views is the only way we can address the
intractability of the abortion issue. Albert Schweitzer (1987) said: "The great enemy
of ethics is insensitivity", and:
Ethics is nothing but reverence for life (79) ... Ethics consists in this: that
natural happenings in man are seen, on the basis of conscious reflection,
to carry within them an inner contradiction (225) ... Life-affirmation (Nietzsche)
and life-negation (Schopenhauer) are both for a certain distance ethical; pursued
to a conclusion they become unethical. .. The ethical consists in a mysterious
combination of the two (248).
Schweitzer wrote this in a broad context after World War I, trying to come to terms
with the atrocities committed during wars and the view he had on the decay of the
Western civilisation. He was deeply concerned about Nature, animals, and humanity.
Human and nonhuman beings have a "will to live" that seems to be incompatible with
the inescapability of death. On his view, pain and suffering sometimes can be
alleviated only by the infliction of death. But to kill discriminately we need respect for
life, reverence for life - a mysterious combination, indeed. From reading Schweitzer,
I am not aware of any reference to abortion in his writings. However, I believe that
the mysterious combination of reverence for life and of discriminate termination of
pregnancy is an ethical stance I can subscribe to.
I have tried to present and to consider all the aspects one should take into
account when talking about the im-/morality of abortion. I have placed the main
emphasis on the analysis of sentience as a possible candidate for moral standing. This
took us through the evolution of the brain, the organogenesis of the human brain, and
the neurophysiology of pain. I have attempted in vain to find scientific grounds
supporting the claims made by some moral philosophers that the unborn acquires
(somewhere during intra-uterine life) the ability to feel pain and to suffer, and that it
does suffer in the process of abortion. No robust neuroscientific evidence supports
that view. Neurophilosophy is about a philosophical conclusion supported by
neuroscientific evidence - in this case, the neuroscientific prove that the unborn is
sentient and, therefore, the owner of moral standing. Since the neuroscientific
evidence is lacking (at least for the time being), the philosophical conclusion does not
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follow. But it does not follow either that any abortion "on demand" is ethica1. Neither
does it follow that the negation of the complexity of the abortion issue is ethical. As
asked by Cilliers (1998: 137): can behaviour in accordance with an abstract, universal
set of rules be called 'ethical' at all? Is it ethical to be pro-life in all circumstances? Is
it ethical to be pro-choice against all odds? Is it ethical to deny moral consideration to
insensate entities? Is it ethical to look at the world with the "unblinking eye of the
utilitarian accountant"? It is quite clear that pro-lifers leave out women's plights to the
only potential benefit of the child to be born. It is equally clear that the strict pro-
choicers leave out the subtleties of the moral choice in favour of women's rights. The
deconstruction of the concept of sentience shows that, in spite of the laudable
intention not to harm an entity that is able to feel, a vast world of possibly insensate
(in the strictest neurophysiological acceptance of the term, that is) is denied moral
consideration. The reality is that there is no final and universal ethical rule to address
the complexity of abortion. But this does not mean that anything goes. Each case has
to be dealt with on its own merits. And that is the ethical paradox of postmodernity, as
expressed by Zygmunt Baumann (1992: xxii): "it restores to agents the fullness of
moral choice and responsibility while depriving them of the comfort of the universal
guidance that modern self-confidence once promised".
The reader might rightfully ask: What is the ethical alternative? Is it enough to
debunk sentientism? Is this an exercise in sophistry? A partial answer could be, first,
that sophistry sounds rather pejorative and that "situation ethics" would sound more
positive. Second, the aim of this essay has been to try to show that sentientism does
not satisfy the quest for a satisfactory moral theory on the ethics of abortion. I hope
that I have given a glimpse of the complexity of the problem. Complexity cannot be
explained in a simple manner. The morality of abortion needs to be addressed in a
multifaceted way, taking into consideration virtue, duty, consequences, care, rights,
situation, and even sentience.
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9 Afterword
The great enemy of ethics is insensivity.
Albert Schweitzer
It is the responsibility of philosophy not
to answer our questions but rather to
question our answers.
John Howie (1981)
The central question that motivated the venture into the world of sentience is:
Is it really true that abortion inflicts pain to the embryo or to the fetus? The answer to
this question can only be: yes or no. If the answer is a loud and convincing yes, then
abortion is reprehensible and indeed morally wrong since it is undoubtedly wrong and
impermissible to inflict wanton pain to any sentient being. This is a categorical
imperative regardless of the moral philosophy one may advocate, be it virtue ethics,
deontology, consequentialism, or whatever ethical stance. It the answer is a
categorical no, then the moral theory advocating sentience against the permissibility
of abortion proves irrelevant.
The fundamental question, however, does not have a simple, clear-cut and
easy answer unless sentience is understood as an unequivocal basic concept. It has
been my endeavour to show that sentience is not a simple and unequivocal concept.
The concept needs qualification.
First, it appears that much of the argumentation in favour of sentience as the
most primordial criterion of moral standing, and the extension of sentience with the
attached moral standing beyond the boundaries of the human species, is question
begging. In other words, the premise of the moral theory assumes that human animals
(including the embryo and the fetus) and nonhuman animals (how far down the scale
of the animal kingdom is difficult to establish) are sentient. And since it is wrong to
inflict pain to a sentient being, it is wrong to inflict pain to human and nonhuman
animals. The extension of the argument - that is, the claim that the moral standing
that results from sentience implies the right to life - runs similarly and is, therefore,
also a circular argument.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
161
Second, to support the argument from sentience one should agree with the
premise that a biological property ascribes a moral standing. In other words, one must
accept that a moral philosophical argument may rest on a biological premise. This is
the core of a neurophilosophical argument. In the present case, the argument is that,
provided there is a certain type of neural equipment or machinery that enables the
living entity to feel (whatever that means), it possesses moral considerability. In order
to be valid, the neurophilosophical argument needs more than mere assumptions. It
needs well-established neuroscientific premises. In the case of sentientism, the
neuroscientific argument has been shown to be unsubstantiated (e.g., the EEG claim)
or thin (e.g., the structure and function of the fetal brain). There is ample evidence
that the newborn's brain may be well structured but not fully functional.
Third, in addition to the need for scientific evidence and clarification, the
following question needs an answer: What is it like to feel? The verb to feel and the
word feeling are ambiguous. We can have feelings of love, hatred, empathy, hunger,
thirst, and so on. We can feel cold, hot, pain, dizzy, sleepy, high, low, happy, and
miserable. There is a whole subtle world of feelings. Sentientism focuses on the
ability to feel pain and pleasure. It reduces the world of senses to two. Sentientism
obliges us to maximise those two feelings. How do we maximise the pleasure of a
sentient being? Which pleasures do we maximise? Bodily sensuous or intellectual?
How do we maximise the pleasure of an ant, oyster, porcupine, human embryo or
fetus? Since that is problematic, sentientism dwells rather on pain and the duty to
refrain from inflicting pain. This is not less problematic. We all agree that torture is
wrong because of the suffering it inflicts rather than the pain. The distinction between
the two is a major shortcoming of sentientism.
Furthermore, the experience of pain as "my pain", the ability to experience
qualia, requires a much more complex brain structure and function than for feeling
pain. Sentientism provides a functionalist approach to pain: pain is a signal of tissue
injury (Hamad 2001: 38). Arguably, this view could only apply to lower animals with
a rudimentary neuronal network but no brain so to speak. Moving upwards in the
animal kingdom the complexity of the brain increases. But, still, this allows the
neurovegetative functions required for survival: fight, flight, nutrition, and
reproduction.
The real difficulty starts with the so-called higher animals, especially those
bonding with humans. The closer to us the more we are tempted to endow them with
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feelings. And we, as qualia-Iaden observers, can only interpret animal behaviour as
suggesting that they are sentient. As we have seen, the neurosciences teach us that
there are degrees of consciousness and that there is a difference between
consciousness and self-consciousness. The presence of the latter is linked to a specific
brain structure and function. The concept of time (past, present, and future) IS
intimately linked to the ability to suffer (as opposed to the ability to feelpain).
It could then be argued that if sentientism is functionalistic, the
neurophilosophical view is reductionistic. And the nagging question remains how and
why do qualia come in other than the usual mysterious, unexplicated correlations
(Hamad 2001: 39)? Are qualia an epiphenomenon - an extra-force, something
nonfunctional and inexplicable - or telekinesis - an independent power on their own
(38)? The choice then would have to be between functionalism, reductionism, and a
sort of vitalism. We still do not know what it feels to be a bat. As Rorty (1998: 29)
writes, "understanding about the physiology of pain does not help us feel pain". To
talk about the causal role of neurones - the feeling-neurone problem - as what is
essential to pain, does not explain what is essential to being in pain, for feeling painful
(31).
Finally, sentientism suffers from the either/or dichotomy. In other words,
insensate entities are of no moral concern since they have no moral standing. In this
perspective, the insensate world has only instrumental value. Although the advocates
of sentientism are vocal against speciesism, the limitation of moral standing to
sentient entities could be seen as speciesism in disguise. Environmental philosophers
and ethicists could rightfully argue against the argument from sentience by asking:
What good moral argument do you have to deny moral considerability to insensate
living entities?
In the current state of our neuroscientific knowledge, it seems fair to admit
that the human embryo has no brain to speak of It is equally fair to admit that the
fetal brain acquires gradually the potentiality to function once it reaches viability. It is
also fair to admit that it is only after some amount of time that the infant's brain
establishes the neuronal connections required to function in an adaptive manner. To
admit that along these steps there is a gradual transition from non-sentience, to
sentience and to qualia, from the ability to fell pain to the ability to suffer, is quite
reasonable. It does not follow, however, that abortion inflicts pain (much less
suffering) to the aborted embryo or fetus.
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Hence, the question remams: Is abortion immoral, or is abortion always
immoral? The overarching principle of the sanctity of human life is not the answer.
The overarching principle of women's rights is not more satisfactory. The overarching
principle of sentience not only fails to be proven, but leaves too much out of the realm
of what deserves our moral respect and consideration. Even if the issue of sentience
was to be solved, would it really matter? Jamie Mayerfield (1999: 159) reminds us:
I am sure that it is wrong to seek destruction of sentient life, even if it could
be done painlessly. I am not sure I know how to defend this conviction. Or
I should say: I do not think I could articulate the defense it deserves. The right
defense may rule out the thought that the world is not worth having,
Is pain always evil? Is killing always wrong? As we have seen earlier, pain is
an inescapable part of life. Without sentience no living entity could even survive.
What is wrong is to kill indiscriminately. We live at the edge of chaos, as Stuart
Kauffman put it. To kill discriminately we need reverence for life, as Schweitzer
(1987) put it:
Ethics is nothing but reverence for life (79). , .Ethics consists in this: that natural
happenings in man are seen, on the basis of conscious reflection, to carry within
them an inner contradiction (225), ..Life-affirmation (Nietzsche) and life-negation
(Schopenhauer) are both for a certain distance ethical; pursued to a conclusion they
become unethical. .. The ethical consists in a mysterious combination of the two (248).
Is it then possible to be ethically "pro-choice"? Is it possible to be ethical with
no rules or by bending the rules? Can we do as we like and still be ethical? In a
postmodern perspective, the answer is: Make your personal moral choice and accept
the discomfort that results from your choice (Bauman 1992: xxii). This choice making
involves "respecting otherness and difference as values in themselves" (Cilliers 1998:
139). It also requires "gathering as much information as possible" (ibid.). This is not
equal to lawlessness.
A distinction should be made between a metaphysical pro-choice position as
adopted by Michael Tooley and the complex facts of life. It is easy to make an
impeccable and logical argument showing that the infant's brain does not function as
paradigm rational brain and to deduce that therefore it has no right to life. In real life,
no one has the "guts" to kill it. In fact, even if it has anatomically no brain at all (the
anencephalic newborn who stands no chance to survive) we let it die (we don't kill it).
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The same dilemma arises with brain dead persons in ICU. Is it wrong to kill them or
should we let them die? Is a potentially fully functional brain or a dead brain what
makes the difference? Or is it reverence for life and the hard decisions it implies? In
Civilisation and Ethics (1923), Schweitzer wrote:
Reverence for life is an attitude of mind, not a code of rules or a set of propositions.
It commands nothing. It forbids nothing. All it requires is that whatever is done should
be done in full awareness. It lays on everyone the responsibility for every action.
Reverence for life involves awareness - it begins with sinking deep into oneself, as a
meditation - but does not stop there. It proceeds to action. It avoids the kind of busy
and unconsidered helpfulness that often stems from guilt feelings and generally does
as much harm as good- and it avoids the self-centredness of dedicated navel-gazing.
Reverence for life is not in itself an activity. It is a means of checking all activity ...
When life is harmful to other life a choice must be made (quoted in Brabazon 1976: 253-255).
It is doubtful that Schweitzer ever had to deal with the problem of abortion.
However, it is equally doubtful that he would not have recognised the compelling
necessity of thoughtful and discriminate abortion as fitting with his ethics of
reverence for life. In his October 20th 1952 address to the French Academy of Moral
and Political Sciences, he said:
The term reverence for life is broader and, for that reason, less vital than that of love,
but it bears within the same energies. This essentially philosophical notion of good
has also the advantage of being more complete that that oflove. Love includes only
our obligations towards other beings. It does not include our obligations towards
ourselves. One cannot, for instance, deduce from it the necessity of telling the truth;
Yet this, together with compassion, is the prime characteristic of the ethical personality.
Reverence for one's own life should compel one, whatever the circumstances may be,
to avoid all dissimulation and, in general, to become oneselfut the deepest and noblest
sense (quoted in Brabazon 1976: 404).
In other words, the ethics of reverence for life forces us to face our responsibilities
and the ensuing dilemmas. Derrida (1995) has tackled this dilemma in his analysis of
Abraham's choice between upholding the right to life and sacrificing consideration of
rights. To take one's responsibilities, he says, "is both a scandal and a paradox". And:
The absolutes of duty and responsibility presume that one denounce, refute,
and transcend at the same time, all duty, all responsibility, and every human law ...
Ethics must be sacrificed in the name of duty ... I can respond only by sacrificing
ethics (66, 67, 68).
Martin Benjamin has expressed a similar view in the context of the abortion dilemma:
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We cannot employ the Kantian principle of respect for persons to resolve
the problem of abortion because what is at issue is precisely whether this
principle is applicable to such entities. Whether one regards the principle
applicable or not depends on one's worldview and way oflife (1990: 104).
Annette Baier (1993: 141) writes:
A moral theory of which we are initially suspicious, because we do not trust
the theorist, given his lack or non-display of relevant credentials, can still be
one that, if studied, proves helpful. A theorist we fully trust can come out
with a trite or unhelpful theory .... My suggestions that it would be helpful
if moral theorists identified the position from which they spoke, and the range
of relevant experience informing their conclusions ...
So let a thousand theoretical flowers bloom ... and a thousand thousand styles
of criticising theories and critis.
What Baier is talking about is the male biases in moral philosophy and the
lack of "hands on" of moral theories. It can be said that I have criticised the argument
from sentience, and that my view on the morality of abortion is influenced by
Schweitzer's worldview. What I want to conclude with is to meet Baier's invitation.
To avoid the charge of male bias, it must be said that, with the exception of
Bonnie Steinbock, the argument from sentience has been addressed mainly by males.
Now I will identify the position from which I spoke by presenting my personal
narrative. I am a European male born to a mother of nine. I grew up in a conservative
Roman Catholic environment. I received my under- and post-graduate education at
theCatholic University of Louvain (Belgium). As an undergraduate, I was fully aware
of the thalidomide disaster; as a postgraduate in Obstetrics & Gynaecology, I was
equally aware of the fetal risks and damages resulting from the exposure of pregnant
women to toxoplasmosis, rubella, cytomegalovirus, and herpes. For some, so-called
"therapeutic" abortions were a matter of debate; I was "pro-life". My first face-to-face
encounter with a botched backstreet abortion was in the late sixties. The woman, a 27
years old mother of four, died in spite of our desperate efforts. In the late eighties, I
collided once again head-on with a victim of a backalley abortion. She was in her
early twenties and died. The South African Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act
(1996) forced me to meet once more the challenge. I became "pro-choice". There are
a number of reasons for that: abortion is a public health issue (prevention of deaths
from "unsafe" abortions, and prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV)), it
is a "reproductive rights" issue, it is a male chauvinism issue, it is a failed
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contraception issue, it is a reproductive technology issue, it is a socio-economic issue,
etc. The choice is between an unwanted/unplanned child (potentially abused) and a
wanted child. The choice is between the clean and the infamous "dirty" hands. The
choice is between the sanctity of human life and the hard choices of reverence for life.
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Notes
2 Approaching the complexity of the abortion debate
1. The 1996 Act came into effect in February 1997. Since then about 40 000
terminations of pregnancy (TOP) are performed per annum. It is believed that the
number of illegal abortions (also called "unsafe") - that is, those practiced in
facilities not accredited by the Department of Health - exceeds the number of
legal ones. Although they are illegal stricto sensu, no prosecutions are made to
prevent them. The reason for this is that the overall percentage of serious
complications of abortion has decreased substantially. This is attributed to the fact
that safer methods are used to induce abortion (viz., the use ofmisoprostol instead
of intrauterine instrumentation/manipulation).
2. According to Luker (1984), the first crusade against abortion was launched in
1797 by Doctor Buchan's book Domestic Medicine, followed in 1869 by Hugh
Hodge's Foeticide, or Criminal Abortion. The earliest American Catholic stand on
abortion was that of Francis B. Kenrick, bishop of Philadelphia, who, in 1841,
declared that there were no therapeutic indications of abortion. He wrote: "Two
deaths are better than one murder".
3. In the seventies second trimester abortions were induced by injection of a
hypertonic saline solution inside of the amniotic cavity. Haemolysis (the
destruction of red blood cells) was a serious potential complication (du Plessis
2001: 29). Misoprostol (Cytotec®), a prostaglandin El analogue, is now used
instead to terminate pregnancy at any stage. It is safe for the pregnant woman;
there are very few contraindications to misoprostol (mainly bronchial asthma).
Fetal viability outside of the uterus is now set at 24 weeks of gestation (provided
sophisticated neonatal intensive care is available).
4. Some current views on ontogeny see the development of a zygote (a fertilised egg
cell) into an adult as under control by networks of genes and their products in each
cell of the body. This is in contrast with Darwin's theory of evolution that
contingent useful accidents allowed the fittest to survive. According to Stuart
Kauffman (1995: 151), "one of the most important presuppositions of Darwin's
entire thesis is gradualism - that is, that mutations to the genome (or genotype)
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can cause minor variations in the phenotype (or the organism's properties), and
that these variations can be accumulated piece by piece over time to create the
complex order in the organisms we observe". In Kauffman's opinion, Darwin's
view on evolution as "random variation, selection-sifting" falls short of a concept
of self-organisation. Furthermore, against Darwinism's tendency to see the current
state of affairs as "frozen", Kauffman advocates the theory that "life evolves
toward a regime that is poised between order and chaos"(26). He claims that "all
living systems are nonequilibrium systems and no general law can predict the
detailed behaviour of all nonequilibrium systems"(21).
5. Traditionally care of women in pregnancy and labour was (and is still) called
obstetrics. There is controversy concerning the etymology of the word. Some
believe that it comes from the Latin obstare - to be in front of and to watch
carefully. The new trend is to talk of feto-maternal medicine or fetal medicine,
and to say that the fetus is a patient. The fetus can, indeed, be a patient that
requires, for instance, intra-uterine repair of a surgical condition. With surrogacy,
wombs can be rented and the fetus can become a third-party disputed by the
biological mother. I remain quite happy to be just an obstetrician and to try not to
make of the fetus a third-party.
6. There is scientific evidence indicating that pesticides that infiltrate the soil and
contaminate water have some estrogenic side effects responsible for a significant
increase in male infertility (Bhatt 2000).
7. With in vitro fertilisation (I.V.F.), women are treated with hormones that increase
the number of ovulations. There are two reasons for this. First, it allows reducing
the number of retrievals of ova, and, second, by fertilising more than one ovum
one increases the chances of successful implantation. The drawback is that the risk
of abortion, of preterm delivery, and of maternal complications is proportional to
the number of embryos/fetuses. In order to prevent this problemfetal reduction is
practiced. The issue was highlighted by Nancy Hill-Holtzman's article More
Coffins than Cribs in the Washington Post (May 2, 1990). A Mormon couple
conceived sextuplets. They refused fetal reduction. Four fetuses died in utero; the
three survivors suffered from cerebral palsy. Professional ethical regulations are
now in place aiming at limiting the need for fetal reduction.
8. The embryologic concept of pre-embryo (or pro-embryo) is relatively new. It
refers to the embryo between day-one and day-fourteen since fertilisation. The
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first appearance of what is to become the nervous system occurs on day 14/15.
Afterwards one speaks of the "embryo proper". There is controversy surrounding
the term pre-embryo (strictly speaking, a stage that is not yet a real embryo);
others promote the term pro-embryo, a first step in embryogenesis instead of a
separate phase (in line with the argument from potentiality).
9. The morning after pill and the IUD prevent the implantation of a possible
conceptus by modifying the endometrial environment and making it unsuitable for
implantation. Mifepristone, as an anti-progesterone, if used to "induce"
menstruation (even if fertilisation has occurred), has a similar action. Both
mifepristone and misoprostol are most commonly used to induce abortion;
mifepristone (with or without misoprostol) till nine weeks of pregnancy, and
misoprostol at any stage. If one agrees with the Warnock Commission's
recommendation (or even with Donceel's theory on delayed animation) only the
methods preventing implantation would be morally neutral or permissible.
10. The similarity in gene structure, embryology and neuroanatomy between humans
and chimpanzees is such that they are almost indistinguishable (Miklos 1998:
203).
11.At a recent meeting of the Advisory Committee on TOPs for the National
Department of Health (February 2001), it was made quite clear that health
workers involved in TOPs were stigmatised (and even penalised) by their
coworkers and suffered from a lack of support from Provincial Health Authorities.
Many were keeping their "real"job secret from close relatives and friends. During
counselling sessions most of them claimed to be ready to continue in spite of the
hardships because they feit that they were rendering a service to their fellow
human beings (by preventing the birth of unwanted children and/or the maternal
health hazards from illegal abortions). The same issue was highlighted by the
SABC 3 programme Special Assignment (October 2,2001).
12.Warren has compared abortion with a "hair cut"!
13. In the case of ectopic pregnancy, the placenta erodes the tubal wall and causes
life-threatening internal haemorrhage; there is no chance for the embryo to
survive. In the case of cervical cancer, one should distinguish early pre-invasive,
early invasive, and gross invasive stages. In the early stage, there is no absolute
need to proceed with a hysterectomy (a cone biopsy, that is, a cone resection of
the cervix, would be sufficient). In the advanced stage, the possibility of getting
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pregnant is extremely thin. The example of obstructed labour might well be
outdated, unless it happens in a rural setting remote from any health facility. Even
then, who would do the destructive procedure? Definitely not the traditional birth
attendant (who would have no alternative but to let the woman die). Such patients
are referred to a hospital for Caesarean section. The only condition that might fall
under the DDE would be that of a medical disease (usually a heart disease) that
would worsen during pregnancy.
14. This refers to another thought experiment imagined by Thomson where a baby is
strapped in front of a tank. The tank driver threatens an innocent passer-by. Is the
strapped baby still innocent?
15. The Warnock Commission, chaired by philosopher baroness Mary Warnock, was
created on a request by the British Government to make recommendations
concerning the ethical issues resulting from the new advances in reproductive
technology. The commission supported the concept of the pre-embryo and the
permissibility of the abortion of a pre-embryo.
16. The concept of embryo experimentation should be clarified and cleared from
simplistic views with a Mephistophelean flavour. The fact is that, in the current
state of the art no experiment can be done in vitro beyond 3 or 4 days after
fertilisation, because the pre-embryo does not survive beyond 3 to 4 days (Singer
et al. 1993). Even the argument from potentiality that is advocated to ascribe
moral standing to supernumerary embryos (van Niekerk & van Zyl 1996) might
have to be rethought. An embryo produced in vitro has no potentiality unless it is
implanted in a woman's uterus. Ifnot, it has no potentiality whatsoever.
17. It is noteworthy that Beauchamp and Childress (1994) make fifteen references to
abortion and that none of them faces the dilemma head on.
3 Four moral philosophers on alleged brain function of the unborn
1. The term fetus (from the Latin, fetus; the English spelling is .foetus, but the
American spelling .fetus has gained acceptance instead) is used instead of
"baby" because the latter denotes an emotive bias when used in the context of
the abortion debate. The same would apply to the use of pregnant woman
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instead of "mother". In strictly medical terms, it is more appropriate to use the
neutral terms fetus and pregnant woman.
2. The term unborn may sound impersonal, if not denoting even a negative bias
in support of a radical pro-choice position. Like fetus, it is here employed with
an intention of neutrality. Moreover, unborn covers the whole spectrum of a
pregnancy from conception to birth.
3. With the exception of Steinbock (1992), Brody, Tooley, and Sumner
published their book or original article in the early 70s and 80s. Their texts are
republished many times in contemporary texts on moral philosophy. Tooley
and Sumner, however, have made some amendments to their original script.
Therefore, where relevant reference is made either to the original or to the
reprint. It should also be borne in mind that Brody's book was published at the
times of the Roe v Wade court case which sparked in the US the controversies
and debates around maternal versus fetal rights, fetal personhood and
potentiality. Roe v Wade is still on the agenda of electoral political debates
between Republicans and Democrats in the US. Matters are even worse since
the introduction in the debate of the so-called "partial birth" - that is, the
extraction of dismembered fetuses with late abortions. The Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 1995 was passed by the US Congress and vetoed in 1996
by President Clinton. See also Viveca Novak's Abortion on Trial, Again
(Time, May 1, 2000), and Anna Quindlen's RU-486 and the Right to Choose
(Newsweek, October 9,2000).
4. The term pre-embryo is relatively new and was instrumental in the
recommendations made by the Warnock Committee. The gist of the concept is
that the neural ridge, the very first structure that will give rise to the central
nervous system, appears on day-14 after fertilisation. During the 13-14 days
after fertilisation, the pre-embryo may divide (twinning), or (much more
exceptionally) twins may fuse (chimera). In other words, the identity (i.e.
whether there will be one or two embryos) is not yet established, and hence
there is no "person" yet. Therefore, it may be considered that abortion (and the
disposal of supernumerary embryo resulting from in vitro fertilisation) of a
pre-embryo is morally neutral.
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5. The term conceptus refers to the product of conception, which is a zygote, a
pre-embryo, an embryo proper, or a fetus as well as the placenta and amniotic
membranes. Like "unborn", it covers the whole of intrauterine life.
6. The gestational sac consists of the amniotic membranes and the early placenta,
which is not yet really individualised (i.e., not yet localised to its final site).
The gestational sac is filled with amniotic fluid and contains the pre-embryo or
the embryo proper. Because of the small size of the embryo in the early weeks
of pregnancy (till 7-8 weeks) the ultra-sonographic dimension of the
gestational sac is used to estimate the gestational age (Jeanty & Romero
1987).
7. The zygote is the result of syngamy, the process of fertilisation (that takes
about 24 hours to be completed) of an ovum by a sperm cell.
8. Same comment as in note 2 of this chapter.
9. Speciesism refers to the ascription of a certain value to a being for the mere
fact that it belongs to a specific species. Although the term is mainly used to
ascribe value to human beings because they belong to the species Homo
sapiens, it may apply to other forms of segregation such as racism and sexism.
Speciesism can be direct or blatant, or indirect in the sense of judging things
by human standards (Frey 1997: 149). The term speciesism, or species
chauvinism was coined by Ryder (1975), but its use was popularised by Peter
Singer.
10. It makes no real sense to talk about "physiological structure". Physiology
refers to the natural normal functions of living beings. Although a normal
function operates on a structured entity, and although a dysfunction may result
from a structural abnormality, it is odd to speak of a "physiological structure"
unless physiological is meant to indicate normal and properly functioning.
Physiology refers to a function and anatomy refers to a structure. There is a
normal or abnormal physiological function and/or a normal or abnormal
anatomy. There is no physiological structure.
Il. Tooley (1983: 149) calls Brody a "theological voluntarist". It is noteworthy
that in spite of being a self-proclaimed moderate pro-lifer, Brody claims that
even in the case of rape or incest abortion is impermissible.
12. A fascinating picture of a brain scan of a 23-year old male patient during
schizophrenic hallucinations was published by British psychiatrist Lars
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Hansen (2001). The brain scan shows activity at the level of the visual and
auditory areas. Although there is no visual or auditory input from the outside
during hallucinations, the patient "sees" and "hears" them. In other words, the
brain cortical areas function as though there was an input from the outside.
13. The real scope of sleep is far from being understood (Borbéli & Tononi 1998).
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14.Table 1*
Approximate age Approximate length Morpho-functional observations
Embryo proper:
5 weeks (35 days) 5-8mm 3 primary brain vesicles
limbs appear as paddle-shaped buds
6 weeks (42 days)
7 weeks (49 days)
8 weeks (56 days)
10-14 mm
17-22 mm fingers and toes begin to form
28-30 mm reaction to peri-oral stimulation
Fetus (pre-viable):
9 weeks first olfactory receptors 10 weeks first
movements (flexion and extension of the chest)
14 weeks first taste buds
first swallowing movements
16 weeks first "breathing" movements
20 weeks onset of myelinisation of spinal and
peripheral nerves
appearance of Merkel's bodies in the hands (for
pressure sense)
22 weeks reaction to noise
appearance of first cortical convolutions
Fetus (potentially viable):
24 weeks first sucking movements
30 weeks
sensitivity of the eyes to light
non-REM deep sleep EEG waves
28 weeks
36 weeks REM sleep
* Compiled from Carpenter (1996), Cunningham et al (1998), Lazorthes (1999),
and Sadler (2000).
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4 Approaching the complexity of the brain
1. According to Edward O. Wilson (1995: 139-142), the estimates are that there
is a total of 42,580 vertebrate species, of which 6,300 are reptiles, 9,040 are
birds, and 4,000 are mammals. There are 990,000 species of invertebrates, of
which 290,000 alone are beetles. George L. Gabor Miklos (1998) has shown
that, except in the extreme comparisons, there is little relationship between
gene number, neural components, and the morphological or behavioural
characteristics of organisms. Comparing the nervous system of an octopus and
of a mouse, he states that it is not objectively possible to decide which of them
is more complex at any level. Furthermore, he indicates that the comparison
between vertebrates and invertebrates is irrelevant. For instance, the brain of a
worker honeybee has 850,000 neurons, whereas the brain of a miniature
salamander has only 300,000 neurons. Miklos states: "apparent
neuroanatomical simplicity does not correlate with apparent behavioural
complexity"(202).
2. See Appendix with pictorials.
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Appendix 3. Intrauterine brain development.
Figure l.Schematic view of the brain vesicles ofa 27 days (4 weeks) human embryo.
Mesencephalon
alon
pinal cord
On day-27 after fertilisation (at this stage the total length of the embryo is about 10 mm), the
primitive neural tube is formed; its cephalic and caudal ends are now closed. The cephalic end of the
neural tube exhibits a dilatation as well as a flexure. This is now called the 'brain vesicles'.
What is to become the future brain is theoretically subdivided into three barely distinguishable portions:
the forebrain (prosencephalon), the midbrain (mesencephalon),and the hindbrain (rhombencephalon).
At this stage the histologic structure (that is, the tissue architecture and the cell component) is still
uniform (that is, there is no differentiation yet into specific neural cell types).
The term 'brain' refers, strictly speaking, to the paired parts derived from the telencephalon (the foremost
part of the prosencephalon). The term 'brain-stem' refers to the unpaired portions: the mesencephalon
and the rhombencephalon.
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3. Figure 2. Schematic view of the primitive brain vesicles ofa 32-days human embryo.
Mesencephalon
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Metencephalon
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At day-32 (four and a half weeks embryo), the three main brain vesicles (forebrain, midbrain,
and hindbrain) have become much more individualised. The whole flexure of the central nervous
system is increased and the incisures demarcate the vesicles from each other. The first thickening
of the neural tube appears in the hindbrain to constitute the roof of the fourth ventricle. The latter
indicates that the first part of the brain that develops is the hindbrain (the regulator of the neuro-
vegetative or autonomic system and function. The future brain hemispheres (the telencephalon)
is still undifferentiated at this stage of intra-uterine development..
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4. Figure 3. Schematic view of the brain ofa 7-weeks (49 days) human embryo
Roof of diencephalon
thickening
Thalamus
Infundibulum
At 7 weeks, the first features of the thalamus and hypothalamus appear in the lateral wall of the
diencephalon (i.e. the caudal portion of the forebrain). It should be noted that the size of the
cerebral hemispheres is very small compared with the size of the diencephalon. In the adult,
the two areas (i.e. the thalamus and the hypothalamus) are no larger than a fingernail or a peanut.
(Adapted frpm Sadler 200: 433, figure 19-24).
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5.Figure 4. Schematic general view of the central nervous system of a 56-days human embryo.
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This is a general view of the brain ofa 56-days (8 weeks, that is the last week of the embryonic stage)
human embryo (the crown-rump length, or eRL, measured by ultrasound is 21 mm). The relative
size of the forebrain, the midbrain, and the hindbrain is roughly equaL The flexion of the three
respective components increases leading progressively to the burrowing of the midbrain underneath
the forebrain. The olfactory bulb, the optic chiasma, and the infundibulum (future hypophysis) start
their development.
(Adapted from http://courses.temple.edu/neuroanatomy/lab/emhryolimages/dien 11.jpg and from
Sadler 2000:426, Figure 19.17).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
I~U
6. Figure 5. Schematic view of a frontal section through the brain of a lO-weeks human fetus.
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At ten weeks, the crown-rum length reaches between 3 and 4 em. The fetal diencephalon exhibits two
additional structures: the neostriatum (the caudate and lentiform nuclei) and the paleostriatum (the
globus pallidus). Together they constitute the corpus striatum, a system involved in the connection of the
motor neuron system with the cerebral cortex. The telencephalon or pallium (from the Latin, coat or mantle)
is now subdivided into three parts: 1) the paleocortex at the base of the diencephalon (the future olfactory
system); 2) the archicortex on the medial and lower aspect of the primitive cerebral hemisphere (the future
hippocampus)( the archicortex will become composed of only three layers of neurones); and 3) the neocortex
at the upper part of the cerebral hemispheres (this part of the brain will become composed of six layers of
neurones). The hippocampus will gradually become the organ of integration of the optic, acoustic, tactile
and visceral inputs that influence endocrine, visceral, and affective phenomena (Kahle et al. 1996:216).
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7. Figure 6. Schematic view of a three months' fetal brain.
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This view illustrates the anatomy of the central nervous system of a three months' fetus. It shows that
the cerebral cortex is still flat (without sulci and gyri). The main structures are still rudimentary. As showt
on figure 3, the thalamus is present (still relatively very large as compared to the size of the brain). The
corpus striatum, composed of the nucleus caudatus and the putamen (see figure 10), is present. The
colliculus superior (a relay involved in reflex eye movements and pupillary reflexes) and inferior
(a relay involved in acoustic reflexes) are present. The pons, the site of origin of the cranial nerves
and of their connections, is identified. The medulla oblongata, one of the three components of the
truncus cerebri (together with the pons and the mesencephalon), connects the brain with the spinal
cord. The rudimentary structures required for reflex neuro-vegetative functioning are in place.
(Adapted from http://course.temple.edu.neuroanatomy/lab/embryo/images, and Kahle et al 1996).
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8. Figure 7. Schematic view of the medial aspect of the brain of the 4-months' fetus.
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The cerebral hemispheres have expanded. Their relative size, compared with the size of the diencephalon,
is still small. The corpus callosum, which is covered by the cingulum of the limbic convolution, connects
the two hemispheres. The outer surface of the cortex is still smooth - that is, devoid of sulci and gyri
(therefore, named 'lissencephale' in French). The olfactory bulb is well developed. The hypophysis
starts appearing (between the optic chiasma and the mammillary bodies).
The midbrain and the hindbrain (pons, medulla oblongata, and cerebellum), at this stage, are the most
developed parts of the central nervous system.(Adapted from http://courses.temple.edulneuroanatomy/
lab/embryo/images, and from Sadler 2000: 439 Fig.19-29).
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9. Figure 8. Schematic representation of the mature human brain.
Legend. 1. Substantia nigra. (dopaminergic ).2. Ventral tegmental area (dopaminergic).
3. Locus ceruleus (noradrenergic). 4. Raphe nuclei and ponto-mesencephalo-tegmental
complex (serotoninergic). 5.Meynerfs nucleus. 6. Medial septal nuclei ('pleasure centre).
This figure shows the main structures involved in the neurotransmitter Diffuse Modulatory
System (D.M.S.). The dopaminergic D.M.S. arises from the substantia nigra and from the
ventral tegmental area; it fans out to the frontal lobe, the striatum, and the limbic cortex
(situated behind the corpus callosum). The norepinephrine D.M.S. arises from the locus
ceruleus ; it projects to the entire cortex, the thalamus, the cerebellum, and the spinal cord.
The serotonergic D.M.S. arises from the raphe nuclei and projects to all levels of the central
nervous system. Finally, the cholinergic D.M.S. arises from the medial septal nuclei, the
basal nucleus of Meynert, and from the ponto-mesencephalo-tegmental complex; it fans out
to the cortex, the hippocampus, and the thalamus (Adapted from Changeux 1998: figures 14 to 17).
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10. Figure 9. How the brain functions according to AR Luria (1973).
On Luria's view, any mental act depends on the cooperation between three functional units. The
central unit (bold and underlined on the picture) does the following: 1) the substantia reticuIata
keeps the cortex awake (or activated) and able to receive information; 2) the thalamus acts as an
activator of the substantia reticulata; 3) the limbic brain activates the cortex when emotion-laden
signals are perceived; and 4) the frontal lobes handle consciousness. The second unit (bold but
not underlined) is composed of the specific areas that receive, analyse and store visual and auditory
information. Each of them (e.g. the visual cortex) comprises three subareas: 1) the primary area
receives its specific input (e.g. light); 2) the secondary area is associative in nature (i.e. operates
connections with other systems); and 3) the tertiary area integrates the inputs. The third unit (in
italics) is the program unit located in the prefrontal cortex: it regulates, checks out, and organises
the thought process. (Adapted from Lazorthes 1999).
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Il. Figure 10. Frontal section through the diencephalon of the mature human brain.
Cingulum
Septum :---....:.pellucidum
Infimdibulum - __ _.....;
3rd ventricle
Corpus callosum
and fornix
Nucleus
caudatus
Corpus striatum:
--nu-cleus caudatus
Corpus striatum:
putamen
Substantia nigra
This frontal section runs roughly through the level of Rolando's sulcus eentralis (the demarcation between
the motorcortex and the sensory cortex. The figure illustrates the topography of the main components of
the diencephalon, which is wedged between the upper portions of the cerebral hemispheres (above) and
the temporal lobes (below). The two-way connections (afferent and efferent) between the various nuclei
and the various parts of the cerebral cortex are not illustrated.(Adapted from Grey's Anatomy on-line).
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5 The birth of the brain
1. According to Lewin (1993), Darwin's VIew on evolution was gradualist and
functionalist in nature. He was greatly influenced by Lamarck's belief that
organisms respond to an innate drive to greater complexity, mediated by invisible
fluids (146). As a gradualist, however, Darwin saw the Cambrian mass extinction
as a failure. Moreover, in the same perspective, he denied the abrupt appearance
of new multicellular animals in the Cambrian (74). Darwin's theory of "survival of
the fittest" was strongly influenced by his friend's, Herbert Spencer, "law of
evolution" - that is, the view that order evolves, or crystallises out of chaos. For
Darwin, however, it is natural selection that produces complexity (149). The
Science of Complexity sees the dynamics of complex systems as the driving force
of evolution - a combination of self-organisation (the internal engine for change)
and selection (the external engine for change). The success of one species, then, in
evolutionary terms is dependent on what itself does and what the species do
(Kauffman 1995).
2. The Turing machine is a mathematical device invented by English mathematician
Alan Turing (1912-1954) in order to simulate the human mind. Turing's rationale
was that the only way we have for deciding whether or not humans are thinking is
to observe their behaviour (Casti 1994: 152). A Turing machine, the conceptual
foundation of computer science, is completely determined by its program: you
feed a program P into a universal Turing machine (or VTM for short) along with
the input data. The machine passes the Turing test if it manages to be
indistinguishable in its responses from a human brain (Cilliers 1998: 49): an input
produces an output.
3. Canadian psychologist Donald O. Hebb postulated the following: "When an axon
of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part
in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both
cells such that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased" (quoted in
Carpenter 1996: 271). In other words, during learning co-active connections
become strengthened and non-coactive ones weaker (Gazzaniga & Hutsier 1999:
131). Hebb's mental construct was later on shown to be a reality, now called
Hebbian synapse, involved in the neural mechanism of memory and learning
through weakening and strengthening of connections. Hebb's rule states that, after
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it has been trained, the network will be able to perform the required task by itself
(Cilliers 1998: 17). Hebb's concept explains how chemical substances are able to
guide and regulate connectivity within the central nervous system, how genetic
and epigenetic (that is, a product of activation and environment) contribute and
complement each other (Gazzaniga & HutsIer ibid.). The state of the system is
determined by the strength of synaptic interconnection or connection weights and
the transfer function of in- and out-put at each neuron (Globus 1995: 87).
4. See Peter Singer's claim that similar looking cells make similar neuronal entities:
"Even crustaceans have complex nervous systems and their nerve cells are very
much like our own"(1993: 286).
5. See figure 1, appendix 3.
6. See figure 2, appendix 3.
7. See figure 4, appendix 3.
8. See figure 7, appendix 3.
9. See Chapter 3, Encephalography
6 Three moral philosophers on sentience
1. Cognitive neuroscientist and Nobel Prize laureate, Gerald Edelman's trilogy
consists of Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neural Group Selection (1987),
Topobiology: An Introduction to Molecular Embryology (1988), and The
Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness (1989). In Bright
Air, Brilliant Fire. On the Matter of the Mind (1992), Edelman provides a
synthesis of his trilogy. His "fundamental position", he writes (1992: 7), is "that
mind is a special kind of process depending on special arrangement of matter". In
other words, "a particular kind of biological organisation gives rise to mental
processes" (ibid.). His basic intention is "to describe the necessary bases for
consciousness in a scientific fashion" (167). Edelman's thesis in Topobiology is
that mechanical events leading to the topography and the specialisation of cells in
the embryo must be coordinated with the sequential expression of the genes. The
synapses are not precisely pre-specified in the genes. The brain maps are
established through a mechanism of epigenetic (viz., the fact that key events do
occur only if specific events have occurred before) self-organisation. Edelman's
thesis in The Remembered Present is that what in the brain's structure and function
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lead to the emergence of consciousness is that it increased fitness. Consciousness
should not be seen as an epiphenomenon, but rather as something efficacious. In
Neural Darwinism, Edelman explains (i) how the anatomy of the brain is first set
up during development; (ii) how patterns of responses are then selected from this
anatomy during experience; and (iii) how reentry gives rise to behaviourally
important functions (1992: 82).
2. In order to ensure proper and harmonious sensory-motor behaviour, the input from
the outside world must be categorised to allow the creation of a scene. Responses
are not specified in advance; categorisations on value result from a process of
selection and not from instruction. Causal connections must be established in
order to cope with familiar events and with new events. To do this a link is needed
between cortical maps; this is the function of the thalamo-cortical system. It is
through this primary consciousness that an individual entity is able to establish a
link between the sensory input, its motor response, and past rewards. It is,
however, "limited to a small memorial interval around a time chunk, the present"
(Edelman 1992: 122). Even if it were true that thalamo-cortical connections are
established during intra-uterine life, it sti11 would only mean the ability to
establish categories, and not the possession of higher-order consciousnesslself-
awareness. As Churchland put it:
The perceptual world is largely an unintelligible confusion to a newborn infant,
but its mind/brain sets about immediately to formulate a conceptual framework
with which to apprehend, to explain, and to anticipate that world ... It must set
about to learn the structure and activities of its inner states no less than those of
the external world (1999: 80).
3. Self-consciousness, Churchland writes (1999: 73) is "a kind of continuous
apprehension of an inner reality, the reality of one's mental states and activities".
In addition, this goes by degrees; it is a "learned component". Therefore, not
everyone has the same degree of self-consciousness, for it requires a "cognitive
advancement" (74).
4. What Edelman is saying is that a particular kind of biological organisation (not the
mere possession of nerve cells) is needed for mental processes; a specific
morphology is required for a specific function. What is special about the brain is
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how it is organised. A brain with a primary and a secondary "repertoire" has
limited categorical abilities and responses. The fine-tuning of a primary repertoire
into a secondary repertoire depends on how signals manage to construct a
structure able to self-organise continuously through global mapping. In order to
arrive at a higher brain function, a higher-order consciousness, three functions
need to be integrated: (i) perceptual categorisation (the ability to conceptualise, to
attribute a meaning to a perception); (ii) memory (the ability to store concepts for
a certain amount of time, a sense of time past and future); and (iii) learning (the
ability to cope with new situations). Linguistic capacity (the ability to
communicate) is also a feature that distinguishes being with higher-order
consciousness from those with primary consciousness.
5. A being with primary consciousness is a being that lacks a concept of self, past
and future; it lives in the remembered present. Such an entity needs a brain
structure that satisfies the basic vegetative functions (the brain stem that regulates
autonomous bodily functions) and a "value system" - that is, the limbic system
that is involved in consummatory, sexual, and aggressive/defensive behaviour
patterns. Primary consciousness and the concept of remembered present provide
the entity with only a "picture of biological identity" (Edelman 1992: 133); and "it
is what one may presume to be possessed by some nonlinguistic and nonsemantic
animals" (112). According to Edelman, most mammals and some birds may have
primary consciousness (122); chimpanzees "appear to have some elements of a
higher-order consciousness - that is, some elements of a self-concept" (125).
6. Proprioception is the sense of one's body configuration. It is the awareness of the
position of one's limbs in space. For Paul Churchland (1999: 119), proprioception
"is one form of self-perception", and (arguably) "perhaps this already constitutes a
primitive and isolated form of self-consciousness".
7. Nociception is the ability to perceive and transmit noxious, painful, harmful or
injurious stimuli (from the Latin, nocere, noceo: to hurt, to injure, to inflict pain).
Pain elicits two very different kinds of response. One is reflex withdrawal, as
when touching a hot object; the other is immobilisation, protecting the affected
part from being further injured by movement (Carpenter 1996: 84).
8. The tendon jerk response is an example of "monosynaptic reflex arc". A primary
afferent fibre carries an impulse from stretch receptors in a muscle synapse
excitatorily with a motor neuron in the ventral hom of the spinal cord, whose axon
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returns to innervate the same muscle from which the afferent fibre came. Tapping
the tendon of the muscle (the patellar tendon) causes a brief stretch of the sensory
ending, firing an la fibre, which then excites the motor neuron and causes a reflex
twitch of the muscle (Carpenter 1996: 57).
9. It is not clear what Sumner means by "first vertebrates". Is it amphioxus, the first
known vertebrate and ancestor of the lower vertebrates (fishes, reptiles,
amphibians) (see Chapter 4), or is it the class of lower vertebrates as we know
them? Whatever the case may be, lower vertebrates do not possess a forebrain in
the sense referred to by Sumner. The most primitive vertebrates possess an
elongated central ganglion (a cluster of cells) running the length of the spine, and
connected to the rest of the body by somatosensory and motor fibres (i.e. a
primitive spinal cord). This, progressively, developed into a "primitive brain"
where the forebrain is mainly involved in olfaction, the midbrain in vision and
audition, and the hindbrain in coordination of motor activity. This is what the
brain of a fish is like. In amphibians and reptiles, the forebrain starts dominating;
more than mere olfaction, it serves to integrate all sensory modalities. It is only
with early mammals that the cerebral hemispheres and the cerebellum become
prominent (Churchland 1999: 127).
10. Edelman's concept of reentry plays a central role in the function of higher brains.
It is "the ongoing recursive dynamic interchange of signals occurring in parallel
between maps that continually interrelates these maps to each other in space and
time" (1999: 72). Reentry is the concept that helps to understand how brain
anatomy relates to brain physiology (71), or "how the selectional events of
development and experience connect psychology to physiology" (1992: 84).
Through reentry, perception and behaviour are integrated as a unity; it allows the
signals to be integrated in a global mapping.
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Simplified representation of Edelman's Neural Darwinism.
Somatic selectionDevelopment of
species
Inheritance: Genes
Synaptic connectivityInitial anatomy
of the brain:PROTOMAP
STRENGTHENING .-.- SELECTIONAL PROCESS ...WEAKENING
(COMPETITION/CONSTRAINTS)
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11. If "first vertebrates" are sentient (Sumner's claim), and if first vertebrates are in
fact what we call lower vertebrates (fishes, reptiles, and amphibians), it seems
inconsistent to claim that "early fetuses" are "pre-sentient". The human so-called
pre-sentient embryo/fetus possesses a brain structure that easily compares with
that of lower vertebrates. If the possession of sentience is a matter of brain
structure/anatomy, it is inconsistent to deny sentience to one category (pre-
sentient fetuses) and to attribute it to another category with a similar brain
development.
12. The concept of viability has changed. Traditionally the limit was set at a
gestational age of 28 weeks. Progress in neonatology, linked to progress in
technology, has advanced viability to a gestational age of 24 weeks from
conception. This, obviously, applies essentially to first-world conditions.
13. See chapter 3 Table 1: note 14.
14. "Mammals and birds have the basic nervous system" is quite a controversial
statement. Furthermore, what is the meaning of "basic nervous system"? Although
mammals and birds are vertebrates, it is likely that birds have evolved from the
early reptiles and that their brains have commonalities. Mammals are defined as
vertebrates whose females possess milk-secreting glands for the nourishment of
the young - that is, humans, primates, rodents, whales, bats, porcupines, lemurs,
marsupials, etc. On the other hand, mammals are to be separated into lower
mammals (e.g., porcupines) and higher mammals (primates). Only amongst
mammals, the difference between brains is very conspicuous (Kahle et al.1996:
196-197; Churchland 1999: 128-129;Lazorthes 1999:45).
15.Edelman's TNGS states that the brain results from neuronal group selection. In the
process of the evolution of animals, differences in adaptation to the environment
resulted in differences in reproductive processes leading to changes in the
frequencies of genes in the population. Differential reproduction and heredity
enhance the likelihood that the traits that increase fitness will be preserved (1992:
42). Neural Darwinism, he says, states that "evolutionarily selected value patterns
help the brain and the body [to] maintain the conditions necessary to continue life"
(94). This happens as follows: "a small loop consisting of the events of neural
group selection leads to diverse phenotypic behaviour in different individuals of a
species that provide the basis of ongoing natural selection in the grand loop of
evolution" (97).
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16. The "higher brain" is the brain that has the ability to carry out all the functions of
the primary and secondary repertoire through interconnection or reentry. Higher
brain functions include speech, thought, reasoning, complex movement patterns,
planning, emotions, music, etc. (Edelman 1992: 17). This requires mapping of the
cerebral cortex (19) through external stimuli (109). Edelman acknowledges that
amongst nonhuman animals, apes and cetaceans may possess some degree of
higher-order consciousness. Like Paul Chuchland (see note 2), he does not believe
that fetuses and infants do possess self-consciousness (109).
17. See appendix 4.
7 Utilitarianism and moral theory on sentience revisited
1. Aristotle in the Eudaimian Ethics: 1216 a Il.
2. Cognitivist meta-ethics is the discussion of the nature of ethical concepts; it views
ethical concepts as prescriptive. Non-cognitivist meta-ethics sees ethical
commitments as an expression of the attitudes of the moral agent, a form of
subjectivism. Or, in other words, our ethical principles depend on our attitudes
and preferences; they are subjective, personal decisions (Smart & Williams 1973:
3).
3. A kind of blend of deontological and eonsequentialist moral theory like
Beauchamp and Childress.
4. Another kind of blend of deontological and eonsequentialist moral theory, but
with a fundamental difference that each case should be judged on its own merits.
Amongst all variations on the theme of utilitarianism, I would be inclined to
consider it as the best suited to deal with the abortion dilemma. The rule could be:
respect life in all of its manifestations. In a particular case where a pregnancy was
not the result of lightheadedness or negligence, and where the continuation of the
pregnancy would result in serious emotional, physical, social, or economical
consequences, it can be considered that abortion would not be a form of
disrespect for a potential life. I am not sure whether this would be different from
a virtue ethics approach, or from an ethics of care.
5. See Chapter 4 on sentience.
6. See Holmes Rolston III view on all living entities (e.g., respect for trees).
7. See Chapter 7 on pain vs. suffering
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8. There are different techniques of sterilisation. With laparoscopic sterilisation, a
ring or a clip is placed on each Fallopian tube. When a laparotomy is performed,
a loop of tube is tied off and the loop is excised. Whatever the method there is a
failure rate of 0.0 to 0.3%. Good medical practice requires that the woman be
informed about this minimal but real risk.
9. Current statistics (Benagiano & Pera 2000) show that the legalisation of abortion
does reduce the number of abortions, and that in countries where abortion is still
illegal the number of illegal (or unsafe) abortion far outnumbers the legal
abortion rates. For instance, Belgium (where abortion is legal since the early 90s)
has one of the lowest numbers of abortions, i.e. 6 per 1000 women per year. Peru
(with severely restrictive abortion laws) has almost ten times more (56/1000). As
emphasised by the authors, "there is no question that contraception is the
cornerstone of the fight to reduce abortion". In developing countries (where the
number of abortions remains high), they argue, "education is the key". This
requires a political commitment, training of providers of family planning
services, and educational programs for consumers.
10. Abortion is either spontaneous or induced. Spontaneous abortions are classified
clinically into threatened, inevitable, incomplete, and recurrent. Induced abortions
(viz., termination of pregnancy, TOP) result in complete or incomplete abortions.
See also note 1 Chapter 1.
11. In Japan, abortion is widely practiced as a method of "family planning". It is
customary that after an abortion, women hang an ex voto in shrines designated for
that purpose.
12. See Abortion on Trial, Again. The Supreme Court will decide whether bans on
some procedures threaten a woman's right to choose, by Viveca Novak. Time,
May 1,2000 p.25. See also note 3 Chapter 2.
13. According to Schenker & Cain (1999), half of pregnancies are unintended, and
half of the unintended end in termination. Worldwide there are 50 million
abortions per annum; half of them are unsafe and occur mostly in countries where
abortion is illegal. At least 75 000 women die each year from unsafe abortion.
The Fédération Internationale de Gynécologie Obstétrique (or FIGO) Committee
for the Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction and Women's Health recognises
that the provision of termination of pregnancy services is justified by 1) a
woman's right to autonomy; and 2) the need to prevent unsafe abortion. In its
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recommendation 5.1.4, the Committee recognises that doctors' autonomy (viz.,
the right to conscientious objection) should be respected, but emphasises the
obligation to refer abortion seekers to an institution where the service would be
rendered. According to Jonathan Glover (1990: 153), "Pursuit of personal ideals
is a large but bounded part of morality, and in desperate cases the right action can
be the one that most revolts you. The cultivation of your own character is
something that should sometimes take second place to the plight of others". Cook
and Dickens (1999) acknowledge that conscience is a right of individuals, but not
of institutions such as hospitals. In countries where abortion is legal, they say,
"legislation usually leaves implicit that institutions responsible for provision of
health services on which inhabitants of their region rely must meet their duties by
employing adequate staff to deliver them, while respecting individual's right of
conscientious objection". They mention that the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has criticised countries
that have allowed healthcare providers' conscientious objection to deny women
timely access to legal abortion services. They further emphasise that "states
proposing reduction in maternal mortality due to unsafe abortion by liberalising
laws on access to safe services assume ethical and legal responsibilities to ensure
that services are accessible in fact". In South Africa, the Act makes provision for
penalties against whoever, in public health institutions, would obstruct the
delivery of abortion services.
8 Poststructural neurophilosophy
1. Roger Lewin (1997: 133-134) writes: "The image of an ordered world, with
organisms arranged from the 'lower' to the 'highest' is found in Plato and the
Order of Creation in Genesis, and later in the 'Great Chain of Being' of pre-
Darwinian times. But this is not biologically meaningful. It only reflects what
in people's mind is an evolution of simple to complex forms". This view is
also reflected in Darwin's gradualism. The classification of animals according
to their similarities was the work of Carolus Linneaus' Systema Naturae. It is
still used today. There are 32 phyla today; vertebrates are only one of them. It
is estimated that today's earth harbours between 10 and 100 million species
(Kauffman 1995: 199,208). There is 40,000 species of vertebrates: 25,000 of
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them are fishes, 8,000 are birds, and 6,000 mammals (Lewin 1997: 145). The
concept of 'lower' and 'higher' animals reflects a "brain-centric" view of
evolution. Nevertheless, we should acknowledge the reality of biology. The
brain of an oyster, says Colin McGinn (quoted in Lewin 1997: 167), (this is to
be taken as an alJegory, since the oyster has no brain) is limited in what it can
encompass, but so too is that of a rat, a monkey and a human. On the other
hand, we don't hear ultrasounds nor see ultra-violet and infra-red light for
simple biological reasons (167).
2. The concept of distributed representation is discussed in detail by Cilliers
(1998: 69-74). Against the traditional view on representation of formal
symbols in logical relationship, distributed representation involves the
following main claims. Information is not stored but reconstructed each time it
is activated (i.e. objects in the world are not represented in the brain). Training
is a major component (i.e. the brain is not pre- and hard-wired). The system
resists damage (i.e. no single node has any specific significance, it is the
connectivity that supports the function of the network even when a specific
node is damaged).
3. According to Paul Churchland (1999: 80), the perceptual world is largely an
unintelligible confusion to a newborn infant. Against Thomas Nagel view that
even the most advanced neurophysiological knowledge will never provide
access to qualia, Churchland argues that young and unpractised ears hear
music as "undivided wholes without structure". Only musical education wiIl
change this into "groups of discriminate notes" (65). In other words, our sense
perception needs experience and education; the internalisation of our sense
perceptions (the qualia) equally make progress. The way a music composer or
interpreter hears music is of a different quality from the lay-person.
4. In Per Bak's (1991) sand pile, the size of the avalanche is not related to the
size of the grains of sand. A single grain of sand may cause a small or a large
avalanche - the theory of self-organised criticality.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. The sequence of appearance in evolution of the encephalic
and cortical structures.
Encephalic structure
1.Centrencephalon:
paleoencephalon (limbic brain)
2.Archencephalon:
-hypothalamus
-hindbrain
3. Neoencephalon: forebrain
Cortical structure
1. Paleocortex: rhinencephalon
2.Archicortex ~ hippocampus
3. Neocortex
In the evolution of animal species (phylogenesis) as well as during the embryologic
development (organogenesis), what appears first are the centreneephalon and the
paleocortex. The centreneephalon is composed of the paleoencephalon (the limbic
brain) and the archencephalon (the hindbrain or brain stem, and the hypothalamus, a
component of the llimbic brain). The paleocortex is the origin of the olfactory system.
The striatum is also composed of a more primitive portion, the paleostriatum (globus
pallidus), and a more recent portion, the neostriatum (putamen, caudate and lentiform
nuclei). Finally, Vogt's taxonomy is worth mentioning (even if no longer fully
accepted)(Kahle et al. 1996). He subdivided the cerebral cortex into: 1) the isocortex
(i.e. the homotopic or homogenie cortex, or neocortex, with six cell layers); 2) the
allocortex (i.e. the heterotopic or primordial cortex, with less than six layers); and 3)
the juxtallocortex (i.e. an intermediate between the neocortex and the primordial
cortex, located in the ventral part of the cingulum, and the entorhinal area of the
parahippocampal gyrus, called the periarchicortex)(Kahle et al. 1996: 228). The point
is that we have to distinguish brain from brain, and cortex from cortex.
The class of the vertebrates (phylum Chordata) includes fishes, amphibians,
reptiles, birds, and mammals. Lower vertebrates (fishes, reptiles, and amphibians)
possess only an archencephalon. Lower mammals exhibit a paleoencephalon (its
surface is smooth with no sulci or gyri). Only higher mammals have a neoencephalon
and a neocortex (with convolutions). During intrauterine life of humans the same
sequence is followed - that is, the development of the brain starts with the hindbrain.
A relatively complete structure of the forebrain is not acquired before the fifth month
of intrauterine life.
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Appendix 2. Neurotransmitters
About fifty neurotransmitters have been identified in the human brain, either
inhibitory or excitatory (Changeux 1998: 148). The main neurotransmitters are
acetylcholine, the monoamines, the neuropeptides, and the amino acids. The
monoamines comprise dopamine, noradrenalin (or norepinephrin), and serotonin (or
5-0H-tryptamine). They activate the monoaminergic (or cholinergic, or adrenergic)
receptors of the sympathetic nervous system. The main neuropeptides are (3-
endorphins and enkephalins; their functions are not yet fully understood (Carpenter
1996: 87). Some of the opiate receptors are located in areas related to pain
(centromedian nucleus), and othrs are not (striatum). Gamma-aminobutyric acid
(GABA) is an amino acid and an inhibitory neurotransmitter (is decreased in
epilepsy).
Each of the main neurotransmitters acts on what is called a diffuse modulatory
system (OMS) - that is, an area within the central nervous system on which a
neurotransmitter influences a preferential or predominant action. In this manner,
neurotransmitters occupy central maps of positively (stimulation) or negatively
(inhibition) reinforcing sites and projections to the midbrain and forebrain (Changeux
1998). Figure 8 (see appendix 3) illustrates the differents DMSs. The dopaminergic
DMS, located in the substantia nigra and in the ventral tegmental area (i.e., in the
truncus cerebri, at the junction between the pons and the pedunculi cerebri), fans out
to the frontal cortex, the limbic cortex, and the corpus striatum (i.e., the nucleus
caudatus and putamen of the telencephalon). The noradrenergic DMS, located in the
nucleus locus ceruleus of the mesencephalon (midbrain), fans out to the entire
cerebral cortex, the thalamus, the cerebellum, and the spinal cord. The serotonergic
DMS, located in the raphe nuclei of the medulla oblongata, fans out to the entire
central nervous system. Finally, the cholinergic DMS, located in the brain stem and
the base of the forebrain, fans out to the entire cortex, the hippocampus, and the
thalamus (Changeux 1998;Kahle et al. 1996).
A number of neurological and psychiatric diseases have been linked to
dysfunctions in neurotransmission in the form of hyperactivity or hypoactivity. For
instance, schizophrenia is attributed to an overactivity of the dopaminergic system
that can be improved by antipsychotic drugs that decrease the levels of dopamine.
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Globus (1995: 97), however, sees schizophrenia rather as a kind of hypofrontality, a
decreased tuning of system constraint. Parkinson's disease, on the other hand, is a
state of hypoactivity of the dopaminergic system that can be improved by drugs
stimulating the production of dopamine. Alzheimer's disease is a condition of
cholinergic hypoactivity. Serotonergic hypoactivity results in depression and sleep
disturbances. Finally, serotonergic hyperactivity is said to be involved in autism
(Berkow et al., 1992: 2656; Lazorthes 1999: 157).
Appendix 3. See pictorials.
Appendix 4. The main role players in the central nervous system.
Brain (encephalon, or cerebrum) refers to the parts derived from the
telencephalon; brainstem refers to the parts derived from the mesencephalon
(midbrain) and rhombencephalon (hindbrain). The telencephalon (the anterior part of
the prosencephalon) produces the olfactory bulbs, the cortex, the subcortical
telencephalic nuclei, and the basal ganglia. The diencephalon (the posterior part of the
prosencephalon) produces the thalamus and the hypothalamus.
4.1. The hypothalamus
The hypothalamus is one of the four components of the diencephalon (the
three others are the epithalamus, the subthalamus, and the dorsal thalamus )(see figurs
8 and 9 of appendix 3). The hypothalamus is the lower part of the diencephalon where
the hypophysis arises. It is composed of four nuclei: the nucleus supraopticus, the
nucleus paraventricularis, the tuber cinereum (i.e., the nucleus ventromedialis,
dorsomedialis, and infundibularis), and the mammillary bodies (Kahle et al. 1996:
186). It receives afferents from the cerebellum, the limbic system, and the thalamus. It
sends efferents to the same structures as well as to the hypophysis.
The hypothalamus serves as the control centre for vegetative functions (the
autonomic nervous system), and it regulates the instinctive activities aimed at
conservation that possess emotional overtones such as desire, denial, fear, and anger.
Because of its connections with the hypophysis, the hypothalamus plays a role in the
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regulation of the endocrine syse=tem. In Carpenter's (1996: 278) words, "the
hypothalamus determines all we do". It is the place where the basic and fundamental
inputs (those regulating the milieu intérieur) and outputs (control of the pituitary)
come together since it is at the interface between the blood and the brain and so
coordinates external stimuli and responses. It links internal and external stimuli to
internal and external responses as a "need detector and a response generator". In
humans, abnormalities of its function (congenital or acquired) result either in
precocious puberty or gonadic atrophy, and in obesity or cachexy.
4.2. The Thalamus
The thalamus (from the Greek: thalamos, bedroom) is one of the four
components of the diencephalon; the epithalamus, the subthalamus, and dorsal
thalamus are the three others. It operates as a relay for sensory and motor afferents to
the cortex; it also exhibits connections with the associative cortex - that is, parts of
the cortex that are neither sensory nor motor, but make connections between the
various cortical areas. The dorsal thalamus is the end-point of the sensory system of
the cutaneous, taste, optic, and acoustic pathways. The anterior and the dorso-lateral
thalamic nuclei connect with the limbic brain. The median nuclei connect with the
frontal cortex. The lateral nuclei connect with the parietal lobe. Some of the venral
nuclei connect with the motor and the sensory cortex, and others with the visual and
auditory cortex.
It is through the ventral thalamic nuclei and the anterior thalamic fibres that
somatic inputs are integrated and transmitted to the frontal cortex. This pathway is
involved in how we are aware of our moods. (Moods are largely influenced by
unconscious stimuli from the visceral and somatic sphere)(Kahle et al., 1996: 170).
The electrical stimulation of the ventrobasal thalamus produces a pricking pain
(also called first pain, which provokes withdrawal); the stimulation of the central
thalamus provokes a sense of intense unpleasantness (Carpenter 1996: 85).
Thalamotomy - the stereotaxic destruction of selective portions of the thalamus - is
practised to relieve pain, or involutary movements, or epilepsy, or emotional
disturbances (Stedman 1997: 876).
4.3. The Limbic System
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The limbic (from the Latin: limbus, edge) system was identified as such only
in 1953 (Rey 1995: 328). It has received a number of nicknames, such as visceral
brain, affective brain, and emotional brain. These point to the view that this part of
the brain is involved in the emotional overtones of animal behaviour. In evolutionary
terms, the limbic brain is called the paleoencephalon; together with the
archencephalon (the hypothalamus and the hindbrain), the limbic system belongs to
the centrencephalon. Reptiles possess an archencephalon, but lower mammals (e.g.,
the porcupine) possess a limbic brain. Only higher mammals are endowed with a
neoencephalon (Lazorthes 1999:65).
The limbic system is a heterogeneous array of brain structures situated at the
edge of the medial wall of the cerebral hemispheres. It has telencephalic and
diencephalic components. It is composed of nuclei, cortical areas, and fibre tracts. The
limbic nuclei comprise the amygdala (corpora amygdaloidea), the septal nuclei (the
so-called "pleasure centres"), the mammillary bodies, and the hypothalamus. The
limbic cortical areas are the hippocampal (from the Greek: hippocampus, seahorse)
gyrus, the cingulate (from the Latin: cingulum, girdle) gyrus, and (to some extent)
some parts of the olfactory cortex. The limbic nuclei and limbic cortical areas are
connected by fibre tracts (Carpenter 1996: 258). The limbic convolution, also called
gyrus cinguli or cingulum, consists of an associative system that links up the different
lobes of the brain. It has connections with the hypothalamus, the thalamus, the
mammillary bodies (the posterior part of the hypothalamus), and the frontal cortex
(Fig.lO). The limbic convolution connects with the hypothalamus through three
pathways: 1) the fornix to the preoptic area and the tuber cinereum; 2) the stria
terminalis to the tuber cinereum; and 3) ventral fibers of the corpora amydaloidea.
The projection from the amygdala is involved in two types of emotion: conservation
(withdrawal) and arousal (positive emotional drive) (281). The limbic system
influences the primitive vital processes aimed at survival (hence, the emotional
overtones) such as eating, digesting, and reproducing. The cingulum sends
information to the hippocampus (involved in the process of memory) and to the
amygdala (involved in emotions). The limbic system and its most important
component, the hippocampus, activate the cortex through the reticulate substance
whenever an emotional signal appears (Lazorthes 1999: 102). Broadly speeking, it
can be said that the limbic system's main concerns are the integration of emotions,
motivation, and the control of the milieu intérieur (Carpenter 1996:259).
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In animals, the selective electrical stimulation of specific areas of the
cingulum produces anger, hyperphagia, micturition, defecation, or retreat. In humans,
it produces relaxation. Cingulectomy (i.e.,the removal of the limbic system)
significantly decreases aggressive behaviour; it also produces indifference to
intractable pain. The stimulation of the septal nuc1ei (the "pleasure centres") produces
euphoria (Kahle et al.,1996: 306). The electrical stimulation of some areas of the
dorso-medial thalamus, hypothalamus, or amygdala evokes avoidance/withdrawal
(perhaps this results from the production of pain, but it has not been
ascertained)(Carpenter 1996: 282).
4.4. The Frontal Cortex
The brain hemispheres are subdivided into four cerebral lobes: frontal,
parietal, temporal, and occipital. The frontal lobes extend from the frontal pole (i.e.,
the most anterior part corresponding to the forehead) to the sulcus eentralis of
Rolando (or central sulcus). The pre-frontal cortex (i.e., the anterior lower part of the
frontal lobe) exists only in humans. It is constituted of associative cells that connect
all the areas of the brain (Lazorthes 1999: 102). It receives afferents from the thalamic
dorsomedialis nucleus that, in tum, receives fibres back from the frontal lobe and
from the limbic system (Carpenter 1996: 249). The left prefrontal cortex is involved
in planning and the right one in interpersonal relations. As Kinsboume (1998: 238)
put it: the prefrontal cortex is not a "general executive", it enables the individual "to
overcome primitive preprogrammed responding when that would be maladaptative".
Catecholaminergic neurons, and more precisely the dopamine-
mesocorticoJimbic neurons from the ventral tegmental area of the midbrain, project in
the prefrontal cortex and the nucleus accumbens of the limbic system. The latter
contribute to and playa role in emotions, hedonic pleasure, and memory. The former
contribute to motivation, planning, temporal organisation of behaviour, attention, and
social behaviour. They are the "reward circuits in the brain" (Changeux 1998: 159).
The electrical stimulation of the amygdala provokes either anger and fear, or
relaxation depending on the mood of the subject before the initiation of the stimulus
(Kahle et al. 1996). The electrical stimulation of the somatosensory cortex (behind the
central sulcus) in conscious human subjects rarely induces pain (Carpenter 1996: 84).
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The first reported case of accidental frontal lobotomy or leukotomy is that of
American mining engineer, Phineas Gage. Working in a mine, in 1848, he sufferend
from a head injury when a crowbar perforated his skull. The most remarkable
consequence was that Gage became generally indifferent, but mainly to pain. A
similar case was that of Elliott VR who underwent the surgical resection of the
ventromedial part of the frontal lobes. He became unable to plan for the long-term; he
lost the sense of what is socially proper and the ability to defer instant gratification
(Changeux & Ricoeur 2000: 196).
Gage's accident was at the origin of what became known as frontal lobotomy,
first carried out surgically (by severing the connections between the prefrontal cortex
and the rest of the brain) and eventually pharmacologically. It is practised especially
for intractable pain. It results not so much in the Joss of the knowledge of pain, but
rather in the loss of its emotional aspect. This could perhaps be explained, as
Carpenter (1996: 250) suggests: "by stripping pain of its meaning for the future, we
also relieve its emotional threat". In experimental so-called "frontal" animals (i.e.,
they do not possess the equivalent of the human prefrontal cortex), leukotomy results
in the inability to store a program of action for deferred use.
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Figure 11. Simplified schematic view of the afferents and efferents of the limbic
system.
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Appendix 5. Sensory modalities and sensory systems
According to RHS Carpenter, lecturer in neurophyioslogy at the University of
Cambridge, "our cutaneous sensory world is vastly richer than the pathetic number of
'modalities' derived from studies of skin fibers" (1996: 74). The exteroceptive sense
relates to the perception of stimulation by external agents. The skin may sense
physical effects (e.g., pain, tickle, and softness). Nociceptors belong to the poorly
myelinated protopathic sensory system; they receive and transmit painful or injurious
stimuli through the spinothalamic tract of the spinal cord to the sensory cortex.
Proprioceptors perceive the movements and position of the body. They belong to the
heavily myelinated epicritical sensory system that also senses tactile and vibratory
stimuli. There are many different types of sensory receptors in the skin: the Pacinian
corpuscles (respond to deformation, pressure), Meissner's corpuscles (respond to
mechanical stimuli, Merckel's discs (respond to light touch)( appear around the 20th
week of intrauterine life), Ruffini's endings (proprioreceptors ), encapsulated endings
(sensitive to cold), and free endings (sensitive to warmth, pain, and mechanical
stimuli)(75).
The stimulus of Pacinian, Meissner, Merckel, and Ruffini receptors travels to
the spinal cord through large (wit fast conduction speed) Af3 nerve fibers. The
stimulation of the nociceptive receptors of the skin (free and encapsulated endings)
travels through A3 and C fibres. The A3 fibres of first pain or immediate feeling are
large and have a fast conduction; their stimulation is followed by withdrawal. The C
fibres of second pain are slow; their stimulation is followed by immobilisation.
Visceral pain is also conducted by C fibres (84). A sensation of pain may be caused
by tissue damage (noxious stimulus) that is sensed by nociveptors; yet, many kinds of
pain are not associated with tissue damage at all. In addition, says Carpenter,
The sensation of pain is itself very complex ... the degree of pain that is feit
depends to a large extent on the emotional state and on the meaning that pain
may have (e.g. frontal leucotomy). Sensing the pain is not the same as feeling
the pain (85).
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Appendix 6. The loci involved with pain in the central nervous system.
The following is known from animal experiments with stereotaxic electrical
stimulation of specific areas, from congenital and acquired lesions of specific brain
areas in humans, as well as from electrical destruction or stimulation of specific areas
of the human brain (e.g., electroconvulsive therapy).
1. Hypothalamus. Abnormalities result mainly III preCOCIOUSpuberty or gonadal
atrophy, and/or in obesity or cachexy.
2. Thalamus. In humans, the stimulation of the ventral region evokes first pain
(pricking pain). Stimulation of the central region evokes a feeling of intense
unpleasantness. Stimulation of the dorso-medial region causes withdrawal (a
reaction that usually follows the sensation of first pain). Mesencephalotomy
(involving the section of the spinothalamic tract) relieves intractable pain.
3. Limbic system. Stimulation of the cingulum in humans produces relaxation.
Cingulectomy for intractable pain results in indifference to pain; the pain persists
though. Stimulation of the septal nuclei ("pleasure centre") produces euphoria.
Stimulation of the amygdala induces either relaxation or anger and fear,
depending on the mood of the subject prior to the stimulation. In animals, unlike
humans, the stimulation of mentioned areas induces different and sometimes
opposite reactions.
4. Prefrontal cortex. Leukotomy for intractable pain, like cingulectomy, results in
indifference to pain. "Leukotomy" in animals (a misnomer since they have no
prefrontal cortex) is followed by the loss of the ability for planning.
In sum, a sensation of pain can be evoked by stimulation of the thalamus. A present
pain cannot be taken away by any procedure (with the exception of
mesencephalotomy); only the emotional affect can. The prefrontal cortex plays a
predominant role in the processing of pain affect (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Diagrammatic brain 'map' of the loci involved in pain and emotions.
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